The fact that Belgium expelled Russian spies working under diplomatic cover confirms the scale of Russian intelligence’s infiltration in European countries. The expulsion of Russian diplomats followed a similar action in October 2021, when 8 Russian diplomats were expelled from NATO headquarters in Belgium on suspicion of espionage. Alexander Smushko, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s personal translator, was one of the expelled diplomats.
The embassy in Brussels, the consulate general in Antwerp and the Russian representation to the EU Russia are the establishments used by Russia to conduct intelligence activity.
Alexei Kuksov (14-08-1975), the Russian embassy adviser (trade representative), expelled this year, is worthy attention. Despite the fact that this position in Russian embassies is traditionally assigned to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), after graduating from a military school in 2001, Kuksov served in military unit 54726, a part of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Since 2005, this unit has been turned into the Centre for Research on the Military Potential of Foreign Countries (CIVPZS), a military intelligence analytical unit missioned with collecting and processing data from military attachés, undercover intelligence officers and GRU illegal residencies abroad. The Center reports ultimately flowed to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. Moreover, while staying in Belgium, Kuksov was the coordinator of the port of Antwerp.
Alexei Kozhevnikov (08-09-1985), an attaché, the GRU representative, was also included in the list of the military intelligence officers expelled from Belgium. According to records in Moscow Kozhnevnikov’s vehicles are registered to his home, the base of the 162nd Centre for Military-Technical Information, so called ‘Object-500-T’ specializing in intercepting European and American satellite signals. It means that Aleksey is on the waiting list for a departmental apartment, but since he did not get it yet he was registered at the address of his service location. Therefore, there are doubts that Kozhevnikov specializes in space and radio intelligence.
The Belgian authorities also expelled the second Russian attaché, Dmitry Chulaev (12-09-1978), a hereditary intelligence officer, whose father worked in the KGB intelligence in Spain. Chulaev’s biography points to a possible link between Russian intelligence and casinos and gaming clubs network in Russia. For example, Sputnik Telecommunication Entertainment Company, with which Chulaev worked, had GRU military space intelligence officers Alexei Miroshnichenko and Oleg Kuts in its top-management; they were tasked with recruiting promising technical universities’ graduates. In 2005, the company purchased the SkyEdge system of the Israeli company Gilat; it gave an opportunity to provide any schemes for organizing satellite communications, used by the FSB, the Federal Guard Service (FSO), GRU, SVR, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While working at the Russian embassy in Brussels, Chulaev was likely in charge of technical intelligence and communications.
The embassy adviser Sergei Zemledeltsev (29-10-1976), attache Nikita Ostroverkhy and Alexei Strelkov also left Belgium. Like Kuksov, Ostroverkhy is registered at the service location at Khoroshevsky Highway, 76-B (the GRU headquarters). It means that he is not a Muscovite but arrived in Moscow from the provinces. It is known that Zemledeltsev was trained as a military intelligence officer to work abroad at the Military Diplomatic Academy (VDA). His wife is also the GRU-associated, she was responsible for housekeeping at military unit 22177.
Perhaps, attaché Strelkov worked in Belgium in scientific and technical intelligence in the sphere of agriculture.
Together with Kuksov, Russian Consul General Georgy Kuznetsov (10-06-1978) was missioned with intelligence in Antwerp. However, he is not a military intelligence officer, but the Federal Security Service (FSB) employee; he has been recruiting and gathering information from Russian citizens who live or work in Belgium. According to our estimates, Kuznetsov works in the FSB 5th Service.
The expulsion from the country of Sergei Spirin, vice-consul in Antwerp, also confirms Russians’ special interest in Antwerp. Spirin also worked for the FSB.
The focus on Antwerp is likely due to Russian business interests in the city’s vast port and its diamond trading center – the world’s largest, which handles up to a third of Russia’s diamond exports. Diamonds are used as payment under sanction circumstance and bribery to politicians. In addition, the port of Antwerp can be used to smuggle and move sensitive goods, such as in the case of Rotterdam. One former VSSE investigation centered round a Belgian firm co-owned by an SVR officer that specialized in diamond and petrol smuggling from Russia, via Belgium, to the US.
Colonel Sergei Karpushkin (08/17/1974) and Lieutenant Colonel Igor Losalov (06/26/1983) also entered the list of military intelligence officers who left Belgium.
Lieutenant Colonel Losalov is a graduate of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense and a GRU staff member. In Belgium, he coordinated communication with compatriots and actions of the Immortal Regiment. These very actions are within the competence of Rossotrudnichestvo, using to cover the SVR. However, Losalov example confirms the interdepartmental activity engaging Russian emigrants to work in the interests of intelligence.
The embassy technicians were also expelled. For example, Vadim Artyushov (03/14/1976) who served in military unit 47747. Previously, this military unit, number 54238, was stationed in Cuba in the GRU electronic center in the city of Lourdes (REC Lourdes) and was tasked with electronic intelligence.
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Alexander Tsibulya (08-08-1974), Counsellor, Nuclear Energy at the Permanent Mission to the EU and Euratom, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, is a Russian intelligence officer too. The connection between Russian intelligence and the European Nuclear Society Young Generation Network and the International Youth Nuclear Congress was exposed due to him. These structures are also connected with Rosatom. Alexander was engaged in scientific and technical intelligence in the field of nuclear energy and technology.
The second secretary of the embassy, Andrey Dmitriev (10-03-1982), is probably the SVR officer.
Igor Taut (July 15, 1967), the embassy electrician, was expelled from Belgium. Perhaps, he a cipher officer of the Belgian residency and the FSB employee.
An unusual position for covering the GRU was occupied by Ivan Kvasha, the ‘host’ of the embassy. He specializes in the GRU human intelligence and wears the epaulettes of a colonel.
In 2012 Timur Akhtareev (29-07-1984) worked as an attaché of the Russian embassies in Tehran, Iran. Since he took part in the events of the Congress of Compatriots, he is probably the SVR-linked.
Before being appointed to the Russian Mission as Senior Counsellor, Justice and Home Affairs, Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU, the expelled Dmitry Kirizliev (11-11-1970) worked as Second Secretary in Paris. In 2011 he served as Senior Adviser, Dept. of European Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow. Therefore, it is likely that in Belgium he worked undercover for the SVR. In 2007, he worked as an adviser at the Russian Embassy in Madagascar.
Sergei Koritsky (05-11-1980) who previously served as Vice-Consul in Antalya was also expelled from the Russian Mission to the EU.
Members of the government and their families, persons close to the royal court, diplomats, military personnel with NATO clearances, reservists and military personnel are Russians’ intelligence interests in Belgium. The most interesting intelligence objects of interest for Russians are the following: scientific and technical intelligence, sanction policy, military assistance (nomenclature, volumes) for Ukraine, conflicts inside the EU, collection of compromising information on Belgian citizens, as well as Russian business lobby in Belgium.
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