Following an attack by a Russian Shahed-type drone on an electrical substation in the city of Perechyn (Zakarpattia region, approximately 10 km from the Ukrainian–Slovak border), Slovak President Peter Pellegrini initiated the introduction of a new legal regime in the country—referred to as a “state of threat.”

Although Slovak military authorities confirmed that the drone did not cross the state border, the proximity of the explosion—which injured one person and caused a power outage in a Ukrainian settlement—prompted Bratislava to reconsider its legal framework.

The proposed amendments to the Constitution are intended to eliminate the legal gap between “peacetime” and “wartime” conditions by granting the armed forces the authority to rapidly shoot down or intercept aerial targets in border areas without the need to formally declare a state of war.

Currently, Slovakia recognizes only two legal states—peace or war—with no intermediate framework. As President Pellegrini noted, this creates operational challenges for the military, as in peacetime it lacks the authority to effectively implement preventive measures to safely respond to incidents such as drone crashes or other aerial threats.

Slovak military officials are increasingly concerned about Russian drone attacks targeting energy infrastructure in Ukraine’s Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia regions.

President Pellegrini has announced a “roundtable” meeting, during which military representatives will brief political parties on the proposed legislative changes aimed at introducing the new “state of threat” legal regime.

Slovakia’s “State of Threat”: Closing the Legal Gap in Europe’s Emerging Grey-Zone Warfare

The Russian drone strike near Perechyn—just 10 km from Slovakia’s border—has triggered more than a tactical response in Bratislava. It has exposed a structural vulnerability in European security frameworks: the inability of states to respond effectively to grey-zone threats that fall between peace and war.

Slovakia’s proposed “state of threat” doctrine is therefore not merely a legal adjustment—it is an early indicator of how frontline states are adapting to persistent, low-intensity cross-border risks generated by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The Strategic Problem: War Without Crossing Borders

The incident highlights a key feature of modern conflict:

• Russia conducts strikes close to NATO territory
• Effects spill over (shockwaves, infrastructure disruption, civilian impact)
• But without formal violation of NATO borders

 Result:
A security grey zone where:

• Threats are real
• But legal thresholds for response are unclear

The Legal Gap in European Defense Systems

Slovakia currently operates under a binary framework:

• Peacetime → limited military authority
• Wartime → full operational powers

This creates a critical gap:

• The military cannot act proactively against emerging threats
• Air defense responses are legally constrained
• Reaction time is slowed by political/legal procedures

The “state of threat” aims to:

• Enable rapid interception of aerial targets
• Allow preventive action without escalation to war status

From Reactive to Preventive Defense

The proposed changes shift Slovakia’s posture:

Before:

• Reactive
• Legally constrained
• Dependent on formal escalation

After:

• Preventive
• Flexible
• Operationally empowered

This is a transition toward continuous readiness, not episodic response.

Implications for NATO’s Eastern Flank

Slovakia’s move reflects a broader trend among frontline states:

• Poland, Romania, and Baltic states face similar risks
• Repeated drone/missile activity near borders increases pressure

Potential outcomes:

• Development of national-level “grey-zone doctrines”
• Increased autonomy in rules of engagement
• Gradual shift from NATO-wide frameworks → state-driven adaptations

 This could lead to fragmentation in response standards across NATO

Escalation Management vs. Escalation Risk

The doctrine attempts to balance two competing needs:

A. Avoid Escalation

• No formal declaration of war
• No automatic NATO Article 5 trigger

B. Ensure Security

• Immediate response to aerial threats
• Protection of critical infrastructure

However, risk remains:

• Misidentification of targets
• Accidental interception near borders
• Russian exploitation of incidents for escalation narratives

Russia’s Strategic Advantage in the Grey Zone

Russia benefits from this ambiguity:

• Can apply pressure without triggering NATO response
• Forces neighboring states into legal and political dilemmas
• Tests thresholds of Western tolerance

The goal is not direct confrontation, but:
constant strategic pressure at low cost

Broader European Implications

If Slovakia proceeds:

A. Norm Setting

• Other states may adopt similar legal frameworks
• A new category of “pre-war readiness” may emerge

B. Legal Evolution

• European security law shifts from binary → spectrum-based

C. Institutional Challenge

• NATO and EU may need to:
  • Harmonize rules
  • Define thresholds for grey-zone response

Strategic Outlook

Most likely developments (2026–2028):

• Expansion of similar legal regimes across Eastern Europe
• Increased militarization of border zones
• Growing normalization of constant low-level threat environment

Key Judgment

Slovakia’s “state of threat” is not just a domestic legal reform—it is a prototype for how European states will adapt to prolonged hybrid and grey-zone warfare.

The core shift:
From peace vs. war
to
continuous threat management

Policy Implications

For NATO / EU:

• Develop shared doctrine for grey-zone aerial threats
• Improve cross-border air defense coordination
• Clarify legal thresholds for:
  • interception;
  • engagement.
• Support frontline states with:
  • intelligence;
  • rapid response systems.

The war in Ukraine is no longer contained geographically.

It is reshaping how Europe defines security, law, and response itself.

Slovakia’s move is an early signal of that transformation.

because Slovakia’s proposed “state of threat” is not unique in substance, even if the wording is. Many countries already have intermediate legal regimes between peace and war, designed exactly for grey-zone threats, terrorism, or hybrid warfare.

France — State of Emergency

• Legal regime: State of Emergency (état d’urgence)
• Used after 2015 Paris attacks
• Powers include:
  • Expanded police/military authority
  • Movement restrictions
  • Rapid security operations

 Closest Western example of non-war emergency security regime

Poland — State of Emergency / State of Threat 

• Used during:
  • Belarus border crisis (2021–2023)
• Allowed:
  • Military deployment in peacetime
  • Restricted access zones
  • Faster response to hybrid threats

Very similar logic to Slovakia: grey-zone border threats

Baltic States — Emergency / Enhanced Readiness

• Legal tools:
  • States of emergency
  • Crisis regimes
• Used for:
  • Hybrid threats (migration weaponization, Russia risks)

Focus: continuous readiness without full war declaration

Germany — State of Defense / Internal Emergency

• Germany is more restrictive:
  • Strong legal limits on military use domestically
• But allows:
  • Deployment in “internal emergency” situations

 More cautious model, but still bridges peace-war gap

 Israel — Continuous State of Emergency

• Permanent state of emergency since 1948
• Allows:
  • Immediate military response
  • Rapid interception of threats

Extreme example of permanent “state of threat” reality

United States — National Emergency Framework

• Uses:
  • National emergency declarations;
  • Homeland security frameworks.
• Enables:
  • Military support;
  • Airspace protection.

Flexible but less explicitly codified as “threat state”

 Where Slovakia Fits

Slovakia’s proposed “state of threat” would:

• Be closer to:
  • Poland;
  • Baltic models;
• Less like:
  •  Germany (too restrictive);
  •  France (terror-focused).

 It is essentially:
A NATO-border version of a hybrid-threat legal regime

Key Insight

Most Western systems are evolving from:

 Binary model:
peace 🟢 vs war 🔴

Toward:
🟢 peace → 🟡 threat → 🔴 war

Why This Matters

Slovakia is not inventing something new—
it is formalizing a trend already happening across Europe:

• Permanent low-level threats
• Drone warfare spillover
• Hybrid operations

“State of threat” is becoming:

The new normal legal category
for countries living next to modern conflict zones.

Here’s a compact comparison table of countries with a “state of threat”-like regime—meaning a legal framework that sits between ordinary peacetime administration and full war, and lets the state use emergency powers for security or crisis response. France’s état d’urgence can be declared in cases of imminent danger from serious public-order threats or public calamity; Germany’s Basic Law separates an internal emergency from a state of defence; Israel’s Basic Law lets the Knesset declare a state of emergency; Estonia has both an emergency situation under the Emergency Act and a distinct state of emergency under the State of Emergency Act; Lithuania has used a state-level emergency situation/state of emergency in response to hybrid pressure at the Belarus border; and the United States uses a national emergency framework alongside Stafford Act emergency declarations. 

Country	Name of regime	Main trigger	Typical powers	Military/security role	Closest match to Slovakia’s proposed “state of threat”?
France	State of emergency(état d’urgence)	Imminent danger from serious public-order disturbances or events amounting to public calamity	House searches, residence restrictions, expanded administrative security measures	Primarily internal-security focused; not a war declaration	Partial match — strong emergency powers, but more public-order/terror oriented than border-air-defense focused.
Germany	Internal emergency/ state of defence	Internal threat to the constitutional order, or armed attack for state of defence	Federal-Länder coordination, security reinforcement; separate war powers for state of defence	Bundeswehr role exists but is constitutionally constrained; Germany keeps a sharper legal separation than Slovakia appears to want.	Limited match — Germany has an intermediate concept, but it is narrower and more restrictive.
Israel	State of emergency	Declared by the Knesset, or by the government if immediate action is needed before Knesset approval	Broad emergency rulemaking and emergency administration	Strong, continuous civil-military emergency management capacity through state emergency structures.	Functional match, though Israel’s regime is much broader and more entrenched.
Estonia	Emergency situationand separate state of emergency	Serious crisis affecting vital services/public safety; separate constitutional-order threat for state of emergency	Crisis management, continuity of vital services, emergency measures	Defence Forces and Defence League can be involved in resolving an emergency situation.	Strong match — Estonia already has a layered model between routine peace and full national emergency.
Lithuania	State-level emergency situation / state of emergency	Hybrid pressure, border crisis, public-security threat	Border controls, crisis-response powers, emergency administration	Used in practice for Belarus-border hybrid pressure; geared toward fast reaction short of war.	Strong match — probably the closest political-legal analogue in the EU/NATO east.
United States	National emergency/ emergency declaration	President determines a national emergency; Stafford Act emergencies for disasters/man-made crises	Activates statutory emergency authorities and/or federal assistance	Military role depends on the statute invoked; framework is flexible but not one single border-threat regime.	Partial match — flexible emergency law, but less tailored to the “border drone threat” problem.

Best analogues for Slovakia: Lithuania and Estonia are the closest practical models, because both already operate with legal layers designed for hybrid threats, border pressure, and crisis response short of war. France and Israel clearly have intermediate emergency regimes too, but they are broader and were built around different threat profiles. 

Bottom line: the basic European trend is moving away from a simple peace/war binary toward a three-step model: ordinary peacetime, heightened threat/emergency, and full war. Slovakia’s proposed “state of threat” would fit that broader shift.

Impact of Slovakia’s “State of Threat” on Democracy

Executive Judgment

Slovakia’s proposed regime is not inherently undemocratic—in fact, it addresses a real security gap.
However, its impact depends entirely on how it is designed, limited, and overseen.

 Best case: strengthens democratic resilience;
Worst case: creates a tool for gradual executive overreach.

Positive Effects (Democratic Resilience)

A. Closing the “Security Gap”

Slovakia currently faces a structural problem:

• Peace → no action
• War → full powers

The new regime allows:

• proportional response to real threats (e.g., drones near border)
• faster decision-making

This strengthens:

• state credibility;
• citizen protection.

B. Avoiding Overreaction

Without a middle regime, governments face a dilemma:

• Either do nothing
• Or escalate to state of war

The “state of threat”:

• Provides a controlled, limited response framework

This can actually protect democracy from extreme measures

C. Alignment with Modern Security Reality

Modern threats:

• Hybrid warfare
• Drone strikes
• Cyber and infrastructure attacks

Democracies must adapt or risk:

• Paralysis;
• loss of control.

Democratic Risks

A. Expansion of Executive Power

The biggest risk:

 More authority shifts to:

• government;
• military;
• security agencies.

Potential consequences:

• reduced parliamentary control;
• faster—but less scrutinized—decisions.

B. Blurred Legal Boundaries

A “state of threat” sits in a grey zone:

• Not peace
• Not war

Risk:

• unclear thresholds for activation;
• possibility of frequent or prolonged use.

C. Normalization of Emergency Governance

If used repeatedly:

Emergency becomes:

• routine
• politically convenient

This can lead to:

• gradual erosion of:
  • civil liberties;
  • oversight mechanisms.

D. Potential Political Instrumentalization

In polarized environments, governments may use such regimes to:

• justify restrictions on:
  • protests
  • opposition activity
• frame dissent as “security risk”

Especially sensitive in:

• election periods
• high political tension

Key Democratic Safeguards (Critical Factor)

Whether the regime strengthens or weakens democracy depends on:

Time Limits

• Strict duration (e.g., 30–60 days)
• Mandatory renewal by parliament

Parliamentary Oversight

• Regular reporting;
• Approval for extensions.

Judicial Control

• Courts able to:
  • review decisions
  • protect rights

Clear Triggers

• Defined criteria:
  • drone threats
  • cross-border incidents
  • infrastructure attacks

Prevents arbitrary use

Comparison to Other Democracies

Slovakia would not be an outlier:

•  France → used emergency powers after terror attacks;
•  Poland → hybrid-border emergency;
• Baltic states → crisis regimes.

The key difference is always:
how constrained the power is.

Strategic Interpretation

This reform reflects a broader shift:

Democracies are moving from:

• binary systems (peace vs war)

 toward:

• continuous threat management

This creates tension:

• security ↑
• potential for power concentration ↑

Slovakia’s “state of threat” will:

 Strengthen democracy
if it is:

• temporary;
• transparent;
• accountable.

 Weaken democracy
if it becomes:

• vague
• permanent
• politically exploited

The regime itself is not the problem.

The real question is:
Will it be used as a shield for security—
or a tool of power?