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# Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism

**Interagency Intelligence Memorandum**

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NI IIM 82-10002  
26 March 1982

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## PROSPECTS FOR ANTI-US TERRORISM

Information available as of 26 March 1982 was  
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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## SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum is an updated version of IIM 81-10018, *Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism*, 6 October 1981. Like the earlier version, it examines the sources and implications of recent terrorist acts and threats against the United States, and estimates the extent and nature of the threat posed by the leading perpetrators of these acts and threats. In particular, it examines the implications of recent developments concerning:

- The threat by Libyan leader Qadhafi to assassinate President Reagan and other high-level US officials, which was the first serious instance of a reported major international terrorist targeting of officials within the United States in recent years.
- The kidnaping of Gen. James L. Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades on 17 December 1981, the first such kidnaping of an American citizen by that group.
- The terrorist attacks on US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chapman and Assistant Military Attache Lt. Col. Charles Ray in Paris.

It should be stressed that there remain a number of intelligence gaps on several of the specific questions discussed in this Memorandum.

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Note: This Memorandum was requested by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and was produced under the auspices of the Associate Chairman, National Intelligence Council. It was coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Energy, the Treasury, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

The terrorist threat to President Reagan and to other senior US officials in the United States and abroad remains serious. The most immediate threat to the President is Libyan inspired, and will probably continue.

Overseas, the threat to US targets, particularly to lower level US officials and to military personnel and facilities is also serious, and may actually have increased. There are reasons to anticipate an increase in anti-US terrorism in the Middle East, particularly in the event of an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, and in Latin America and Western Europe.

Within the United States, the threat of international terrorism remains low except to senior US officials  Libyan-inspired terrorist attacks may be carried out in the future by American, as well as by foreign, proxies.

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The Libyans, the radical Palestinians, the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), and the Italian Red Brigades pose the most immediate major terrorist threats to the United States, but other terrorists harbor strong anti-American feelings and have the ability to strike US personnel and interests.

There continue to be numerous ties among terrorist elements, including Libyans, Syrians, radical Palestinian terrorists, and some in Western Europe. These ties will probably increase, and some collaboration among certain of these elements in future attacks is likely.



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It is our judgment that the major terrorist attacks of the last year against US targets—including the Ramstein (Germany) bombing, the attack on General Kroesen, Colonel Qadhafi's threats against US personnel and facilities, and the kidnaping of General Dozier—spring



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
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generally from disparate conditions and causes. It remains uncertain who was responsible for the murder of Lt. Col. Charles Ray and the attempted assassination of US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chapman; it is possible that these attacks were Libyan inspired.

We have no hard evidence of a Soviet hand behind recent anti-US terrorist events. We conclude, however, that this lack of hard evidence is not itself proof of Soviet noninvolvement in these incidents. The Soviets certainly bear some responsibility for anti-US terrorism in general. The USSR supports governments (including those of Libya, Cuba, South Yemen, and some East European states) and entities (such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) which, in turn, support or conduct terrorism. The Soviets' support for training (particularly in the Middle East) which benefits some terrorists, their provision of weapons to patrons of terrorism, their anti-American propaganda campaigns, and their efforts to foster cooperation between groups which undertake terrorist acts all provide a backdrop which in some cases favors anti-American terrorism.<sup>2</sup>



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## DISCUSSION

### The Implications of Recent Anti-US Terrorism

1. US personnel and property have been targets of several prominent terrorist attacks and threats during the past year. These incidents include:

- Libyan threats to assassinate President Reagan and other senior US officials.
- The kidnaping of Gen. James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades.
- The attack on US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chapman and the assassination of Assistant Military Attache Lt. Col. Charles Ray in Paris.
- The bombing of the headquarters building of the US Air Force, Europe, at Ramstein Airbase in West Germany.
- The attempted assassination of Gen. Frederick Kroesen, Commander in Chief of US Army, Europe, near Heidelberg.
- Reported contingency plans by radical members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to organize attacks against US and other targets in Western Europe and elsewhere.
- The attempted murder of US servicemen in Turkey.
- The attack on the US military training team in Honduras.
- The attack on the Marine guards at the US Embassy in Costa Rica.

2. The most important elements in these situations are:

- A change of strategy by the Italian Red Brigades, to target US persons and interests [redacted]
- The reactivation of the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany.
- The growing opposition to US and NATO security policies—including the US “neutron bomb”

and NATO's INF modernization decisions—especially on the left of the West German political spectrum, and efforts by West German radicals and terrorists to exploit these sentiments and draw public attention once more to themselves and their activities.

- The reactivation of extremist elements in Fatah after a relatively dormant period, and of radical Palestinian splinter groups.
- A perception by many Palestinians and other Arabs of US association with Israeli activities, including Tel Aviv's aerial attacks on Iraq and on Palestinian targets in Lebanon, and its annexation of the Golan Heights; Palestinian frustration at the reelection of Prime Minister Begin; anger at the resumption of deliveries of military aircraft by the United States to Israel; and inter-cine Palestinian and Arab quarrels.
- An increasingly confrontational stance by Libya toward the United States, intensified by media allegations of US activities against Libya and by the US-Libyan military clash over the Gulf of Sidra.

3. American interests have been and will continue to be targeted by terrorists because:

- Terrorism is perceived to be a legitimate political weapon and instrument of foreign policy by numerous countries and groups that are anti-US in their ideology.
- US interests are worldwide, highly visible, and in many cases easily accessible to terrorists.
- The US presence, notably its military and diplomatic aspects, is widely regarded by leftist and radical elements as the visible symbol of “imperialism” and “neocolonialism.”
- Attacks against US interests and personnel will often serve to embarrass a host government because they will receive publicity and so serve

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sometimes to highlight alleged government incompetence and vulnerability.

have initiated planning for a new campaign of anti-US terrorism. [Redacted]

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— The occurrence of spectacular terrorist acts, such as the kidnaping of General Dozier, tends to have a “demonstration effect.” Terrorist groups, which may have nothing in common other than visceral anti-Americanism, are prone to emulate one another as each event receives publicity.

[Redacted]

4. A question of particular importance is the degree to which various international terrorist groups and states hostile to the United States may work together against US interests. In this regard, of particular concern is the possible expansion of links among Libyan terrorists, radical Palestinians, and terrorists in Western Europe:

[Redacted]

6. We have no hard evidence of a Soviet hand behind recent anti-US terrorist events. We conclude, however, that this lack of hard evidence is not itself proof of Soviet noninvolvement in these incidents. The Soviets certainly bear some responsibility for anti-US terrorism in general. The USSR supports governments (including those of Libya, Cuba, South Yemen, and some East European states) and entities (such as the PFLP) which, in turn, support or conduct terrorism. The Soviets’ support for training (particularly in the Middle East) which benefits some terrorists, their provision of weapons to patrons of terrorism, their anti-American propaganda campaigns, and their efforts to foster cooperation between groups which undertake terrorist acts all provide a backdrop that in some cases favors anti-American terrorism.<sup>2</sup>

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**Libya**

— Other supporters of anti-US international terrorists include Cuba and South Yemen. Moreover, for some time there have been contacts among West European terrorist groups; more recently, some Italian Red Brigadists showed interest in establishing operational coordination with other West European terrorist groups. Such initiatives may presage more coordinated anti-US terrorism than is currently the case.

7. The most serious near-term terrorist threat to the United States is that posed by Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. On 13 August 1981, after allegations in the US press of a CIA plot to assassinate him, a group of Libyan military officers close to Qadhafi publicly declared:

... we shall hit at US interests anywhere and undertake the physical liquidation of anyone who permits himself merely to think of harming the life of the leader of the Great 1 September Revolution, beginning with Ronald Reagan.

5. There is evidence, for instance, that Libya and radical Palestinians—either separately or in concert—

8. Information [Redacted] strongly indicates that Libya planned a terrorist campaign designed to assassinate senior US officials. There is a

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possibility that the attempted assassination of the US Charge d'Affaires and the assassination of the US Assistant Military Attache in France may have been supported by the Libyans [Redacted]

[Redacted] In addition, US diplomatic facilities in the Middle East, Western Europe, Africa, and possibly Latin America have been targeted as part of Libyan-backed operations against US interests.

9. Most important, Qadhafi apparently set in train plans to assassinate President Reagan and/or other high government officials in the United States.<sup>3</sup> The Libyan leader, however, was apparently greatly disturbed by the worldwide publicity which his assassination plots have received, by the precautions taken against them, and by the prospect of strong US actions against Tripoli. In fact, Qadhafi sent a message to the US Government that he had abandoned all Libyan terrorist activities.

10. Although the initial Libyan threat to assassinate President Reagan and other high US officials may have abated, the threat of their assassination by Libyan or Libyan-inspired agents (US or foreign) must still be regarded as serious. In addition, the Libyan or Libyan-inspired threat to US officials outside the United States remains very serious as well and may have increased in recent weeks. Qadhafi's assurances cannot be accepted fully at face value. Moreover, he could revive these or similar plans, most particularly if he judges that the risk of their being traced to him is minimized, or that US willingness to take strong steps against Libya is reduced; and, most important, if he continues to believe—as he has for some time—that the United States is trying to oust or kill him.<sup>4</sup>

[Redacted]

<sup>4</sup> Over the years, there have been several internally inspired coup and assassination plots against Qadhafi which he has often attributed to the United States.

11. Qadhafi has also threatened to attack US nuclear depots in the Mediterranean area and cause "an international catastrophe" if America again "attacks" the Gulf of Sidra. Libya may have the resources to make such an attempt either by means of a terrorist attack or the use of aircraft or missiles. [Redacted] suggests that his threat to attack US nuclear depots is only propaganda but that Qadhafi is planning to attack a US ship in the Mediterranean. We have

[Redacted]

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12. These threats are consistent with Libya's established pattern of supporting and conducting terrorist activities. Qadhafi has targeted world leaders [Redacted] for assassination in the past; he considers assassination a justifiable foreign policy weapon and has the resources to carry out such an act. While Qadhafi has not succeeded in assassinating any world leaders [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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13. Over the years Qadhafi has supported such diverse terrorist groups and liberation movements as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red Army, and the radical Palestinians; he identifies himself with forces striking out against "Zionism" and the "imperialist oppression of the West." Recently, he has focused increasingly on the United States as a target. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] It is possible that this is related to Qadhafi's public threats against US military installations. The incident in the Gulf of Sidra, the withdrawal of US personnel from Libya, and the US decision not to buy Libyan oil have contributed to Qadhafi's aggressive, confrontational stance vis-a-vis the United States. The very act of standing up to the United States is interpreted by Qadhafi as an act of

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revolutionary courage, and will in all likelihood prompt him to seek further opportunities for confrontation.

[Redacted]

16. Qadhafi has also dispatched assassination squads to Western Europe and the United States as a part of a campaign to silence critics of his regime. Exiles who do not return to Libya voluntarily are either to be kidnaped or murdered.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Because of the negative publicity his campaign has generated, Qadhafi may have become more discriminating in the Libyan dissidents he will target.

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15. Despite shifting moods in Libyan foreign policy, Qadhafi continues to be driven by three causes: championing his version of an Islamic revolution, assisting people fighting wars of "national liberation," and eliminating the state of Israel. In promoting these causes Qadhafi has supported groups whose connection to Islam, national liberation, or Pan-Arabism were highly tenuous. Libyan support for terrorist groups seems to reflect the following priorities:

- Palestinians, particularly extremist groups like the PFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC), the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)—and possibly the Black June Organization (BJO), which Qadhafi hopes to use in assassinating Palestinian "moderates."
- Muslim groups, such as the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines and the Pattani United Liberation Movement in Thailand, which are minorities in states ruled by non-Muslims and, perhaps, Muslim extremists in countries like Bangladesh and Indonesia. Qadhafi has also assisted the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman/Bahrain (PFLO/B) and the Polisario forces fighting Morocco.
- Antigovernment groups in southern Africa, Latin America, and, to a diminished extent, Western Europe. Libya has in the past trained members of the Italian Red Brigades and the West German RAF. Currently, Libya also trains Salvadoran terrorists and possibly additional Latin American terrorists as well.

17. [Redacted] Qadhafi's terrorist plans may include the use of proxy terrorists (for example, radical Palestinians or Americans) in operations against officials in the United States or against US personnel and facilities abroad. Such use of proxies would reduce the risk of tracing such operations directly to Qadhafi. We cannot count on timely warning of some future Libyan terrorist operations

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**The Palestinians**

18. There are growing indications that the United States may be confronted with increased terrorism on the part of radical Palestinians or dissident members of Fatah. Although incidents of Palestinian terrorism in Western Europe (such as the attack on a synagogue in Vienna, and bombings in Rome, Istanbul, and Athens) have been directed against Israeli and Jewish interests, Palestinian-sponsored terrorist acts may be carried out against US interests as well.

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[Redacted]

Nevertheless, a number of reports suggest the possibility of Palestinian terrorism against US interests. The most important of these are:

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[REDACTED]

Palestinians. A much more serious terrorist threat to the United States, particularly in the Middle East, would arise in the event of an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon.

20. The ties of Palestinian terrorists with terrorists elsewhere, the implacable hostility of some radical Palestinians to the United States, and the fragmentation of the Palestinian movement contribute to the threat which they pose to US interests. The major Palestinian organizations have not attacked Americans since the early 1970s. Nevertheless, attacks have occurred on US personnel and facilities in the Middle East since that time which may have been the work of Palestinian splinter groups and radical elements. For its part, the PLO has called for "decisive reprisals" against the United States for deporting Abu Eain. Even if the first wave of anti-American feeling subsides without terrorist attacks, passions will again rise when the Israelis try Abu Eain. A conviction and long sentence may well spark reprisals against US interests. The Israelis have not yet announced a trial date.

21. It appears that the recent increase in tension in the Middle East has intensified the struggle for control of the PLO. On one side is Fatah leader Arafat, who is still striving to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian problem. He is seeking support from conservative Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia, and is trying to improve his image in Western Europe and the United States. On the other side are a number of small but radical Palestinian splinter groups which oppose Arafat's leadership of the PLO, militantly seek to undermine the Camp David accords, wish to see a broad revolution throughout the Middle East, and are prepared to serve the aims of radical patron states like Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In addition, there are radicals within Fatah who oppose Arafat and what they perceive as his less militant approach to the Palestinian problem.

22. Some of the most radical Palestinian splinter groups are offshoots of the PFLP, which was for a number of years the most active Palestinian group in international terrorism. That group's terrorist activities began to decline in 1978, and the group was relatively inactive by 1980. However, there are reports of training of West European terrorists, including members of the West German Red Army Faction, at PFLP-run training camps in South Yemen [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

— Increasing pressure has been placed by radical Palestinian groups, by Fatah militants and pro-Communists, and by Libya and Syria on PLO leader Arafat, particularly in the past year, to approve the resumption of international terrorism and the targeting of US interests.

— Radical Palestinians, supported by Syria and Libya, are seeking to embarrass Arafat by launching or planning to launch terrorist attacks in Western Europe against US and Israeli targets and to sabotage growing PLO-European ties. The attack on the Vienna synagogue is an example of this effort to embarrass Arafat.

[REDACTED]

19. The US extradition to Israel on 13 December 1981 of accused Palestinian terrorist Ziyad Abu Eain has further intensified anti-US sentiment in the Middle East and the threat to the well-being of Americans there and elsewhere. US embassies in the region have been warned during the past two years that US interests would be attacked if Abu Eain were extradited. His extradition, moreover, comes at a time of increased tensions in the Middle East due to Israel's formal annexation of the Golan Heights, the stalemated Palestinian autonomy talks, and the reinforcement of military positions along the Israeli-Lebanese frontier. The US veto of the UN resolution condemning Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights and the arrival of the US peacekeeping force in the Sinai may also provide excuses for anti-US terrorism by

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

anti-US terrorism in West Germany is likely to reduce popular support for the West German "peace movement."

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23. The Arafat camp has not been inactive. There have been reports of the training of Turks, Irishmen, German rightists, and Armenians at Fatah camps in Lebanon [Redacted]

[Redacted] The Soviets also requested that Arafat offer Cuba cooperation with Latin American revolutionary movements, and he apparently agreed to this request.

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### The Red Army Faction

24. The anti-American terrorism in West Germany is the work of the Red Army Faction and its sympathizers. The RAF has claimed responsibility for the attack on Ramstein AFB, and we have had indications for some time that the group was indeed planning a return to international terrorist violence and that some attack was planned there [Redacted]

26. The resurgence in RAF terrorism follows a period of reduced activity after the Mogadishu hijacking of October 1977. This reduction was the result of arrests, deaths, and "retirements" of key RAF personnel. Consequently, the RAF shifted its tactics from demands for money or the release of jailed terrorists to those of low risk aimed at "punishing the establishment," in order to provoke a "Fascist state" and popular revolt. The reduced level of RAF terrorism convinced security authorities that the terrorists were rebuilding their organization outside West Germany. On 25 June 1979, Gen. Alexander Haig, then SACEUR, was nonetheless the target of what was probably an RAF assassination attempt in Belgium.

27. The resurgence of RAF terrorism in 1981 reflects a reanimation of the group despite the disruptions caused by police efforts during the middle and late 1970s. [Redacted]

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group. However, the attack on Ramstein and the attempted assassination of General Kroesen indicate that the group is increasingly focusing on US targets. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

28

[Redacted] the RAF was trying to recruit personnel from the ranks of the "anti-Fascist" groups ("Antifa") in West Germany as well as from its "legal" supporters, and wished to use its "legals" to create public disturbances connected with causes like antinuclear protests and squatters' rights in order to broaden its base of support.

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25. The recent round of RAF violence appears to be aimed at transforming that isolated group into the vanguard of the West German extraparliamentary left, which has been demonstrating against theater nuclear force modernization and enhanced radiation warhead production. In the early 1970s, the RAF gained supporters and recruits by attacking US targets during a period of widespread protests against US involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The RAF probably hopes to capitalize on current leftist sentiment against US foreign and defense policies in order to renew its support among extreme West German leftists. At Ramstein, the United States may have been the immediate target, but the West German left was almost certainly meant to take notice. The left is not likely to rally to the RAF, however, because continued

29. Despite ups and downs, the RAF has continued to maintain links to other terrorists. For example, in the mid-to-late 1970s individual members of the RAF participated in PFLP operations, and the PFLP at that time engaged in terrorist operations to force the release of RAF prisoners. The involvement of West German terrorists with the PFLP offered them logistic support. It enabled such terrorists, through flight to several Middle Eastern countries, to avoid criminal prosecution. The training of such terrorists in Palestinian camps expanded their knowledge of the use of weapons and ability to practice sabotage. The RAF was identified in the mid-1970s as a conduit of weapons and forged documents for the Japanese Red

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Army. Additionally, the RAF has had intermittent contacts with radicals and terrorists throughout Western Europe—the Dutch Red Resistance Front, Swiss anarchists, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and Italy's Red Brigades.

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**The Italian Red Brigades**

30. The kidnaping of General Dozier on 17 December 1981 marked a new stage in Red Brigade strategy: this was the first time the Brigades had targeted an American. Previously, they had sought to undermine domestic institutions by conducting a prolonged terrorist campaign against Italian targets designed to provoke repressive government reactions that would in turn prompt armed popular responses. And the stated goals of the Red Brigades, though not their violent tactics, have enjoyed noteworthy support among Italians, especially the youth, who are disenchanted with their government's unfulfilled promises. The Brigades' most visible action had been the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro, but the Dozier kidnaping brought them comparable publicity. What is significant about the Dozier kidnaping is that it indicates that the Red Brigades, like the RAF, are trying to broaden their support beyond traditional backers by attempting to tap antinuclear, antimilitary, and anti-American sentiment that they perceive is behind popular support for the "peace movement" in Italy.

[Redacted]

31. The Dozier kidnaping was undertaken by the Red Brigades alone. Various "strategic directives" published by the Brigades over the past three years have indicated an increasing tendency on the part of some factions to internationalize their struggle. However, some Red Brigade members do not believe that attacks against non-Italian targets are a high priority. The latter believe that the Brigades should continue to target industries (including multinational firms), Italian journalists and industrialists, members of the judiciary, prison officials, and the police; and to involve themselves in the labor and prison issues.

33. Lack of public pronouncement of support from these groups and others undoubtedly is disappointing to those Brigade theoreticians who believed the Dozier kidnaping would be the catalyst for a united European "war on NATO."

34. Despite public pronouncements by some Italian politicians [Redacted] the Italian Government has as yet developed no information on foreign involvement in the Dozier case. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] According to unconfirmed press reporting, Italian police allege that one of General Dozier's kidnapers may have spent four months in Libya under unexplained circumstances in 1981, prior to the Red Brigade kidnaping operation. [Redacted]

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32. The Dozier operation was carried out primarily by the Veneto Column, which has been the leading advocate of internationalizing terrorist operations.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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theless, the Brigades pride themselves on their independence, although [Redacted] they received some weapons from Palestinians.

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[Redacted]

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35. The kidnaping of General Dozier initially achieved a number of Red Brigade objectives. It embarrassed the Italian Government, sowed discontent among Italian political factions, enhanced the Brigades' image as a group capable of striking anywhere, and achieved enormous publicity for the group. The kidnaping, however, ended as a disaster for the Red Brigades and has boosted the morale of the Italian Government in its fight against terrorism. Several Brigade columns have been seriously damaged. Nevertheless, the Brigades—especially the Naples Column—are still capable of carrying out additional attacks against US interests.

[Redacted]

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38. The attacks on US officials in Paris may augur a major increase in anti-US terrorism in Western Europe in the near future. We do not yet know, however, whether these attacks are unilateral events or the beginning of a sustained terrorist campaign by Libyans and/or radical Palestinians against US persons in Europe.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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### The Paris Attacks and the Heightened Threat in Western Europe

36. As of the time this paper is issued, it remains uncertain who was responsible for the attempted assassination of US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chapman on 12 November 1981 and the murder of Lt. Col. Charles Ray in Paris on 18 January 1982. We have unconfirmed reports that the attack on the US Charge was the work of Libyan terrorists, and the circumstances of that attack and the assassination of Colonel Ray are similar.

[Redacted]

39. General Dozier's release may affect terrorist tactics, deterring kidnaping attempts, but does not lessen the threat either in Italy or elsewhere in Western Europe. The Red Brigades' first communique called for a coordinated or cooperative effort between the Brigades and other West European terrorist groups, specifically the RAF, the PIRA, and ETA Basques in Spain. But they received no response from these groups. We believe, however, that RAF operatives on their own have already begun target selection and surveillance, and preparations for additional operations against US targets in West Germany.

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40. The PIRA and ETA Basques are less likely to target Americans at this time. The PIRA values the aid it receives from segments of American society and would risk categorical condemnation in the United States if it were to attack US targets. If the ETA Basques were to attack US targets, they would shift attention away from their traditional ethnic cause.

### Latin America

41. The potential for anti-US terrorism in Latin America has recently increased. Reported threats by Salvadoran leftist guerrillas against US targets give

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grounds for special concern, because of the guerrillas' ability to strike outside as well as inside El Salvador, and of the possibility that these anti-US threats are partly Cuban inspired. Despite intense security measures, attempts to assassinate or kidnap US officials (including military advisers) are likely and are clearly within the capabilities of the Salvadoran guerrillas. The insurgents probably believe that such terrorist acts—even at significant cost to the guerrillas—serve to bolster insurgent morale, attract media attention, and perhaps erode US support for involvement in El Salvador.

42. Another significant threat to US interests may be posed by the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia, whose members claim responsibility for two recent attempts to penetrate US Embassy buildings in Bogota. Other threats to Americans have recently been reported in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.

43. For some time Cuba has been supporting various terrorist groups in Latin America which have attacked US interests. It is possible that Castro may encourage these groups to heighten such attacks in a variety of locations, but in any event he is unlikely to let Cuba's hand be shown.

#### Other Threats

44. In addition to Libya, Palestinian groups, the RAF, the Red Brigades, and Latin American revolutionaries, a number of other regimes and entities

currently harbor grievances against the United States and have the capability to conduct terrorist attacks on US targets. The foremost among these are:

- Iranians who see an American hand behind all of Iran's woes.
- The Syrian regime, which perceives the United States to be in collusion with Israel and Syria's conservative foes in the Arab world.
- Radical Armenian terrorists who have expressed support for radical Palestinians, are anti-American and anti-Israeli, and resent Armenian emigration from the USSR to the United States.
- Turkish leftists who have mounted a number of attacks against US personnel and installations in Turkey.
- Croatian extremists who are aggrieved at US prosecution of their compatriots and US extradition of accused Croatian terrorists to Sweden.
- Puerto Rican separatists who have attacked US military interests since December 1979 and have declared themselves to be "at war with the US military."

#### The United States: Principal Target of International Terrorism?

45. US interests have been and remain the principal target of international terrorists of both left and right. This will certainly continue to be the case for the

#### Terrorist Threats and Incidents Against Americans, 1968-81

Year	Total Threats and Incidents	US Deaths	Anti-US Threats and Incidents	Next Leading Target	
1968	142	5	65 (46%)	Israel	(13%)
1969	214	1	113 (53%)	Israel	(14.5%)
1970	391	11	247 (63%)	Israel	(4.4%)
1971	324	5	231 (71%)	Israel	(3.1%)
1972	648	25	217 (33%)	Israel	(38%)
1973	563	24	203 (36%)	UK	(19.2%)
1974	528	45	180 (34%)	UK	(11.8%)
1975	474	11	156 (33%)	UK	(5.2%)
1976	599	11	194 (32%)	Israel, Ireland, Argentina	(4.0%)
1977	562	8	172 (31%)	UK	(6.4%)
1978	850	12	352 (41%)	UK	(5.2%)
1979	658	13	228 (35%)	France	(6.0%)
1980	763	10	254 (33%)	USSR	(5.4%)
1981	709	7	258 (36%)	UK	(6.6%)



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foreseeable future, even though only seven Americans were actually killed in terrorist attacks in 1981—fewer than in most previous years—and all of these were in Latin America. The percentage of terrorist incidents directed against Americans has remained roughly constant since 1972. The table shows how consistently Americans have been the principal targets of international terrorism since 1968.

46. Terrorism against US targets is likely to be intensified because of the large-scale publicity which the Libyan assassination plot and the kidnaping of General Dozier have received. There will almost certainly be terrorist attacks against US military personnel and facilities in Western Europe, and against diplomatic/corporate interests there as well as in Latin America and the Middle East. Terrorist groups, which may have nothing in common other than visceral anti-Americanism, are prone to emulate one another as each event receives publicity. Finally, individual

fanatics, with no connection to any terrorist group, may be incited by the publicity which terrorist acts have received to attack US officials or interests abroad or in the United States. We believe, therefore, that international terrorism is likely to increase in the next year, particularly against the United States.

#### **Prospects for Terrorism Within the United States**

47. We believe that the potential for incidents of terrorism against high-ranking US officials in the United States remains serious, particularly from Libyan and Libyan-sponsored groups. Historically, terrorism in the United States has included acts by Americans (particularly Puerto Rican nationalists) against Americans or by foreigners against other foreigners. The future, however, may witness foreign-inspired attacks by foreign terrorists or American proxies directed against senior US officials or other interests.

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