Vučić’s ‘wishlist’ for Kosovo: A year after Serbia’s failed attempt to annex northern Mitrovica

A few days before the one-year anniversary of the terrorist attack in Banjska, which resulted in the death of a Kosovo police sergeant and three Serbian attackers affiliated with the terrorist group, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić once again sought to dramatize the situation for the Serbian opinion. On September 13 of this year, he held a conference he had preemptively announced 72 hours earlier. Vučić frequently resorts to the phrase “I will address the people” whenever a significant political challenge arises, deliberately prolongs the tense situation for several hours, only to appear and reiterate the same old falsehoods. 

After failing to annex the northern part of Kosovo through the attack on Banjska, Vucic clearly is trying to continue to manipulate the Serbian citizens of Kosovo. The Banjska attack is believed to have been orchestrated by the Serbian state in an attempt to annex the northern part of Mitrovica. In the place of the event, in addition to heavy weaponry, images and documents were confiscated that implicate the Serbian state with the terrorist group that carried out the attack, the leader of which is the former vice-president of the Serbian List, Milan Radoicic. Radoičić, who has admitted responsibility for the attack, is known for his close association with Vučić.

Meanwhile, the Serbian community in Kosovo continues to be exploited by Vučić’s government, to the extent that in 2021, the Serbian population in Kosovo was encouraged to boycott Kosovo institutions in an organized manner. A year later, the Serbian state offered them a “special work commitment contract,” a type of contract not recognized under Serbian labor law and clearly not intended for long-term employment. Serbs who refuse to comply with Vučić’s boycott orders are often labeled as traitors or accused of disloyalty to the Serbian government.

As anticipated, Vučić did not provide any substantive new insights at the recent conference for those who had coordinated their resignations from Kosovo’s institutions. Instead, he presented a series of demands framed as prerequisites for the Kosovo government to facilitate continued dialogue between the two nations. These demands include a return to the status the return of the situation before the so-called ‘unilateral’ decisions of Kosovo Government, the designation of Kosovo as an area under special social protection, the strengthening of Serbian institutions in Kosovo with a prohibition on their closure, the organization of new local elections in northern Kosovo, the reintegration of Serbs into the Kosovo Police and judiciary, and the withdrawal of special units of the Kosovo Police from northern Kosovo.

Vučić’s so-called “wishlist” appears to be a strategic move aimed at maintaining internal support, particularly among Kosovo Serbs who continue to place their trust in him. The Serbian government swiftly approved the measures proposed by Vučić and has ordered their implementation. Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević announced that a request would be submitted to the Serbian Assembly, seeking to declare as illegal any actions deemed to contravene the agreements between the negotiating parties, dating back to Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

From a legal standpoint, the Special Prosecutor’s Office of Kosovo has filed an indictment against 45 individuals, including Milan Radoičić, for their involvement in the armed attack in Banjska. Radoičić has long been sanctioned by the United States and the United Kingdom for his participation in international organized crime. At the end of last year, INTERPOL issued an arrest warrant for Radoičić, requested by Kosovo’s Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, in October, the High Court in Belgrade rejected the prosecutor’s request for Radoičić’s detention and released him. He is believed to be residing freely in Serbia.

Despite repeated calls from the international community to hold accountable those responsible for the Banjska attack, official Belgrade has thus far refused to accept responsibility. President Vučić has made only minimal references to his associate Radoičić, acknowledging his presence in Serbia a year ago. At the United Nations General Assembly, Vučić adopted a defensive tone, addressing issues ranging from NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to the ban on the circulation of the Serbian dinar in Kosovo. These efforts appear to be aimed at deflecting attention from the Banjska incident and the role of the Serbian state in the affair.

The recent closure of several Serbian parallel institutions by Kosovo authorities, which are considered unlawful and unconstitutional, has exacerbated tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. In addition to international pundits, Belgrade has labelled these actions as “criminal acts” intended to “expel the Serbs.” For unilateral and uncoordinated actions with European partners, Sanctions have been imposed on Kosovo from the European Union, on the other hand Serbia’s refusal to join the European Union’s sanctions against Russia has positioned it as a strategic tool in Russia’s efforts to destabilize the region. While Serbia officially claims to pursue EU membership, this goal increasingly appears to be a facade, one that allows Vučić to maintain favorable relations with both Western powers and Russia.