Burkina Faso has seen a recent surge in violence that has claimed hundreds of lives and displaced thousands. Rights group accused security forces of executing at least 180 Fulanis in the northern town of Djibo whom they charged with supporting Islamist armed groups operating from the north. The graves over the past seven months have been found around the northern Burkina Faso. The residents explained that the bodies had been left in groups along main highways, under bridges and in fields. Many of the bodies were found bound and blindfolded within a five-kilometer radius of the town.
Djibo, the Sahel region of northern Burkina Faso, has been the site of a numerous attacks by jihadists crossing the border from neighboring Mali and Niger; also the reasoning for security forces stationed in the region.The main ethnic group in Djiboare the Fulani.
According to the Defence Minister Moumina Cheriff Sy the killings could have been committed by jihadist groups dressed in the stolen military uniforms, as sometimes it is “difficult for the population to distinguish between armed terrorist groups and the Defense and Security forces.
However, human rights personnel there points toward security forces. The United States Embassy in Ouagadougou shared a statement in social media, expressing its “deep concern about the continuing and increasing number of allegations of abuse and extrajudicial killings by Burkina Faso’s security forces”.
However, we convinced that these killing are doings of local self-defense groups working for the government forces rather than government forces itself.
In 2019, Burkina Faso suffered more jihadist attacks than any other Sahelian country. Some members of government remain convinced that the former ruling elite has had a hand in creating this situation.
Three jihadist groups have been active in Burkinabè territory since 2015-2016: the local group, Ansarul Islam, and two groups from Mali, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, ISWAP) and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, or JNIM). Originally founded as an autonomous Burkinabè movement in late 2016, later on Ansarul Islam merged with JNIM, a group linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and mainly operating in central and northern Mali. Ansarul Islam is active in Soum and the western part of the Centre-North region (the Bam province and the western part of the Sanmatenga province).
Before the 2014 crisis, 49% of the conflicts reported in Burkina Faso were between farmers and herders. They are particularly affected by the shrinking size of these lands following agricultural developments and land speculation; by dwindling feed and water supplies; by obstruction of seasonal migration routes; and by the non-application of legislation, in particular, the 2020 Pastoral Law.
Following former President Blaise Compaoré’s ouster in October 2014, the state’s already limited capacity to maintain order in rural areas has further weakened. Competition over land and natural resources in Burkina Faso has escalated to unprecedented levels due to:
- population growth leading to internal migration of farmers (especially, among the Mossi, Burkina Faso main ethnic group);
- climate changes, degrading soil where poorly planned land development and irrigation;
- land speculation.
Jihadists are returning from neighboring Mali, most of whom are Burkinabè, gained a foothold in 2016 by exploiting the frustration and anger of rural communities. The state security forces participated in extortion of Burkinabè herders struggling to assert their rights over pastoral lands. It also stimulated them for insurgency.
In both rural and urban areas, municipal authorities committed abuses while handling land subdivisions resulted in expropriations that, in turn, stir up animosity.
Land disputes have evolved into full-scale conflicts that could escalate into community-based violence.A fractured countryside has allowed jihadists to recruit fighters from among the land disputes victims and highway banditry.
As the result, villagers increasingly distrusted elites, both local and urban. The absence of any form of regulation across much of the countryside has led to banditry rise and land disputes.
Jihadists gained land by exploiting rural communities’ frustrations. They are insurgents motivated by local concerns around a small core of ideologues.They include farmers and herders who became victims of land-related injustices or racketeering, bandits bringing experience in weaponry and fighting, gold miners seeking protection, and stigmatized populations.
After so many major jihadist attacks in Mali and Burkina, security forces are really afraid of infiltration. However, while there had been problems with jihadists, and Djibo had been attacked, there had been no clashes between jihadists and the army until a number of bodies was found.
To compensate for the security forces’ shortcomings, particularly, territorial coverage, the Burkina authorities have encouraged the establishment of community-based self-defense groups and, more recently, announced they would recruit “homeland defense volunteers”, notably the Koglweogo (guardians of the bush).
The Koglweogo who mainly recruit from among the Fulse and Mossi have upset the balance between communities in the Centre-North. By taking on police and security prerogatives, they became accomplices in settling scores, often concerning land disputes and to the detriment of the Fulani community.
The military response by self-defense groups with limited government control has often led to abuses that push those targeted into jihadists’ rows.
Jihadists prefer to recruit persons having weapon use skills. In Burkina Faso these people are former soldiers, discharged or deserters, and highway robbers. Bandits are increasingly enlisting as jihadists in Burkina and, to various degrees, throughout the Sahel. Some join out of conviction but many of them are just seeking avenge on the state and self-defense groups.
The vast majority of men killed by alleged security forces are Fulani because they are perceived to support armed Islamists, although many do not support the jihadists.
Fulani often are recruited by jihadists, who in turn attack other communities, including Mossi, Foulse and Gourmanche people.
The supposed predominance of Fulani jihadists is less a reflection of this community’s support for global jihad than of the particular exposure of Fulani herders and landowners to injustices and their relative under-representation in state institutions.
By allowing their fighters to become involved in these conflicts, jihadists (from ISWAP in particular) satisfy the ambitions of a section of their membership – in this case mainly consisting of Fulanis – who are keen to protect and/or seek revenge on behalf of their community. On the other hand, by supporting a local group, jihadists are encouraging fitna (tribal divisions) and compromising their project of uniting the community of Muslim believers.
In 2017, the Koglweogo of Boulsa (Centre-North) began counterterrorism activity to the overt indifference of authorities. Then the Fulani community became their primary targets and sought the protection of the Rouga, Fulani groups charged with protecting herds who were, in turn, perceived by the Koglweogo as “jihadists in disguise”.
Thus, the Fulani and, in particular, the Rouga, were accused of colluding with jihadists, and the Koglweogo of the Centre-North are eager to combat them by enlisting in the state war on terrorism. This involvement allows them to settle disputes, as was observed after the Guendbila attack (Sanmatenga province). Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between the terrorism war and settling of personal and, by extension, communal scores.
The killings in Djibo could have the same origin as the first largescale known massacre against the Fulani on the night of December, 31 2018 to January 1, 2019. Then unidentified gunmen killed six people in Yirgou, including the Mossi village chief and his son. In retaliation, and supported by the largely Mossi population, the Koglweogo killed around 100-200 Fulani civilians. In March 2019 the second massacre was perpetrated by Fulse individuals against the Fulani in Arbinda (Soum), bordering the Centre-North.
As a conclusion, mass killings found in Djibo were highly likely the work of self-defense groups activity in the deep rural crisis environment, and weaken government that can manage with neither jihadists insurgency, nor rural development and land slashes prevention.
