From January 2020, the so-called Doomsday Clock by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, defining the risks of a global catastrophe, shows a record close to midnight – 100 seconds to 12. Even in October 1962, the Bulletin’s Doomsday Clock remained at 7 minutes to midnight.
Russia’s 2020 nuclear policy confirms that deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, is one of its highest priorities. However, it does not spell out the size of the nuclear arsenal needed to ensure this goal, other than stating that it should be ‘at an adequate level’. Given that its conventional forces, though much improved, are still no match for NATO, Moscow is unlikely to be interested in further nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Russia has every reason to want to keep the status quo under New START, which guarantees strategic nuclear parity with the US.
The expiration of the INF Treaty in August 2019, signals both regional and global security changing for the worse. Considering withdrawal from the treaty, all responsibility for peace and security is down to Russia.
Following Crimea’s annexation, the deployment of new complexes armed with prohibited missiles gave the Russian Federation military and political edge.
The INF Treaty was a real breakthrough in arms control. The entire category of American and Soviet missiles was destroyed. From 2014, the United States have been trying to persuade Russia that adherence to the INF Treaty was essential, holding dozens of bilateral meetings that went nowhere.
Russia has previously violated arms control treaties – the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the Russia took the decision to completely halt its participation in 2015), the Treaty on Open Skies, the Vienna Document.
Russia has no interest in maintaining the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The Russians seek to undermine any arms control agreement. Meanwhile, NATO’s high representatives have repeatedly confirmed that dialogue and arms control were the key focus areas for the North Atlantic bloc.
The United States withdrew from the INF Treaty in August 2019, after Russia had violated the Treaty by testing and deploying the prohibited SSC-8 (9M729) missile within its territory. This missile has a flight radius of 2,500 km, prohibited by the INF Treaty. But the treaty was practically violated even earlier, when the Kremlin had fielded the Kalibr missiles, violating the allowed flight range (up to 2,600 km).
Russia made its decision to withdraw from the treaty in early August 2019, when energy prices were favorable for the her. The fall in oil prices has put Russia in a bind. Russia, labelled as a gas station under the guise of a country by John McCain, cannot stand up to the losses from low oil price. It will be tough for Russia to stand against the United States in the “arms race” amid budget shortage and popular discontent in current tight corner. The U.S., unlike Russia, can afford the existing nuclear weapons stock maintenance, build it up and advance new developments. The Kremlin, therefore, will seek to conclude a profitable new INF-2 agreement. Moscow has launched a campaign, to this end, to accuse the United States of withdrawing from the deal, raising the Russian Cold War narrative about the World War III threat.
Violation of the INF Treaty by Moscow raises the question whether it makes sense to extend the START III treaty. START III does not tackle short-range tactical nuclear weapons and Russian warhead delivery systems. These areas today are, vice-versa, a priority for Russia’s defense and industry, seeking to ensure the guaranteed delivery for nuclear warheads and conventional large-yield explosives through the enemy’s air defense systems. The treaty, therefore, is incomplete and technologically backward.
Kalibr missiles, for example, violating the INF Treaty in range, can carry a nuclear warhead, thus challenging the START-3 Treaty implementation.
Any new treaty signed amid permanent disregard by Russia is a waste of effort and time and boosts Moscow to pursue arms race, violating the agreements. Such policy by Moscow lowers the threshold for starting a nuclear war.
Efforts to exhaust Russia in stepping up its nuclear and offensive capacity are the most optimal solution, in this regard. It should be also recognized that violation of treaties by Moscow and absence of an effective mechanism to monitor and verify the nuclear arsenal of the participating countries deprive the international community of a chance to control and limit nuclear weapons.
