Prigozhin’s rebellion in Russia: national political consequences analysis 

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion in Russia led to strengthening of the influence and powers of the FSB group, controlled by Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council. This group is not run by the Presidential Administration; it still  plays its own game in order to transfer power to Dmitry Patrushev, the current Minister of Agriculture of Russia and the son of the Secretary of the Security Council. It clearly explains Moscow’s demand to reconnect Rosselkhozbank to SWIFT (the bank is in Dmitry Patrushev’s sphere of influence). By using a сompany network financed by the agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank, Dmitry Patrushev keeps control over foreign companies’ acquisition in Russia.

In addition, Patrushev’s influence growth is shown in expressing direct accusations of the president during video conferences and picking up sharply of the army leadership by refuting its reports to the head of the state.

Overall, the rebellion did not weaken the Shoigu-Gerasimov group positions. Its opponents among the Russian armed forces (Surovikin and the generals who supported the rebellion) escaped the expected punishment by signaling that another coup is quite possible and the federal government is rather weak to act. Obviously, Putin sought to avoid public discussions about the traitors in the army. However, it caused the opposite effect: the Kremlin has demonstrated its weakness and impunity of the rebellion. We estimate that within the next six months it may lead to new demarches. They may be triggered by the military command’s failures in Ukraine against the backdrop of ongoing pressure of the President, who demands successful results in the frontline. As long as the war in Ukraine lasts the military bloc players are convinced of their immunity. However, in case of the frontline major losses and defeat Putin will have to look for the guilty; it increases the risks for the Kremlin on the part of the military, who will seek to avoid responsibility, both before the President and the International Tribunal.

The rebellion also influenced Putin’s behavior. He shows himself as an indecisive, slow in decision-making and extra prudent leader. Obviously, the ‘coup’ destabilized the President and made him fear of making any radical decisions that could change behavior and affect the loyalty of his entourage. As for Prigozhin, he moves freely all over Russia, continues doing business and signs state contracts. After the coup, his structures have signed nine contracts for a total amount of $11 million.

All Putin’s Spokesman statements about the President’s meetings with Prigozhin and some of the Wagner PMC commanders appeared to be fake. This very fact also signals about the possibility to maintain connections with the Kremlin in case of a demarche. Prigozhin’s temporary immunity can be explained by the fact that he has information and control over certain material assets located in Africa (probably the Central African Republic) protected by PMC Wagner. It explains Vladimir Putin’s decision to give a green light to the Wagner PMC to continue its activity in the Central African Republic.

In addition, the rebellion has strengthened Putin’s business environment, in particular the Kovalchuk brothers and Rotenberg, despite the Kovalchuk brothers-Prigozhin connection. There is a possibility that this group is betting on Kiriyenko as Putin’s potential successor. Putin is rarer and rarer shown himself at the official events. Against the backdrop of Putin’s health deterioration, the Presidential Administration is using a lookalike body double more and more often. 

These replacements are seen by Putin’s entourage as his ongoing disability and power instability.As for now, there is a consolidation of the Kremlin elites against the Patrushev-FSB group, which is likely to fuel media scandals. However, these elites are not strong enough to undermine the influence of the security forces, the only guarantors of Putin’s security after the recent coup.