Ethiopia’s continued efforts to dam the Nile could end in war with Egypt. Ethiopia and Egypt are two of Africa’s most populous and powerful countries; any ongoing showdown between them is a major threat to peace, which is why the international community should press for an equitable settlement.
Meanwhile, two other countries—Russia and the United States—have been looking for ways to mediate the dispute. The U.S. are leading a negotiation process, but if American efforts fail, Russia or China may step in.
Ethiopian-Prime Minister Abiy and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi held a meeting on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia, in late October, during which they merely agreed to allow a technical committee to continue its work. Their host, Russian President Vladimir Putin, pledged to help them reach an accommodation. The United States has invited Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan for discussions in Washington.
In 2011 Ethiopia began the construction of the 4.8 billion USD Dam (GERD) project on the Blue Nile near the Sudanese border. Ethiopia’s GERD will be the biggest dam in Africa. Egypt and Sudan previously argued that the construction of the dam would negatively affect their water shares and insisted the project should be blocked, calling on international donors against funding it. Ethiopia insisted that the project would not have a detrimental affect Sudan or Egypt, and that it would continue with it, regardless of their reactions. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is about 70 percent complete and promises to provide much-needed electricity for Ethiopia’s 70 million people.
The last 10 years Addis Ababa has been investing billions of dollars in building power plants. In February 2012 Ethiopia completed a World Bank funded 41 million USD power transmission line that links its power grid with neighboring Sudan that making available to import an initial 100MW of electricity. Currently export of electricity from Ethiopia to Djibouti is 35MW for 1.5 million USD per month. Ethiopia has plans to export 400MW of hydro-power generated electricity to Kenya by 2016 when a transmission line project will be completed. The long-term plans of Ethiopia are to supply power to South Sudan, Tanzania, Somalia, and Yemen. Thus Ethiopia plans to strengthen regional leadership through the export of energy resources and to become a regional energy hub, which will strengthen the political and economic influence in the region of the country.
There are two groups of countries fighting for their rights on Nile’s water resources. The first one is the downstream countries: Egypt and Sudan. The second groups are the upstream countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, Southern Sudan, Rwanda and Kenya.
Grand Renaissance Dam
The situation around project shows the strengthening of Ethiopian positions in geopolitical framework. The buildup of Ethiopia’s positions was possible due to period of political uncertainty in Egypt in recent years and disintegration processes in the region.
The disintegration of Somalia strengthens Ethiopian regional presence in the Horn of Africa. The participation of Addis Ababa in campaign against Somalia terrorist groups leads to its support by U.S. and cooperation with the White House.Thus Ethiopia gets 4 billion USD yearly in military, development and food assistance. The significant changes in cooperation with Ethiopia we can see in the reversal of positions concerned the construction of dams in this country. Earlier such projects were opposed for decades because they were considered a threat to regional security.
Actually Egypt has lost much of political weight in the Horn of Africa in recent years, given the floor to China and Ethiopia. Cairo has no role in Somalia and was not a key member in the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. Today it is clear that China’s interests are contrary to the interests of Egypt in the region.
The probability of armed conflict in the region is significantly growing since 2011.
The disintegration of Sudan on two parts has weakened this country and strengthens Ethiopia via participation since 2012, in the UN peacekeeping forces in the Abyei region, which is disputed between Sudan and South Sudan.
China is Ethiopia’s primary trade partner. Beijing has expressed willingness to finance a dam construction in Ethiopia and offered Chinese expertise in building large dams. Participation in such large-scale project will strengthen Chinese positions in Africa, specifically increasing its political and economic weight in the region. We believe that the significant importance is the fact that the downstream states are oil-producing and resource-rich countries that Beijing is interested in. In our opinion China has potential to finance GERD project in cooperation with Addis Ababa without financial flows from international organizations. The Ethiopian government is funding the project by selling bonds to Ethiopians and international buyers.
The current situation indicates attempts to change the regulatory and contractual framework, formed during the time of colonialism. In turn, this may result in a revision of other agreements made by countries in the past and breaking the system of inter-state relations in Africa. Thus, in 1929 the Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and UK was signed that gave Egypt 48 billion cubic meters annually and Sudan 4 billion cubic meters. Moreover it gave Cairo the right to veto any project in upstream countries affecting Egypt’s share of water flowing to it.
In 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters (66%) to Egypt would go to the Aswan Dam and 18.5 billion cubic meters (22%) to Sudan. The remainder, 12%, is lost to evaporation from Lake Nasser. But no other riparian signed 1929 and 1959 agreements. Egypt has proposed in the latest negotiations that it be guaranteed at least 40 billion cubic meters of water annually and that Ethiopia take a longer time to fill its reservoir. But Cairo’s leverage is limited, and so Ethiopia has offered just 31 billion cubic meters, which is only slightly more than half the quantity the 1959 agreement had guaranteed. Such an offer does not even begin to address Egypt’s needs, let alone satisfy its national pride as one of the African continent’s most historically consequential states. (Sudan, for its part, is less worried about its share because of its own supply of rainwater.)
The upstream countries want to modify the water-sharing agreement and keep
more of the water by building dams, which will directly affect the water share
of the downstream states, Egypt and Sudan.
In May 2010,
Ethiopia issued the Entebbe Agreement to modify the legal basis for the sharing
of water. The Entebbe Agreement was signed by Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania,
Ethiopia, and Rwanda, and then on February 28, 2011, Burundi became the sixth
signatory. In the end of May, 2013 the Agreement was signed by South Sudan. The
Entebbe Agreement reflects interests of upstream states on irrigated
agriculture in Nile basin, water for drinking and electricity generation.
95% of Egyptians live in Nile Valley and depend on river for fresh water. 86% of water reaching Aswan comes from Ethiopia and 14% arrives via White Nile from Uganda and southern riparian states. Agriculture biggest water consumer and it becomes the issue of national security because population in basin predicted to double between 1995 and 2025. So significant changes in water supply could be ended by crisis and military confrontation because water resources are limited but riparian needs are growing.
Egyptian officials said that signing of all upstream counties does not affect the legal stance of the downstream countries. However, the seventh countries that signed the Entebbe Agreement rejected such reasoning, insisted that the 1929 and 1959 agreements were void and invalid because they were written and ratified under British colonialism by colonialists. The Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Mohamed Bahaa Eddin in January 2013 said that Egypt would not sign the agreement, noting that it was not suitable for downstream countries, including Egypt. He said also that Egypt does not oppose the establishment of development projects along the Nile if they do not affect water distribution. But one of the main reasons was that Egypt suffers from an electricity crisis while the Ethiopian dam is projected to generate 6,000 megawatts. So thus clear that Cairo will have to buy electricity from Ethiopia, which will worsen its economic position and trade balance of Egypt.
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The GERD project could become trigger for further infrastructure projects on Nile. This is confirmed by the plans announced by the Kenyan government in 2011 to build 24 dams on the Nile within 10 years as the best investment to secure the country’s water needs. So the Entebbe Agreement may result in the loss of distribution of water balance in the Nile Basin.
Once completed, water-flows to the Sudan and Egypt could be substantially reduced during several years till reservoir is being filled. It could cause the deficit of 74 billion cubic meters of water for downstream countries. It should be added 2.5 billion cubic meters more of evaporated water and volume of water that will be withdrawn for use in irrigated agriculture in Ethiopia. Such forecast is based on previous experience of Turkey (Ataturk Dam) and USA (projects on Colorado River) and their implications for Syria, Iraq and Mexico. In 2012 there were protests over drinking and irrigation water shortages across Egypt. Several protests turn violent: in Beni Sueif, in Minya, in Fayyoum. So there is a possibility of military conflicts and clashes on the local level between different groups and tribes over water control. During 2003-2007 such fighting occurred in Sudan. The territory of Sudan and southern Egypt will be in the risk zone.
