In the new version of Russia’s Information Security Doctrine, mobile devices, satellite internet systems such as Starlink, as well as email services and other IT technologies developed by Western companies are defined as instruments of “destructive information-technical influence” on Russia.
At the “InfoForum-2026,” Dmitry Gribkov, an aide to the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, stated that mobile devices, satellite internet systems such as Starlink, as well as email services and other IT technologies of Western companies are being used to exert “destructive information-technical influence” on Russia. According to him, these “threats” will be reflected in the new version of the country’s Information Security Doctrine, which is currently being prepared by the Russian Security Council. Gribkov also said that the document—classified as a strategic one and intended to serve as a foundation for legislation and applied programs—will proclaim a course toward “strengthening” Russia’s sovereignty in the information sphere.
Under the new doctrine, the state plans to exercise control over the digital space and personal devices at all stages—from the moment of creation to the start of operation of any digital systems, including those based on artificial intelligence.
In terms of the scale of censorship and restrictions on internet access, Russia already ranks among the world’s leaders, and in terms of the duration of intentional internet shutdowns, it firmly holds first place globally. In 2025, internet shutdowns in Russia lasted a total of 37,166 hours and affected virtually the entire population of the country—146 million people. According to forecasts by RKS Global experts, in the coming years internet access in Russia may be limited to a “whitelist” of government-approved websites, while digital control mechanisms may be tightened to the point of criminalizing any communication not controlled by the security services and introducing a total facial recognition system.
According to their assessments, by 2028 information control in Russia may fully crystallize into an autocratic system modeled on Turkmenistan, with a transition to “whitelists” of government-approved websites. The expansion of surveillance tools would make internet traffic de facto fully transparent and enable the state to create “centralized databases of citizen profiles.”
The course toward creating “whitelists” of websites and restricting satellite internet effectively signifies Russia’s withdrawal from participation in the global information exchange. Instead of building a strong national IT sector, the Kremlin is choosing the path of constructing a digital iron curtain that isolates Russian citizens from global knowledge and turns “sovereignty” into a synonym for technological and cultural degradation. Record-breaking levels of internet shutdowns in Russia in 2025 clearly demonstrate that political control is more important to the Kremlin than economic stability. As a result, Russia risks being left with an archaic economy,
incapable of competing in a world of digital speed, since modern business cannot function under conditions of unpredictable connectivity;
• declaring ordinary smartphones a “security threat” turns millions of Russians into potential offenders simply by virtue of owning everyday devices, creating a legal basis for total intrusion into private life and arbitrary actions by Russian security services under the pretext of combating “destructive influence.” Today, private life in Russia definitively ceases to be private, becoming an object of state “interest”;
• the demand by Kremlin lawmakers to control the creation of digital systems and AI “at all stages” effectively puts an end to independent IT development. No talented programmer will be able—or willing—to create a product if every line of code is overseen by a commission from the Russian Security Council or the FSB. This is a path toward turning Russia into a technological backwater, where innovation is replaced by servicing surveillance systems;
• the orientation toward a model of total control characteristic of the world’s most closed autocracies represents an admission by the Kremlin authorities of their fear of Russian society. The creation of centralized profile databases and facial recognition systems is aimed not at protecting citizens, but at absolute control, paving the way toward a society in which any “incorrect” opinion is punished;
• Under the slogan of “strengthening sovereignty,” a course toward creating a digital ghetto in Russia is being pursued. Instead of developing its own competitive technologies, the Kremlin chooses the path of banning global standards. True sovereignty, however, exists when your technologies are in demand worldwide—not when you ban others because you are unable to control them.
From cybersecurity to preemptive political control
Traditionally, information security doctrines focus on protecting critical infrastructure, state systems, or classified data. The new Russian approach expands the threat definition to mass-use civilian technologies, thereby erasing the boundary between national security and private life.
By asserting the state’s right to control digital systems “at all stages”—from design and development to deployment and use—the Kremlin is institutionalizing preemptive control, not reactive defense. This effectively:
- legalizes surveillance before any offense occurs,
- allows intervention without proof of wrongdoing,
- and shifts the burden of “security compliance” onto citizens and developers.
In practical terms, ownership becomes suspicion. Millions of Russians using ordinary smartphones, foreign apps, or satellite connectivity may fall under expanded scrutiny simply for remaining connected to the global digital ecosystem.
Legal architecture for mass criminalization and selective repression
Labeling common technologies as security risks creates a flexible legal weapon for selective enforcement. The doctrine does not require universal repression to be effective; it enables arbitrary enforcement, which is often more powerful.
This architecture allows the state to:
- selectively criminalize journalists, activists, entrepreneurs, or political opponents,
- justify seizures of devices and data under “information security” grounds,
- normalize intrusive searches and monitoring without judicial transparency.
As a result, private life in Russia is no longer a protected sphere but a conditional privilege subject to security service interpretation. This mirrors patterns seen in the late Soviet period—but with exponentially greater technical capacity.
Economic and technological self-sabotage
The doctrine’s demand for state oversight of all digital and AI systems at every stage is fundamentally incompatible with modern innovation.
Innovation ecosystems require:
- intellectual freedom,
- open-source collaboration,
- predictable legal environments,
- and global integration.
The Kremlin’s approach produces the opposite:
- bureaucratic supervision of code,
- security service oversight of development,
- criminal liability for technical nonconformity.
The likely outcome is not technological sovereignty, but accelerated brain drain, collapse of independent startups, and the transformation of Russia’s IT sector into a subcontractor for surveillance, censorship, and state databases.
This locks Russia into an extractive digital economy, where technology serves repression rather than productivity—placing it at a structural disadvantage against countries operating in high-speed, high-trust digital markets.
The “white list” model: exit from the global internet
The projected transition to government-approved “white lists” of websites marks a decisive break with the global information order. This is not regulation; it is informational secession.
Such a model:
- eliminates free access to global knowledge,
- breaks compatibility with international research, education, and commerce,
- forces users into a curated, state-controlled information bubble.
Comparatively, this places Russia not alongside China (which still maintains global industrial integration), but closer to Turkmenistan or North Korea, where digital isolation reinforces regime stability at the cost of national development.
5. Surveillance state logic: fear as policy driver
The planned expansion of facial recognition, centralized citizen profiles, and fully transparent internet traffic reveals the doctrine’s core motivation: regime insecurity.
This is not about external threats—it is about internal mistrust. The Kremlin is building a system designed to:
- anticipate dissent,
- identify networks before mobilization,
- suppress political alternatives at inception.
In this sense, the doctrine is an admission: the regime no longer believes it can coexist with an informed, connected society.
6. Strategic signaling to allies and adversaries
Internationally, the doctrine signals three things:
- To allies: Russia offers rhetorical support but is retreating into digital autarky rather than global leadership.
- To adversaries: Moscow prioritizes internal control over technological competition.
- To the Global South: Russia’s governance model is converging with the most closed autocracies, weakening its appeal as an alternative development path.
This undercuts Russia’s long-standing claim to be a champion of “multipolarity” in the digital sphere.
Strategic Conclusion
The revised Information Security Doctrine does not strengthen Russia’s sovereignty—it redefines sovereignty as isolation and surveillance. By criminalizing connectivity and subordinating innovation to security services, the Kremlin is trading long-term competitiveness for short-term political control.
The result is a self-reinforcing cycle:
- isolation breeds stagnation,
- stagnation breeds repression,
- repression requires deeper isolation.
Rather than defending Russia from “destructive influence,” the doctrine risks making technological and cultural degradation state policy.
Comparative Models of Digital Control
Russia vs. China vs. Turkmenistan
| Dimension | Russia (Proposed Doctrine, 2026–2028) | China (Mature Model) | Turkmenistan (Closed Autocracy Model) |
| Strategic Goal | Regime survival through total political control and preemptive repression | Regime stability + economic competitiveness | Regime survival through isolation |
| Access to Global Internet | Transitioning toward “white lists” of approved sites; access increasingly restricted | Broad access for business, science, and elites; blocked platforms substituted with domestic equivalents | Severely restricted; most global sites inaccessible |
| Treatment of Smartphones | Defined as potential security threats; ownership may imply surveillance | Fully integrated into state ecosystem; extensive monitoring but not criminalized | Heavily monitored; usage restricted |
| Satellite Internet (Starlink etc.) | Explicitly classified as a hostile technology | Effectively blocked through regulatory and technical means | Prohibited |
| Digital Surveillance | Moving toward total surveillance: facial recognition, centralized citizen profiles, traffic transparency | Advanced, integrated surveillance tied to social governance | Crude but pervasive surveillance |
| Legal Framework | Expanding “information security” laws enabling selective criminalization | Codified, predictable (within authoritarian logic) regulatory regime | Arbitrary enforcement, minimal legal transparency |
| Control Over IT Development | State control at all stages of development, incl. AI | Strong regulation but allows large-scale innovation | Minimal domestic innovation |
| Innovation Environment | High risk of brain drain; IT sector repurposed for surveillance | World-class innovation within political constraints | Near-total technological stagnation |
| Role of Domestic Tech Firms | Subordinate to security services | Central to state strategy (Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei) | Marginal or non-existent |
| Economic Integration | Shrinking integration; sanctions + self-isolation | Deep global supply-chain integration | Largely isolated |
| Model of Sovereignty | Isolationist sovereignty | Competitive authoritarian sovereignty | Autarkic sovereignty |
| Public Narrative | “Defense against destructive influence” | “Cyber sovereignty with development” | “Protection of national values” |
| Long-Term Outcome | Risk of digital stagnation and cultural regression | Sustained growth with tight political control | Structural economic and technological decline |
- Russia is not becoming China.
China restricts information but protects innovation and global integration. Russia’s doctrine undermines both. - Russia is converging toward Turkmenistan’s logic, but with far greater technical capacity—making repression more effective, but also more economically damaging.
- China’s model is selective control + openness; Russia’s emerging model is control + isolation.
The Kremlin’s claim of “digital sovereignty” increasingly resembles digital autarky, not strategic independence.
