For anyone trying to discern U.S. policy toward Russia in the Trump era, it is hard not to describe it as schizophrenic. The State Department regularly criticizes the actions of the Kremlin, and the Administration and Congress are united in supporting strong sanctions, military support to allies and ejecting Russians caught spying. At the same time, the President refuses to criticize Russia or its leader Vladimir Putin, and instead seems to be a fan. When push comes to shove, Trump sides with Putin over his own diplomats, soldiers and intelligence officers. How are U.S. allies – and Putin himself – supposed to make sense of U.S. actions?
While Trump’s attitude toward Russia is baffling, it would be wrong to suggest that the U.S. had a consistent and coherent policy toward the Kremlin prior to his Administration. Putin has been consistent in his anti-western attitude and policies while the U.S. has waffled between treating the Kremlin as an enemy or an ally. U.S. In turn, Putin has doubled down on positioning Russia as an enemy of the west, relying on portraying the U.S. as a threat to Russia in order to have a strawman to blame for economic problems and domestic unrest inside Russia.
There does not seem to be an easy path to improved relations. The U.S. has little it wants or needs from Russia, and engages in the same form of political warfare that it wielded throughout the Soviet period.
Putin’s primary weapon in his war against the west are his intelligence and security agencies. A KGB officer himself, The KGB and its follow-on Russian equivalents were useful weapons for Putin to establish control domestically, and also to keep foreign enemies off-balance. As Catherine Belton commented in her recent book on Putin’s rise, “At the end, when the Soviet Union collapsed, when the music stopped, these KGB men were the men who knew where the money was.”
Unlike western intelligence services that largely collect intelligence to better inform policymakers, Soviet and Russian intelligence has a more active role – to keep the leadership in power by weakening or destroying domestic political opponents, and engaging in subversion abroad. The Kremlin expects its spies to steal secrets, but to also engage in a form of hybrid warfare that relies on propaganda, disinformation, deception, support to fringe and violent groups, provocation, agitation and even assassination.
After WWII, the new CIA also saw itself as a tool of political action. Early CIA covert activity included sending commandoes into unfriendly countries, manipulating foreign elections, and overthrowing regimes. Post-war Presidents saw the CIA as a muscular means to take action abroad without having to do the heavy lifting of defending policies, building consensus and accepting accountability. However, over time it became clear that such action often had negative unintended consequences, caused blowback at home and ultimately was less effective than using all the means of U.S. power to develop overt policy. Also, it turned out that Americans were not particularly good at covert skullduggery.
Perhaps more importantly, as the U.S. developed into an economic and military superpower, it hardly needed to skulk around the world engaging in secret games. It could more effectively get its way by wielding its overt power. The tools of secret subversion were better suited to weaker powers that relied on asymmetric means to undermine a stronger adversary.
For much of its history, Russia had been a weak power that suffered invasion and loss. The early Bolshevik state worried that it would be smothered by stronger powers before it ever had a chance to develop. As such, it became expert in gauging the strength of its enemies, and striking at their vulnerabilities as a means to undermine and keep them off balance. Anything to keep stronger countries and alliances from focusing their power against the Kremlin.
The litany of Soviet and Russian subversive efforts in support of their policies is a long one. They have spread false stories and disinformation, circulated forgeries, bankrolled opposition parties, supported terrorist groups and assassinated enemies. While the ability to weaponize social media and use the internet to spread false stories increased the speed and reach of their efforts, the 2016 campaign to interfere in the U.S. election was nothing new. Indeed, Putin’s actions since 2016 are wholly consistent with his decades of KGB experience, and Russia’s long-held use of covert and political warfare.
So, what can we expect the future to bring in Russia’s relationship with the west?
At this point Putin has defined himself as the leader of a potential anti-western coalition, and positions Russia as the antithesis of western values. He will help anyone who is against the west, and will continue to wield his covert weapons as a form of political warfare. He will also treat countries on his periphery as vassals, feeling free to intervene if they seek to align themselves with the West.
However, as frustrating as it might be to envision a hostile relationship with Russia for years to come, perhaps the bigger question is for Russians themselves. While Putin’s tactics for sowing confusion abroad and blaming the west for his troubles at home are effective in maintaining his day-to-day power, it is hard to envision how they contribute to the development of Russia as an economic powerhouse. As we look at all the lies, disinformation and attacks against the west, it is hard to visualize Putin’s endgame. How is it wise to undercut and attack most of the world’s successful economies? Does Russia truly not need any allies – or at least allies that are not basket cases? It seems that Putin has deftly used his powers to consolidate power and riches at home, and deployed covert weapons to undercut his adversaries abroad. He is largely secure in his seat of power. But like most dictators, he also seems to have painted himself into a corner. He may have kept his domestic and foreign enemies at bay, but has done little to build the means to keep Russia competitive in the world economy. He may be able to hold onto his riches and sit in the Kremlin until he dies, but he is positioning Russia for serious uncertainty and trouble when he goes.
