On January 2, 2026, President Javier Milei published an emergency decree (DNU 941/2025) amending Argentina’s National Intelligence Law (Law 25,520) and reorganizing the intelligence system around SIDE (Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado). The decree (1) formalizes a new internal structure—including a Federal Cyberintelligence Agency (AFC)—and (2) controversially authorizes intelligence personnel to apprehend individuals in limited circumstances (e.g., flagrante delicto / “caught in the act”) while requiring immediate notification of police/security forces.
The move lands after months of turbulence inside SIDE—including the December 3, 2025 removal of the agency’s chief amid allegations and internal power struggles reported by El País—and fits a longer reform arc that began with July 2024changes that dissolved/reshaped the previous intelligence architecture and re-centered SIDE.
Why now: the political logic behind timing
Consolidation after scandal and internal infighting
A common trigger for intelligence “reform by decree” is an internal legitimacy crisis: leadership scandals, accusations of misuse of funds, and allegations of illicit surveillance create pressure for the executive to reassert control, replace personnel, and rewrite authorities in a way that locks in a new chain of command.
The December 2025 leadership switch at SIDE—reported as tied to accusations of improper conduct and framed by El País as part of power struggles in Milei’s inner circle—helps explain why the government would seek to quickly “reset” the system via a sweeping DNU rather than a slower congressional process.
Governing through DNUs to bypass a contested legislature (and exploiting the calendar)
Opposition lawmakers explicitly argue the government moved while Congress was on summer break, calling the reform too significant for a decree and warning it enables political espionage.
That complaint points to a straightforward motive: DNUs are a way to move fast and set facts on the ground before sustained parliamentary scrutiny.
This matters because intelligence reform is uniquely vulnerable to legislative resistance: oversight committees, budget controls, and “red lines” (domestic spying, detention powers) tend to produce cross-party pushback. Moving first, by decree, forces opponents to fight uphill—to reverse an already-operational framework.
Building a “state security” toolkit for a polarized domestic environment
Milei’s government has pursued high-speed economic and institutional restructuring, which tends to generate social resistance, union mobilization, and mass protest. In that setting, executives often look to intelligence services for early warning and counterintelligence narratives (foreign influence, sabotage, interference) that politically justify tighter control.
The decree’s emphasis on counterintelligence and the reorganization of the system around SIDE—plus the shift toward blanket “covert” characterization of intelligence activity—aligns with a model designed for maximum executive visibility, minimum external visibility.
Cyber as the fast-growing justification for centralization
Cybersecurity and cyber intelligence have become the most elastic rationale for intelligence expansion worldwide. Argentina’s decree formalizes a Federal Cyberintelligence Agency (AFC) tasked with intelligence production in cyberspace and the radioelectric spectrum.
Civil society groups argue this trend in Argentina has already been moving toward placing cybersecurity functions under SIDE’s orbit and warn it increases surveillance risk and reduces transparency.
Politically, cyber offers two advantages:
- it is technically complex (easy to justify secrecy), and
- it can be framed as “defending critical infrastructure,” even when tools can be repurposed for domestic monitoring.
What actually changes (high-signal elements)
A) Detention/apprehension authority for intelligence personnel
The DNU explicitly adds authority for intelligence personnel to apprehend persons in specific contexts (including flagrante delicto) with a requirement to notify police/security forces immediately.
B) “Covert by definition” intelligence activity
Reporting and legal critiques emphasize the decree’s move to treat intelligence activity as inherently covert, raising concerns about accountability and the ability to challenge abuses.
C) Expanded structural role for cyber intelligence
The decree and accompanying reporting outline new components under SIDE, including the AFC and inspectorate functions, reinforcing SIDE’s central position within the intelligence system.
Consequences: what this reform is likely to produce
Short-term: stronger executive control, faster operational tempo
If the government’s intent is consolidation, it will likely succeed in the near term:
- clearer hierarchy inside SIDE,
- more centralized tasking,
- quicker ability to initiate sensitive operations without legislative bargaining.
Medium-term: higher risk of domestic political surveillance and “mission creep”
Argentina has a long and painful history of intelligence being used for domestic political purposes. Critics across opposition blocs and civil society argue the decree increases opacity and could enable political espionage.
The key risk isn’t a single abuse—it’s institutional drift:
- cyber-intel collection justified as “security” becomes monitoring of activists/journalists,
- counterintelligence language expands to cover dissent framed as “interference,”
- secrecy prevents external correction until scandals erupt.
Legal and parliamentary backlash
Expect sustained challenges on process and constitutionality. Reporting indicates opposition legislators have argued the decree lacks genuine urgency and intrudes into sensitive legal domains.
Even if courts move slowly, the litigation itself can:
- chill interagency cooperation,
- deter professional кадров within the services,
- create political bargaining costs for the government.
Intelligence effectiveness trade-off: capacity vs legitimacy
Centralization can improve coordination, but legitimacy is an operational asset for intelligence services. If the reform is widely perceived as enabling a “secret police” model (a phrase used by critics), public trust collapses and intelligence becomes politicized—reducing quality, increasing leaks, and pushing the service toward internal politics over external threats.
Cyber governance credibility problem
Civil society analysis argues that folding cybersecurity more tightly into intelligence structures risks undermining rights-based cybersecurity policy and public accountability.
Practically, this can weaken:
- reporting of incidents by private sector actors,
- transparency around CERT coordination,
- adoption of security standards (if stakeholders fear intelligence capture).
What to watch next (indicators the reform is becoming coercive)
- Budget secrecy expansion and reduced congressional audit visibility.
- Use of counterintelligence language to justify monitoring journalists, unions, or opposition figures (echoing past allegations reported around SIDE leadership).
- Early cases where “apprehension” powers are used in politically sensitive contexts (protests, strikes).
Further institutional moves placing cybersecurity implementation under intelligence-led structures.
