Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan military campaign will intensify competition with Russia who supports the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar by providing him with weapons and sending ‘The Wagner-Group’ semi-state military company fighters. The importance to maintain a tactical alliance with Ankara and the desire to receive military-political dividends in Libya present the Kremlin with a challenge:
• deprive Haftar of the support and lose the prospects of a large presence in Libya,
• lose Turkey’s support in Syria or
• offer compromise solutions to Ankara.
The Turkish Parliament approved the mandate to send the military to Libya. Thus, Ankara reinforces its geopolitical positions in the region sharply and achieves several goals at once:
1. Protection of territorial claims to the Mediterranean maritime border according to the agreement signed with the GNA, and block restriction of the Turkish sea zone of influence by such regional countries as Greece, Egypt, France, Cyprus and Israel.
2. Consolidation of the role of a dominant player in the Islamic world.
3. Influence increase in the Mediterranean.
Turkey supports the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) recognized by the United Nations; the latter, on December 26,2019, sent the Turkish side a formal inquiry letter on the military support.
From the international law point of view, Ankara expects that it intervention in Libya will be carried out at the request of a legitimate government that requires no UN approval. Achieving Turkey’s economic goals in the region, in particular, taking control over energy deposits by at least 30%, will reduce Ankara’s dependence on Moscow.
Turkey’s involvement in the military campaign on the side of the GNA will radically change the military-political situation in the country in favor of the Tripoli government forces. It is unlikely that Haftar’s forces will have time to attack Tripoli before the Turkish forces are fully deployed in Libya. The dominance of Turkish air and maritime forces proves the low likelihood of such a scenario, and, thereby, makes a full-fledged attack on the capital impossible.
Despite the decision made by the Turkish parliament was condemned, it is unlikely that any of the foreign players will provide military support to the Haftar forces. At the same time, there are doubts that Russia will refuse to support Haftar. Probably, it will continue to provide assistance with hybrid tools that actually rules out a direct armed conflict between the armed forces of the two countries. Attacks on Russian Wagner’s fighters with no Kremlin’s reaction followed are also possible.
It is highly likely that the parties to the conflict will agree on the formation of zones of influence, thereby dividing the territory of Libya and taking control over them. Such a scenario is the most realistic, given the multi-ethnical tribal population of the country and the prospects to reconcile in the absence of a national leader. In order to maintain its influence, Russia is most likely to take on diplomatic mediation in resolving the situation. In this regard, Russia is likely to propose the federalization of Libya with a stake in Tobruk and retain of Haftar as the political leader of part of the country.
However, Turkey’s positions in Libya and Syria are more advantageous than Russia’s ones. Thus, Ankara has no significant incentives to compromise. At the same time, the Haftar’s defeat will be followed by an international investigation into the Russian fighters’ war crimes that eventually will blow up an image of the Kremlin.
