Having assessed possible scenarios for developments in Belarus, we assume that Russia would come back as the main beneficiary under any of them.
Possibility for Russia to unfold a military scenario in Belarus seems hard to swallow today.
This owes to the fact that opposition-minded people in Belarus are reluctant to a forcible power shift and choose peaceful protests as tactics to struggle. The protests have not been radicalized by the opposition, despite the violence in Minsk. Meanwhile, the opposition leaders are not ready to take responsibility for radicalism and avoid direct participation in the rallies. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the opposition candidate, left for Lithuania, thus having washed her hands of possible victims in clashes with the police. Thus, the current street protests in the country, not centrally managed, influenced by provocateurs, do not pose a significant risk to the regime yet.
We stick to the opinion that Wagner Group mercenaries were in Belarus as a reserve force, in case the developments in the streets radicalize, to provoke the victims among the opposition, step up clashes with the police and set the stage for Russia’s military (peace-support) assistance, alongside with contingent deployment. But the fact that the protest became non-violent takes this scenario off the table. However, the alternative to this scenario can be Russia’s limited mil assistance to Lukashenko’s regime in support for police forces.
There is no question that Russian policymakers are betting on political scenario for the developments in Belarus. This scenario foresees external isolation for Lukashenko, thus enabling the Kremlin to impose the policy that is beneficial to Russia. We believe this refers to deep political integration to a confederated state. De jure, this will start the process of reviving the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Moscow is trying to convince the Lukashenko regime that the danger comes from the West.
Boosting one of the current opposition candidates, loyal and controlled by Russia, to power looks like an alternative scenario.
This scenario requires an official statement by the Kremlin on non-recognizing the election, which is hard to believe. The Belarusian economy, integrated with Russia’s one as part of the Eurasian Economic Community, and a common border line with Russia secure the Lukashenko regime from foreign policy pressure and sanctions that might be imposed by the West. The sanctions are unlikely to force the Belarusian regime to give up power and go to rerun. Lukashenko himself will obviously try to play for time in the hope of deescalating tensions in the country.
Moscow’s support for re-election in Belarus poses risks for Russia itself, providing a behavior pattern to overthrow the Putin regime. Moreover, this could provoke a part of the Russian business elite, tired of Putin, into trying to copy the events in Belarus.
Lack of independent opposition leaders and the low level of civil society development in Belarus are the key challenges for our strategy in Belarus.
People in Belarus, though opposed to the Lukashenko regime, have retained the post-Soviet mentality and are in the paradigm of Russia’s geopolitical model, being supporters of the “Russian world”, influenced by the Russian media in the country as well. Consequently, the Lukashenko regime crash will not lead to the immediate democracy development in Belarus.This poses risks that the opposition-backed Kremlin’s stooge might come to power, thus preventing Belarus from transforming into a democratic state.
