In 2020, Uzbekistan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union emerged full blown again. Moscow is talking about the importance of geopolitical expansion into Central Asia, while Tashkent is considering a band-aid solution – gaining observer status. The economic price tag is 2.2 million Uzbek labor migrants working in Russia.
In late March and early April, both houses of the Uzbek parliament created working groups on the country’s affiliation with the Eurasian Economic Union. Earlier, the government gave notice of submitting a proposal on Uzbekistan’s affiliation with this organization as an observer to both houses. Such efforts stem from the President’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan wording. In January 2020, he said that the issue of Uzbekistan’s joining the union should be studied in parliament from every angle.
Uzbekistan ranks 157th out of 165 possible in the Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit, the British research organization. Therefore, the discussion procedure taking place in Tashkent today has nothing to do with democratic decision-making. It resembles rather an attempt to win a chance for new policy favors talks with Russia, while staying in the game.
It does not make financial sense for Tashkent to join the Eurasian Economic Union. Some technological sectors of Uzbekistan – pharmaceuticals, engineering, food industry, will not stand the integration test. Uzbekistan has defended its domestic market and set a protection agenda for too long. As a result, lots of enterprises will find themselves noncompetitive compared to Russian ones. Barriers removed, Uzbekistan might lose the entire industries, notably those where the added value is formed. Just agriculture and TCF might receive additional drivers. But the first one can be developed independently, and for the second – there are either way sales markets.
Hypothetic Uzbekistan’s joining the Eurasian Economic Union will propel its domestic market into being absorbed by Russia. The global effect of opening markets for Uzbek goods is needless to expect even at the Central Asian markets within the Eurasian Union. The thing is that the global crisis has shaken the already fragile unity within this association. As a result, the participating countries have come into active engaging in protectionism and pursuing the inconsistent economic policy. Kazakhstan’s temporary ban on the import of fuel and lubricant materials from Russia, Kazakhstan’s fixing up flour import quotas for Kyrgyzstan and the Russia-Belarus economic conflict are among the most striking recent examples. Moreover, the common transport, tourism and labor market suffers amid pandemic. Joining an organization of a precarious future is illogical in this context.
Russia is doing its best to draw Uzbekistan into its orbit of influence. After all, this is primarily a geopolitical integration process for Moscow. Pro-Kremlin experts claim that Central Asia is the Kremlin’s priority today.Russia obviously intends to strengthen its hand in the region, making advantage of the fact that the main global players’ attention turns to other processes amid the pandemic and economic crisis. And the Kremlin intends to play the main card – the issue of labor migrants – for that end.
Uzbekistan is Russia’s main labor force supplier. The number of migrants is about 2.2 million people. Some of them work illegally. Closed borders, as part of the measures taken by Russia to combat the pandemic, have already triggered a crisis and disrupted traditional labor flows. The things will just get worse if the borders remain closed. There’s nothing in it both for Russia and Uzbekistan. Moscow is losing its labor force; Uzbekistan is losing household welfare and gaining high social tension. Russia will have to open borders for labor migrants in the long run. But at the same time, it might act selectively as for the list of donor states, since so many workers will not be in demand amid the “cheap oil” and the economic crisis.
That is the main reason why Tashkent gives ear to Russia today and simulates integration. In fact, the observer state capacity does not actually mean anything. Uzbekistan will not open its market and put the economy at risk. Tashkent hopes to face up to the challenge of labor access to the Russian market and simplify the patent system for labor migrants. Moreover, gaining observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union will trigger China’s and some Western states’ activity in the region, seeking not to lose Uzbekistan all the way through.
Russia seeks to play out the viability of its geopolitical pet project amid dark reality. Therefore, any Uzbekistan’s move towards the EAEU integration would be taken positively there with an eye towards the future.
