Russia’s shadow fleet plays a pivotal role in financing the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, serving as a blueprint for nations seeking to circumvent international sanctions while exporting natural resources by sea. These vessels enable Moscow to continue shipping crude oil and petroleum products—critical revenue streams that sustain its war effort and fund covert operations abroad. An analysis of five ships—GURUDEV (IMO: 9253234), VISION (IMO: 9260067), AILAMA (IMO: 9232888), SAVITRI (IMO: 9289752), and SEA HONOR (IMO: 9315654)—reveals the defining characteristics and operational tactics of this clandestine maritime network.’
The aforementioned vessels share common traits that indicate their involvement in illicit operations and sanctions evasion:
Frequent name and flag changes. For instance, the tanker GURUDEV has changed its name three times since 2013 and switched flags twice. VISION and AILAMA have followed similar patterns. These tactics make tracking more difficult and allow the ships to evade sanctions lists.
For example, the frequency of GURUDEV’s name changes between 2004 and 2025 increased significantly after 2014, indicating its targeted use in Russia’s shadow operations. Moreover, all of the listed vessels changed their names and/or flags after being included in Western sanctions lists.
Anonymous ownership structures. All five vessels are linked to opaque corporate networks that obscure their true owners. This is a common strategy to shield real beneficiaries from legal consequences.
AIS manipulation or deactivation. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a key tool for vessel tracking. Disabling AIS suggests an intent to conceal routes and violate international maritime regulations. SAVITRI and SEA HONOR, in particular, have systematically deactivated their AIS to obscure their activities. Russia refined this practice between 2015 and 2019 during the illicit export of agricultural goods from occupied Crimea and Donbas.
Ship-to-Ship (STS) transfers. This is one of the most common methods used to disguise the origin of Russian oil. A vessel loads crude near Russian ports and then transfers it to another ship in neutral waters. SAVITRI, for example, conducted 54 STS transfers in 2024 alone. In response to such tactics, Ukraine has expanded its contiguous zone of Ukraine (a maritime belt adjacent to its territorial sea, extending up to 24 nautical miles (44.4 km) from the baseline of the coastline) at the legislative level, allowing authorities to inspect vessels that disable AIS while conducting offshore cargo transfers.
Challenges and Risks
Russia’s shadow fleet operations pose significant challenges not only to sanctions enforcement but also to environmental security:
- Risk of ecological disasters. Most of these vessels are aging and fail to meet modern environmental standards, increasing the likelihood of oil spills with catastrophic consequences. A stark example is the contamination of the Black Sea and the Crimean coastline with three tons of fuel oil following accidents involving the tankers Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239.
- Destabilization of the global energy market. The shadow oil trade creates an uneven playing field, undermining efforts to reduce dependency on Russian energy resources.
Countermeasures
Effectively blocking Russia’s shadow fleet requires a comprehensive approach that combines sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and advanced technology:
- Strengthening sanctions on shipowners and intermediaries. The U.S., U.K., and EU should expand their sanctions lists to include not just vessels but also companies involved in ownership, insurance, and maintenance. Additionally, flag states such as Panama, Gambia, Djibouti, and Guyana, frequently used by Russia, must be held accountable for registering sanctioned vessels.
- Leveraging advanced monitoring technologies. Greater oversight of AIS deactivations is needed, along with the development of alternative satellite-tracking technologies to monitor illicit shipments. A more extensive analysis of Ship-to-Ship (STS) transfers can help identify and disrupt the routes used for Russian and other sanctioned oil exports.
- Collaboration with financial institutions. Stricter financial controls should be imposed on banks facilitating transactions involving Russian oil. Special attention should be given to blocking payments for crude that has been re-exported through STS operations.
- Implementing a “blacklist” mechanism for ports. An international registry of vessels involved in illicit Russian oil shipments should be established, barring these ships from accessing ports in G7 and EU nations.
Conclusion
Only a comprehensive set of measures can effectively halt Russia’s illicit oil exports and deprive the Putin regime of a critical revenue stream used to finance its aggression.
