Following Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent imposition of Western sanctions, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the central channels enabling Moscow to access “sanctions-sensitive” goods. Trade flows between Kazakhstan and Russia surged sharply from 2022 onward, with the most dramatic growth concentrated in microelectronics, drones, and dual-use components essential for Russia’s defense-industrial base.
Explosive Growth in Microelectronics and High-Tech Transit to Russia
Kazakhstan’s exports of microchips and electronics to Russia expanded at an unprecedented pace in the first year of the war:
- Microchips: from $245,000 in 2021 to $18 million in 2022.
- Electronics and mobile phones: over $575 million between January–October 2022 (compared to just $30–35 million during the same period in 2021).
- Computers: approximately $296 million in 2022, up from a negligible $127,000 in 2021.
Analytical reports on Central Asia consistently identify Kazakhstan—together with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Armenia—as a key conduit for sanctions-restricted goods entering Russia via the Eurasian Economic Union’s duty-free regime.
This is a textbook model of “parallel import.” Goods are purchased in the EU, U.S., or Asia, registered to Kazakh companies, and re-exported to Russia already labeled as “Kazakhstan’s export.”
Drones and UAV Components: A Structured Re-Export Pipeline
Investigative reporting provides extensive evidence of re-exports involving drones, UAV components, and microelectronics used in Russian missile and drone production.
In 2022:
- Kazakhstan imported nearly $5 million worth of drones (mainly from China).
- The same year, it exported $1.23 million worth of drones to Russia.
These figures capture only the officially declared transfers, excluding components, microelectronics, and transit schemes routed through intermediaries. Thus, they represent a confirmation of the pathway, not the full scale of the re-export network.
Microchip flows display the same pattern:
- Kazakhstan’s imports of microchips doubled in 2022, exceeding $75 million.
- Its exports of microchips to Russia increased seventy-fold—from $245,000 to $18 million.
Multiple investigations show that Russian beneficiaries routinely establish Kazakh front companies that procure electronics and drones from Europe, China, and the U.S., and then deliver them to Russia—including directly into its military-industrial complex.
Regional assessments estimate that billions of dollars’ worth of microchips and missile/drone components have already been funneled to Russia through Central Asia, though attributing precise shares to each country remains difficult.
Energy Sector: Indirect Support Through Transit and Integrated Infrastructure
Kazakhstan’s role in supporting Russia extends beyond electronics. In the energy sector, its contribution is less about formal sanctions evasion and more about cooperative infrastructure that mitigates pressure on Russia’s export capacities.
Gas Transit
Transit of Russian gas through Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan reached 5.6 bcm in 2024.
Plans project:
- 7.3 bcm in 2025
- Up to 11 bcm annually by 2026
This rerouting helps Russia redirect gas flows from Europe toward Central Asian markets, softening the impact of sanctions on its gas sector.
Oil Cooperation
Roughly 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to the port near Novorossiysk—an infrastructure Russia also uses.
The EU permits the import of non-Russian oil transported via Russian pipelines, provided the origin is proven. While the system theoretically allows for “origin dilution,” major grey schemes currently occur primarily via Türkiye and India.
Kazakhstan as a Critical Sanctions Buffer for Moscow
As of 2025, Kazakhstan remains one of the strategic hubs enabling Russia to bypass Western sanctions—particularly in microelectronics, drones, dual-use components, and a broad array of electronic goods.
Compared with 2021, the scale of these transfers has expanded by orders of magnitude.
Collectively, these mechanisms provide Moscow with a critical sanctions shock-absorber, allowing it to partially restore access to international technology and sustain its military-industrial production despite Western restrictions.
Why Central Asia became a key sanctions-evasion hub
More on this story: How Hungary’s Outreach to Central Asia Risks Undermining EU Sanctions on Russia
- Collapse of Russia–EU logistics corridors after 2022.
- Rapid pivot to Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) internal free-movement mechanisms.
- China’s dominance in supplying dual-use goods to the region.
- Weak Western export-control presence in Central Asia.
- Political unwillingness in Astana/Bishkek to confront Moscow directly.
Why Kazakhstan specifically—not Kyrgyzstan or Armenia—matters most
Highlight:
- Size of the economy
- Transport infrastructure
- Manufacturing capacity
- Ability to disguise Russian-controlled companies
- Its status as “politically friendly yet officially neutral”
This adds geopolitical depth, not just trade numbers.
Layers of Attribution: Who Runs These Schemes?
- Russian front companies in Kazakhstan
(patterns: newly registered LLCs, Russian beneficial owners, Kazakh nominal directors) - Specific Kazakh intermediaries tied to Russia’s defense industry
- Role of Chinese suppliers and how they mark dual-use goods as “civilian”
- Kazakh customs gaps exploited for re-export
- Kazakhstan’s internal political economy (clans, ministries, and lobby groups that protect these trade flows)
This transforms the paper from descriptive → actionable.
Enforcement Response Scenarios
RLI readers (policy community, analysts, journalists) expect recommendations and scenario forecasts.
- Western countermeasures in 2025–2026
- Expected reactions by Astana
- Russia’s likely adaptation routes if Kazakhstan tightens controls
- What goods are most vulnerable to future interdiction
A short scenario matrix (Optimistic / Baseline / Adverse) would significantly elevate the publication.
Deepen the Military-Industrial Impact Analysis
Critical Russian systems dependent on Kazakh-supported supply chains:
- Lancet drones
- Orlan-series UAVs
- Shahed/“Geran” guidance modules
- Kalibr/Iskander microelectronics
- Night-vision and thermal optics
- CNC machines for missile/aircraft production
- Communications equipment
Quantify the importance:
- “Without Central Asian supply chains, Russia would face an X-month delay in UAV output.”
- “Kazakhstan is indirectly supporting the survivability of Russia’s cruise missile inventory.”
Kazakh Government Positioning
Astana maintains a dual-track foreign policy:
- Public support for territorial integrity of Ukraine
- Private facilitation of trade flows enabling Russian aggression
- Systematic non-enforcement of export controls
- Political fear of Russian destabilization inside Kazakhstan (northern regions)
Why Kazakhstan cannot or will not stop these flows
- Fear of Russian hybrid operations
- Dependence on Russian transport routes
- Pressure from Kazakh businesses profiting from re-export
- Domestic stability concerns
This adds essential geopolitical nuance.
- Kazakh transit allows Gazprom to present itself as expanding in Central Asia despite sanctions.
- CPC oil flows indirectly stabilize Russia’s export infrastructure.
- Russia uses cooperation with Kazakhstan to influence EU energy security debates.
This transforms an economic description into a strategic assessment.
- Kazakhstan is now Moscow’s most important sanctions-evasion corridor.
- Re-export volumes have strategic impact on Russia’s ability to continue the war.
- Western pressure on Kazakhstan is insufficient and inconsistent.
- Russia–Kazakhstan trade is likely to expand further in 2025–2026.
Risks for the West
- Erosion of export-control credibility
- Strengthening of Russian defense production
- Growing Chinese influence in Central Asia
Fragmentation of Western sanctions regimes
