

MIGRATION AS A WEAPON

Turkey's Hybrid Warfare Against the European Union



IOANNIS E. KOTOULAS
WOLFGANG PUSZTAI



© 2020 Foreign Affairs Institute

Foreign Affairs Institute
91, Alexandras Avenue
Athens, 11474, GREECE

Follow FAINST:



fainst2



/fainst



FA Institute



Foreign Affairs Institute, Greece

MIGRATION AS A WEAPON

TURKEY'S HYBRID WARFARE
AGAINST
THE EUROPEAN UNION

IOANNIS E. KOTOULAS
WOLFGANG PUSZTAI



Abstract

Since February 29 and during March 2020 Greece, a strategically located country on the southern periphery of NATO and the European Union, faced an unprecedented event of state-sponsored mass movement of illegal migrants, an organized massive violation of its national borders and state sovereignty. This weaponization of migrant flows was part of an organized attempt of the Erdogan regime to undermine Greek state sovereignty in its border regions, and to exert diplomatic pressure on the EU. We examine the strategic use of migrant's flows in the context of strategic weaponization and the narratives of information warfare as part of a greater hybrid warfare of Turkey against Greece as a primary target, and the EU in general. We also review the alternatives considering effective management of mass migration towards the EU and submit relevant policy proposals.

Keywords

Hybrid warfare, migration, refugees, weaponization, Evros border, state sovereignty, information warfare, safe zones

Table of Contents

The 2020 Migration Crisis on the Greek-Turkish Border: State-sponsored Mass Migration and Hybrid Warfare	6
EU aid to Turkey	10
The Trigger and Erdogan's intentions	11
Response by the EU	13
Policy Implications and Proposals	14
Conclusions	18
Bibliography	20
Primary Documents	21
Media Outlets	21
Videos	23
About the Authors	24

1. The 2020 Migration Crisis on the Greek-Turkish Border: State-sponsored Mass Migration and Hybrid Warfare

Since February 29 and for the whole month of March until the radical outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, Greece, a strategically located country on the southern periphery of NATO and the European Union (EU), faced an unprecedented event of state-sponsored mass movement of illegal migrants, an organized massive violation of its national borders and state sovereignty initiated by Turkey.¹ Tens of thousands of illegal migrants that had resided for years in Turkey gathered along the land border that distinguishes Greece and Turkey in Thrace, approximately along the route of the Evros river.²

Numerous organized groups of illegal migrants have attempted to enter Greek national territory in a violent way attacking Greek policemen, border guards and military personnel.³ From Saturday the 29th of February, when the crisis first unfolded, until the end of March there were over 52,000 attempts to enter Greek territory illegally.⁴ 410 illegal migrants who

¹ Ioannis E. Kotoulas & Wolfgang Puztai, 'Turkey's War on the European Union', Al-Ahram Weekly 1493, 21-27/5/2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/369655.aspx>

² David Gauthier-Villars, 'Erdogan Says Turkey Won't Stop Migrants Streaming Into Europe', Wall Street Journal, 29/2/2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-says-turkey-wont-stop-migrants-streaming-into-europe-11582988372>.

³ Lefteris Papadimas & Alkis Konstantinidis, 'Migrants clash with Greek police at border after Turkey opens floodgates', Reuters, 1/3/2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-greece/migrants-clash-with-greek-police-at-border-after-turkey-opens-floodgates-idUSKBN2001EF>

⁴ '713 Migrants Were Stopped from Entering Greek Territory' [in Greek], Proto Thema, 16/3/2020, <https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/984967/metanasteutiko-apetrapi-i-eisodos-se-713-metanastes-ton-evro/>

violated the border were arrested and 50 of them have been sentenced to 4 years in prison and a 10,000 euros fine each for illegal border crossing. Of those sentenced none came from Syria, a telling fact for the character of the crisis event. The vast majority of the migrants on the border originated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and sub-Saharan countries. These migrants have lived in Turkey for years, as their knowledge of Turkish language shows. Greece faced a massive state-sponsored influx but defended EU borders - for the time being - with success.

The Turkish army, gendarmerie and police participated in this unlawful behavior against the personnel of an EU country. The implication of Turkish authorities has been verified by findings of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND); these indicate that the Turkish government purposely incited the riots against Greek personnel on the border region by planting members of its security services among crowds of migrants.⁵ Turkish policemen used tear gas against Greek security forces, the Turkish army attempted to bring down a part of the Greek border fence using a vehicle and electric saw,⁶ while Turkish soldiers had been deployed on the border preventing migrants to return to the interior of the Turkish territory.⁷ Many of the illegal migrants were organized into groups and mode of action by Turkish police and military.⁸ In some cases, the illegal migrants

⁵ 'Türkei steuerte Ansturm auf griechische Grenze', Bild, 27/3/2020,

<https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/fluechtlingskrise-medienbericht-tuerkei-steuerte-ansturm-auf-griechische-grenze-69663368.bild.html>

⁶ 'Turkey uses EU-paid vehicles to tear down the fence in Evros', Proto Thema, 8/3/2020,

<http://en.protothema.gr/turkey-uses-eu-paid-vehicles-to-tear-down-the-fence-in-evros-videos-photos/>.

⁷ 'Turkish police bolster Greek border to stop migrants' return', Al-Jazeera, 6/3/2020,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/turkish-police-bolster-greek-border-stop-migrants-return-200305114014230.html>.

⁸ Mehdi Chebil, 'Evros river crossing: 'Turkey sends migrants there at night, Greece pushes them back at dawn'', Infomigrants, 9/3/2020, <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/23304/evros-river-crossing-turkey-sends-migrants-there-at-night-greece-pushes-them-back-at-dawn>. See also the videos: 'Migrants gather around Turkish officers', <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfHJPG6aHf0>;

<https://twitter.com/i/status/1236629350050598912>; <https://twitter.com/i/status/1236597221702930432>;

<https://www.facebook.com/KastanCity/videos/2554872591425836/>.

had been transported to the borders by the Turkish authorities themselves with rented buses. Turkish state media showed live broadcasts of the attempted influx in order to persuade more migrants to head for Greece⁹ and pinpointed the exact location of land and sea routes towards EU territory thus facilitating the outflow of illegal migrants towards the EU.¹⁰



Turkish coast guards help migrants following a failed attempt to cross to the Greek island of Lesbos, on the waters of the North Aegean Sea, off the shores of Canakkale, Turkey, March 6, 2020. REUTERS/Umit Bektas

Finally, Turkey used and still uses extensively psychological ops and black propaganda in the context of a real hybrid war against Greece and the EU in general. Ungrounded accusations made by Turkish officials and even by President Erdogan himself include the allegation that Greek military and policemen have caused the death of five Syrian migrants, a

⁹ Matina Stevis-Gridneff & Patrick Kingsley, 'Turkey, Pressing E.U. for Help in Syria, Threatens to Open Borders to Refugees', The New York Times, 28/2/2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/world/europe/turkey-refugees-Greece-erdogan.html>.

¹⁰ Ismaeel Nar, 'Turkish state-owned TRT Arabic posts map showing refugees' path to France', Al Arabiya English, 29/2/2020, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/television-and-radio/2020/02/29/Turkish-state-owned-TRT-Arabic-posts-map-showing-refugees-path-to-France.html>.

totally unfounded claim that has been not verified by any international media outlet.¹¹ These and other fabricated stories are part of Turkey's hybrid warfare on the level of information.

Attempts to illegally enter Greek territory were postponed due to the outbreak of the Coronavirus crisis in late March and most migrants left the border area. The Turkish authorities removed the remaining around 5,800 migrants from the Greek-Turkish border due to pandemic concerns. Still, Turkish authorities insist on the renewal of the demographic engineering and strategic use of migration flows. Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu effectively said in a TV interview in late March that once the Coronavirus crisis is over, Turkey shall once again allow the movement of migrants towards the Greek border.¹² Greece brought the issue to NATO, accusing Turkey during an online NATO conference on April 2 of directing an orchestrated and unprecedented attack on its border and of a disinformation campaign. Greece accused Turkey of resorting to methods that violate the inherent values of NATO and emphasized that all so-called allies have the right to call for NATO's solidarity, but only if they honor their commitments.¹³

On March 1, 2020 Greece decided to increase the level of deterrence at its borders to the maximum and consequently suspended the right of third-country nationals to apply for asylum for a period of one month in order to deal with this extreme crisis. Greece did not violate international law in suspending asylum for just one month because its decision was based on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights which clearly states: 'In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the

¹¹ 'Turkey claims migrant killed in Greek border clash', BBC News 4/3/2020,

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51735715>

¹² <https://twitter.com/i/status/1243577542470184961>

¹³ Paul Antonopoulos, 'Tensions flare up between Greece and Turkey during NATO meeting', Greek City Times, 3/4/2020, <https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/04/03/tensions-flare-up-between-greece-and-turkey-during-nato-meeting/>

extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law."¹⁴

2. EU aid to Turkey

Allowing the mass movement of illegal migrants through its territory towards the borders of Greece, Turkey de facto violates the EU-Turkey agreement that was concluded in March 2016 with the explicit goal of averting the massive influx of illegal migration to Europe.¹⁵ The EU-Turkey agreement was a direct result of the dramatic mass migration event of 2015. It was then that in a dramatized atmosphere over one million migrants entered the EU through the Mediterranean routes, especially through Italy and Greece. According to the deal Turkey continues to receive generous EU funding. The Turkish government was granted by the EU a payment of roughly 3.4 out of originally six billion euros, three of which were used for the accommodation and services offered to migrants residing in Turkey. Turkey assumed the obligation of stopping the mass influx in Europe and thus of controlling the outflow of migrants towards EU territory. According to the readmission provisions, third-country nationals that crossed illegally the border from Turkey to the Greek islands and did not qualify for international protection would be returned to Turkey. A special clause prohibits the transfer of migrants hosted in the Greek islands to the Greek mainland, as these migrants would then not be returned to Turkish territory.

The deal, which to a degree was the result of a Greek government attempt not in line with primary security concerns, was suited to Turkish geopolitical aspirations. The deal allowed for unilateral actions in relation to control of migration flows by the host state, in this case Turkey which has managed to effectively instrumentalize migration flows. Initially the Turkish government limited to a degree migration flows towards EU

¹⁴ European Convention on Human Rights, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.

¹⁵ EU-Turkey Statement and Action Plan, 3/2016, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan>

territory, especially in 2017. Still, as a general pattern, in the years after the 2016 deal Turkey violated the agreement constantly. It allowed the departure of migrants heading for Greece either through the land, towards the Evros border, or through the sea, towards the numerous Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Since February 29, when Turkey declared that it would no longer hinder the movement of migrants towards the EU, this ambivalent stance vis-a-vis the 2016 agreement transformed into outright violation and state aggression against Greece and the EU.¹⁶ Turkey's actions actually form a pattern of using migration as a weapon and can be in a sense described as forming part of a coordinated strategy that takes into account the strategic dimension of both migration flows and demographic data in general.¹⁷

3. The Trigger and Erdogan's intentions

Turkey's decision to use mass migration as a weapon against the EU originates from various structural factors, including the difficult economic situation Turkey faces over the last years, in combination with setbacks in Syria and Libya. The Turkish financial and economic crisis peaked in 2018, as the Turkish lira was significantly depreciated and the state economy featured high inflation, corresponding elevated borrowing costs and rising loan defaults.

On a military level, Turkish interference in Syria and Libya, although quite costly in terms of money and casualties, has met with little success in a mid-term and long-term perspective. In Syria Turkish ambitions to undermine the Assad regime have been stifled by the advance of the regime forces in NW Syria and Russia's steady support for Assad's forces. In Libya, Turkey's attempts to aid the ailing Sarraj government led to a

¹⁶ 'EU 'strongly rejects' Turkey's 'use' of migrants at border', Deutsche Welle, 4/3/2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-strongly-rejects-turkeys-use-of-migrants-at-border/a-52640976>

¹⁷ Wolfgang Puzstai, 'Migration as a Weapon-How to Stop Erdogan', Le Courrier du Maghreb et d' Orient, 3/2020, <https://lecourrierdumaghrebetdelorient.info/headline/migration-as-a-weapon-how-to-stop-erdogan/>; Ioannis E. Kotoulas, 'Turkey's Demographic Terrorism', Al-Ahram Weekly 1484, 19-25/3/2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/365468.aspx>

coordinated diplomatic grouping of both antagonist states of the region, such as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt against Turkish aspirations, and concerned other countries, such as France. These factors have had a negative impact on Erdogan's reputation at home causing an increasing internal pressure. It is in this context and on the basis of his previous experience with a disunited and weak EU that Erdogan turned once again to the "migration weapon" in order to extort the Europeans.



Source:
Kathimerini

Erdogan's objectives are related to two actors, the EU and Greece. Towards the EU, Turkey aims to:

- obtain additional generous funding,
- achieve EU/NATO support for his ongoing campaign in Syria,
- deter the EU mission 'Irene' at the Eastern Mediterranean from enforcing the arms embargo on Libya against Turkish ships and Turkish weapons deliveries.

Towards Greece, which Turkey sees a main antagonist in the Eastern Mediterranean due to the historical rivalry of the two states, Turkey aims to:

- create instability in border areas, such as the Evros region or the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea.
- check the operational readiness and abilities of the Greek administration and military in a major crisis event that also functions as a simulation of war.

One should always keep in mind that Turkey officially still opposes the right of Greece to defend itself by basing its army on the islands of the eastern Aegean Sea and continues to oppose Greece's right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, as foreseen by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea¹⁸. In general, one could assume, Turkey uses migration flows as a strategic weapon in order to destabilize Greece.¹⁹

4. Response by the EU

Still, despite the aggressive Turkish policy towards the EU for years, European administrative elites continue to be trapped in anachronistic perceptions of the EU-Turkey relation and of Erdogan's intentions. The recent statements of several European politicians about offering more money to Turkey and taking some more migrants do not indicate that they have understood the whole scope of the problem and Erdogan's blackmailing tactics.

On a theoretical level the recurring confusion between the notions of refugees and migrants on Greek and EU's external borders should be avoided. Migrants residing for years in Turkey cannot be properly defined as refugees, since they are abandoning a safe country, namely Turkey, and attempt to enter EU territory not through official entry points, but by violating Greek borders. While most of the migrants have left their camps along the Turkish side of the border, again with the help of Turkish

¹⁸ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

¹⁹ Ioannis E. Kotoulas, 'Turkey as A Destabilizing Factor', Al-Ahram Weekly 1482, 5-11/3/2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/364611.aspx>.

authorities, it is still necessary to prepare for future, similar attempts of “migrant diplomacy”.

A “Coalition of the Willing” to accept a certain number of refugees, women and children or unaccompanied minors, has been discussed by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission and the German Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer. But it is not realistic to focus only on those groups. Once admitted by the EU, they have the right for family reunification. At first, EU legislation allows the admission of parents or grandparents of unaccompanied minor refugees for the purpose of family reunification.²⁰ Thereafter other family members have a very good chance to follow. However, Greece must be supported to improve the conditions of the migrants in the camps, especially the conditions for women and children. Another proposal was to take those who were waiting on the Turkish side of the border. Unfortunately, this is not about a fixed number of migrants, but about a barrel without ground.

All these well-meant initiatives would send absolutely wrong messages like “If you send women and children ahead, they will take you!”, “If you are violent and have enough time, you will make it!” and “Now there is again an opportunity to get into Europe!” to other migrants. All this would probably motivate many more others to get on the way. Politicians intending to act humanitarian under the pressure of the pictures from Greece should be aware of the impact of such decisions. Humanity can lead to doing the wrong things. Well-meant is not always good. This is not the right time for emotion-driven decisions.

5. Policy Implications and Proposals

There is no doubt that the stability of Turkey is in the European interest and must be supported, but today’s confrontational policy of its

²⁰ For some more information about this see: “Unaccompanied Minors in the EU”, Brussels, 20/6/2014, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/asylum/uam/uam_infographic_a4_en.pdf

leadership makes this difficult. It must be made clear that ignoring the rights of EU member states and attempting to blackmail the whole Union will lead to nowhere. Keeping the current Turkish objectives and the context in mind, two key elements of a coordinated EU response to the new migration crisis must be emphasized. The EU must take away the opportunity for a continued extortion by Erdogan and send the master message that there is no way of a forced or illegal entry into the territory of the EU. This fundamental message must be made clear towards both migrants and human traffickers.

In order to achieve all this, first of all, the EU should provide strong support towards Greece which protects EU borders with efficiency. This support should be not limited on a political and diplomatic level but should include financial aid that will be invested in border and security structures, and of course corresponding logistical support. The deployment of FRONTEX personnel on both the land and sea borders of the EU in Greek territory is of the utmost importance. Greece has already declared that it will extend the fence along its Evros border with Turkey to 40 km and further increase its operational readiness on both land and sea.²¹

The establishment of safe zones for refugees in countries adjacent to Syria is an important element to allow Syrians to stay in their region and to return home to rebuild their country as soon as possible. The EU should (co-)fund and organize such Refugee Safe Zones (RSZ)²² in countries like Lebanon or Jordan. Those zones are not just another refugee camp; they must be constructed and organized like new (temporary) cities, offering education and working opportunities. Furthermore, RSZs should offer organized proceedings for people seeking asylum in other countries.

²¹ 'Greece to extend fence on borders with Turkey to 40 km at Evros', Proto Thema News, 6/3/2020, <http://en.protothema.gr/greece-to-extend-fence-on-borders-with-turkey-to-40km-at-evros/>.

²² Wolfgang Puzstai: 'The EU Migration Crisis', in: Paolo Quercia (ed.): *Migrazioni e Sicurezza Internazionale - Questioni di sicurezza migratoria dei flussi dall'Africa al Mediterraneo*, 245, GPS - CeNASS, May 2017.

Organized migration procedures should also lower the probability of terrorist infiltration into Europe.



Immigrants talk to Greek soldiers behind a barbed wire fence at Turkey's Pazarkule border gate to the Greek village of Kastanies in Greece, near Edirne, Turkey, on February 29, 2020. REUTERS / Umit Bektas

The safe return of Syrian nationals to their home country, possibly with a third-party mediation, is also a possibility and would also lessen the pressure on Turkey. As an interim measure, a RSZ could be also established in a calm part of Syria. One must always bear in mind that origin from Syria does not equal refugee status, as the latter is based on individual and not collective characteristics. Thus, not every Syrian who has fled the country is automatically an "opponent of the regime" who potentially faces prison, torture or even death upon eventual return.

A “stop-gap plan”²³ needs to ensure the transportation of migrants who have been picked up at Europe’s borders or rescued from the sea to a migrant center on an uninhabited island or - as an interim solution for some days - to larger ships. Once there, the countries of origin must be determined and those who have no prospect for asylum must be immediately repatriated. The others are subject to an orderly, but swift asylum procedure. The political and legal framework to enable this is overdue. EU nations, in particular Greece, need to ensure timely proceedings to limit the waiting period in the migration centers.

Establishing those centers, which must be of course fully in line with international standards, on uninhabited islands has several advantages. There is the psychological effect that migrants did not yet make it into the mainland EU. No walls and high fences are necessary to prevent independent onward movements and the chances for onward smuggling by human traffickers are very limited. There is no destabilization of the surroundings. There should be also no incentive to delay a final decision about asylum (no per-diem or other financial benefits). Consequently, repatriation of those not eligible for asylum will be easier.

For a long-term solution of the migration problem, a mid-term strategy with three layers is required. Layer 1 has the purpose to contain the “multipliers” for destabilization, namely demographic development, environmental degradation, and corruption. Consequently, it focuses on limiting population growth, on environmental protection and on minimizing corruption as well as on improving good governance. Layer 2 aims to achieve a broad positive impact by implementing the most urgent measures for stabilization and by dealing with the key problems in the social, economic, security, and human rights sector. Finally, Layer 3

²³ Armand Back: ‘Zur Zukunft unserer Asylpolitik: „Die EU soll Inseln vor Nordafrikas Küste leasen“‘ (Interview with Wolfgang Puztai), Tageblatt, 21/6/2018, <https://www.tageblatt.lu/headlines/zur-zukunft-unserer-asylpolitik-die-eu-soll-inseln-vor-nordafrikas-kueste-leasen/>

should narrow the gap to the developed world by a consolidation and by achieving a significant improvement in the sectors mentioned above.²⁴

6. Conclusions

From the policy of Turkey's President Erdogan towards Europe over the last years including the ongoing migration crisis on the EU-Turkey borders it is fairly obvious that Erdogan interprets every European concession as a weakness and will continue to act accordingly in the future. It is an illusion that the fundamental problem of migration from Turkey can be solved by accepting a couple of thousand more migrants in Europe and by paying another billion to Turkey. More and more migrants will come, and more and more concessions will be demanded by Erdogan in the near future, in an ever-repeating pattern.

It is of equally great importance on both a methodological and policy level to understand that mass migration towards the EU is not caused solely by the upheaval in the Middle East and the broader Northern Africa-Western Asia region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring or by ongoing conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, but also and mainly by structural macro-historical factors, such as overpopulation, an elevated youth bulge and the geophysical realities of land formation in the demographic hinterland of Europe, i.e. the areas of migrant origin.²⁵ These structural factors can be properly characterized as macro-historical, as their function and consequences unfold over large, inter-generational periods of time with middle-term and especially long-term repercussions; these factors, such as overpopulation, youth bulges and geophysical facts would function in any case, irrelevant of the periodic military and political turbulences in Europe's demographic hinterland.

²⁴ Wolfgang Puzstai: 'Migration: A stop-gap Plan and a mid-term Strategy', , Le Courrier du Maghreb et d' Orient, 12/2017, <https://lecourrierdumaghrebetdelorient.info/migration/opinion-column-migration-a-stop-gap-plan-and-a-mid-term-strategy/>

²⁵ Ioannis E. Kotoulas, 'Macro-historical Causes of Modern Mass Migration', Civitas Gentium 7:2 (12/2019), 113-123, <https://cg.turkmas.uoa.gr/index.php/cg/article/view/134>.

The recurring migration problem that Western European societies face with increasing intensity over the last years cannot be solved in Greece, but a new major crisis for Europe could be triggered there, if Europe adopts an appeasing policy towards Erdogan's Turkey._

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kotoulas, Ioannis E., 'Macro-historical Causes of Modern Mass Migration', *Civitas Gentium* 7:2 (12/2019), 113-123,
<https://cg.turkmas.uoa.gr/index.php/cg/article/view/134>
- Kotoulas, Ioannis E., 'Turkey as A Destabilizing Factor', *Al-Ahram Weekly* 1482, 5-11/3/2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/364611.aspx>.
- Kotoulas, Ioannis E., 'Turkey's Demographic Terrorism', *Al-Ahram Weekly* 1484, 19-25/3/2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/365468.aspx>
- Kotoulas, Ioannis E. & Wolfgang Puztai, 'Turkey's War on the European Union', *Al-Ahram Weekly* 1493, 21-27/5/2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/369655.aspx>
- Puztai, Wolfgang, 'Migration: A stop-gap Plan and a mid-term Strategy', *Le Courrier du Maghreb et d' Orient*, 12/2017,
<https://lecourrierdumaghrebetdelorient.info/migration/opinion-column-migration-a-stop-gap-plan-and-a-mid-term-strategy/>
- Puztai, Wolfgang, 'Migration as a Weapon-How to Stop Erdogan', *Le Courrier du Maghreb et d' Orient*, 3/2020,
<https://lecourrierdumaghrebetdelorient.info/headline/migration-as-a-weapon-how-to-stop-erdogan/>
- Puztai, Wolfgang, 'The EU Migration Crisis', in Paolo Quercia (ed.): *Migrazioni e Sicurezza Internazionale - Questioni di sicurezza migratoria dei flussi dall' Africa al Mediterraneo*, GPS - CeNASS, May 2017.

Primary Documents

-European Court of Human Rights/Council of Europe (ed.), European Convention on Human Rights,

https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.

-EU-Turkey Statement and Action Plan, 3/2016,

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan>

-'Unaccompanied Minors in the EU', Brussels, 20/6/2014,

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/asylum/uam/uam_infographic_a4_en.pdf

-United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,

https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

Media outlets

-Antonopoulos, Paul, 'Tensions flare up between Greece and Turkey during NATO meeting', Greek City Times, 3/4/2020,

<https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/04/03/tensions-flare-up-between-greece-and-turkey-during-nato-meeting/>

-Back, Armand, 'Zur Zukunft unserer Asylpolitik: „Die EU soll Inseln vor Nordafrikas Küste leasen“' (Interview with Wolfgang Puztai), Tageblatt, 21/6/2018,

<https://www.tageblatt.lu/headlines/zur-zukunft-unserer-asylpolitik-die-eu-soll-inseln-vor-nordafrikas-kueste-leasen/>

-Chebil, Mehdi, 'Evros river crossing: Turkey sends migrants there at night, Greece pushes them back at dawn', Infomigrants, 9/3/2020,

<https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/23304/evros-river-crossing-turkey-sends-migrants-there-at-night-greece-pushes-them-back-at-dawn>.

-Gauthier-Villars, David, 'Erdogan Says Turkey Won't Stop Migrants Streaming into Europe', Wall Street Journal, 29/2/2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-says-turkey-wont-stop-migrants-streaming-into-europe-11582988372>

-Nar, Ismaeel, 'Turkish state-owned TRT Arabic posts map showing refugees' path to France', Al Arabiya English, 29/2/2020,

<https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/television-and-radio/2020/02/29/Turkish-state-owned-TRT-Arabic-posts-map-showing-refugees-path-to-France.html>.

-Papadimas, Lefteris & Alkis Konstantinidis, 'Migrants clash with Greek police at border after Turkey opens floodgates, Reuters, 1/3/2020,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-greece/migrants-clash-with-greek-police-at-border-after-turkey-opens-floodgates-idUSKBN2001EF>

-Stevis-Gridneff, Matina & Patrick Kingsley, 'Turkey, Pressing E.U. for Help in Syria, Threatens to Open Borders to Refugees', The New York Times, 28/2/2020,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/world/europe/turkey-refugees-Geece-erdogan.html>.

-[Anonymous], 'EU 'strongly rejects' Turkey's 'use' of migrants at border',

Deutsche Welle, 4/3/2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-strongly-rejects-turkeys-use-of-migrants-at-border/a-52640976>

-[Anonymous], 'Turkey claims migrant killed in Greek border clash', BBC News,

4/3/2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51735715>

-[Anonymous], 'Turkish police bolster Greek border to stop migrants' return', Al-

Jazeera, 6/3/2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/turkish-police-bolster-greek-border-stop-migrants-return-200305114014230.html>.

-[Anonymous], 'Greece to extend fence on borders with Turkey to 40 km at

Evros', Proto Thema News, 6/3/2020, <http://en.protothema.gr/greece-to-extend-fence-on-borders-with-turkey-to-40km-at-evros/>

-[Anonymous], 'Turkey uses EU-paid vehicles to tear down the fence in Evros',

Proto Thema, 8/3/2020, <http://en.protothema.gr/turkey-uses-eu-paid-vehicles-to-tear-down-the-fence-in-evros-videos-photos/>.

-[Anonymous], '713 Migrants Were Stopped from Entering Greek Territory' [in Greek], Proto Thema, 16/3/2020,

<https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/984967/metanasteutiko-apetrapi-i-eisodos-se-713-metanastes-ston-evro/>

-[Anonymous]. 'Türkei steuerte Ansturm auf griechische Grenze', Bild, 27/3/2020,

<https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/fluechtlingskrise-medienbericht-tuerkei-steuerte-ansturm-auf-griechische-grenze-69663368.bild.html>

Videos

'Migrants gather around Turkish officers',

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfHJPG6aHf0>

<https://twitter.com/i/status/1236629350050598912>;

<https://twitter.com/i/status/1236597221702930432>;

<https://www.facebook.com/KastanCity/videos/2554872591425836/>.

<https://twitter.com/i/status/1243577542470184961>

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. **IOANNIS E. KOTOULAS** (Ph.D. in Geopolitics, University of Athens; Ph.D. in History, University of Athens) is Adjunct Lecturer in Geopolitics in the Postgraduate Program “Geopolitical Analysis, Geostrategic Synthesis and Studies in Defense and International Security” at National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (EKPA), Academic Advisor of Foreign Affairs Institute, Academic Advisor of Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition magazine and contributor to Al-Ahram (Cairo) on Geopolitics and International Security.

He has been a Visiting Professor at Tbilisi State University and Visiting Researcher at the Global and European Studies Institute of the University of Leipzig. His research interests include History and Theory of Geopolitics, International Security, Historical Identities, History of Culture, and History of Modern Hellenism.

His books: *History of Greek Geopolitics* (Leimon 2020), *History and Geopolitics of Modern Greece* (Leimon 2019), *Architecture and Ideology* (Leimon 2019), *Immigration and Dominant National Culture* (Papazisis 2011).

<https://uoa.academia.edu/loannisKotoulas>

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/loannis_Kotoulas2

WOLFGANG PUSZTAI (MSc in Political Science, University of Vienna; MSc in National Security Strategy, National Defense University/National War College, Washington D.C.) is a security & policy analyst with a special focus on the MENA region. He is the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations, Senior Advisor of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy and Director of Perim Associates.

He has held positions in the Austrian MoD/General Staff to several international assignments (national, EU and NATO). He was Austria’s Defense Attaché to Italy, Greece, Tunisia and Libya (2007-2012) and liaison officer at the Italian Joint Operations Headquarters and spent quite some time on the ground during the “Arab Spring”.

He has lectured at prominent universities and published extensively about strategy and developments in wider North Africa, in particular related to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, the Islamic State and migration.



Assertions and opinions in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foreign Affairs Institute, its Board, or its Members.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.



Foreign
Affairs
Institute

www.fainst.eu