The Finno-Ugric peoples have influenced greatly on the modern Russian ethnos formation. Nevertheless, many of them stayed isolated in their linguistic, religious and cultural development. First of all, we are talking about the Maris, Moksha, Ezrya, Komi and Udmurts. These mentioned ethnic groups have a separatism tradition. None of the subjects of the Russian Federation inhabited by these indigenous peoples has serious conditions for a large-scale movement. As a rule they are weak economically and demographically, and have no external borders.
In the 16th century the most Finno-Ugric territories were annexed by Russia under the long-term conflicts with the local population. The Mari was the most active ethnic group fighting against the land seizure by the Russians. The so-called ‘Cheremis Wars’ lasted intermittently from 1552 to 1585. As a result, the Mari people were evicted from strategically important areas along the Vyatka River, and Russia built fortified fortresses in the region. The Kremlin implemented a segregation policy on the territory of the modern republic of Mari El. Anti-Christianization rebellions took place in Udmurtia and Mordovia. Later on the peoples were extensively assimilated.
As of now the share of indigenous Finno-Ugric peoples in the ethnic composition of the republics is small. Mari El is the territory with the highest percentage of these people. The share of Maris and Russians in the ethnic composition is approximately the same and numbers about 43%. At the same time most of Russians live in cities; the Mari inhabit rural areas. As of Mordovia the predominant ethnic group is Russians, 53%. The Moksha and Erzya peoples make up 40% of the population. Since 1989 the share of Mordovians (common name) in the republic population has increased by 7.5%, while the share of Russians has decreased by 7.5%. In Udmurtia the share of ethnic Russians reaches 62%, the share of Udmurts is 28%. At the same time, the share of Russians is growing, while the share of Udmurts is falling. The share of the Komi ethnic group in the Komi Republic is even less, 24%, and it keeps decreasing. Other Finno-Ugric peoples are underpopulated. It is explained by the lack of national identity among these ethnic groups that makes many of the indigenous peoples identify themselves as Russians.
The highest level of national self-awareness is observed in Mari El and Mordovia. However, the problems with unity inside the national environment can be observed in these both subjects of the Russian Federation. Thus, there are two Mari groups, mountain and meadow, that have differed a lot of. However, the Mari single national identification tendency has prevailed recently.
Two different Finno-Ugric peoples, Moksha and Erzya, live in Mordovia. They have different languages and live in different territories. Moksha occupies the western part of the republic, and Erzya the eastern one. At the same time, they see the federal center and separatism in a different way as well. Moksha are more pro-Russian but Erzya (especially, intellectuals) are more separatist-minded.
This is the Erzya representatives who play as a locomotive of the nationalist movements in Mordovia. In a meantime, they consider uniting Moksha and Erzya as one people and wide autonomy idea promotion as injustice. The republic leaders are trying to oppose nationalist organizations by uniting these two ethnic groups under a single ethnic group of the Mordovians. Saransk, the capital of the republic, does not welcome the use of the Erzyan language. Local officials do their best to eliminate it. For example, their attempt to create the Mordovian language artificially was sharply picked up by the Erzya representatives.
Erzya, who counts about 400,000 all over Russia, live compactly in several districts of the Samara and Orenburg regions. This ethnos actively supports national traditions and tries to preserve historical memory. The Day of the Erzyan Hero is celebrated in November. On this day in the 18th century Russians burned Nesmeyan Vasilyev, the leader of the Erzya national uprising taken place in the Teryushevskaya volost, the Nizhny Novgorod province. The religion-based uprising was aimed at planting Christianity in the region.
Christianization was one of the key aspects in the Kremlin-Finno-Ugric conflict. As a result, even today, autochthonous religion plays a key role in the self-identification of peoples. Every year traditional pagan beliefs, an important factor in the Mari self-identification, are getting more and more popular in Mari El. This religion is the most widespread among the meadow Mari. In Mari El the number of pagans and the ones who believe in praying to the pagan god Yumo in the Orthodox Christian Church is about 70%.
As of now, the Erzyan national religion, that is also pagan, has been reconstructed rather than preserved. The overwhelming majority of Erzya believers profess dual faith. The Mokshas are Orthodox; as of the Udmurt national environment, pre-Christian beliefs have been rarely preserved in the villages.
All the republics where the Finno-Ugric peoples live are weak economically and have insignificant deposits of natural resources that minimize local elites’ efforts to receive a resource base for the national identity development. The Komi Republic is an exception here, however, the low share of the indigenous population and socio-economic aspects deprive local elites of additional opportunities.
However, the national-separatist movements in the Finno-Ugric republics of Russia have preconditions. First of all, low level of socio-economic development and the disastrous state of the region’s infrastructure. Taking into account the quality of the federal center’s activity, it becomes clear that the Kremlin cannot manage the territory effectively. As a result, the proportion of those who support autonomous and separatist ideas is growing. We have described the similar situation in the material on separatism in Siberia.
Second, the Kremlin’s tough federal policy regarding language and culture against the background of a low level of socio-economic development cause the opposite effect. The more Moscow tries to ‘oppress’ the Finno-Ugric languages, the more active and radical their defenders become. In particular, we mean the Mari, Erzya and Udmurts. In this context, the self-immolation of Albert Razin, the Udmurt activist and scientist protesting against the Udmurt language infringement found audience and caused excitement among the Mari and Erzya elites.
Thirdly, traditional religion is the fundamental factor for the Finno-Ugric peoples’ identification. However, today Moscow is building a rigid system to adhere Orthodoxy and the central government. At the same time, Orthodox clergymen who are often associated with the Russian special services, pursue a tough persecution policy regarding other beliefs. Such a policy is perceived by the Finno-Ugric activists through the prism of historical tradition. It increases protest moods and strengthens the national identity of the Finno-Ugric people.
Fourthly, the federal government treats the regions inhabited by the Finno-Ugric peoples as a non-priority area. It contributes nothing into their development, moreover, it causes the regional ecological situation being worsened. For the post-Soviet space, environment protection is traditionally associated with nationalist movements. Therefore, obviously, that, for example, the Komi protests against building the landfill near the Shiyes railway station, the place for the Moscow trash disposal, escalated in actions of the local nationalists. As a result, the nationalist movement in the Komi Republic that had no significant social support received a second wind, and the speed of nationalist and autonomist views spreading increased among the sympathetic population.
Fifth, in almost every republic inhabited by the Finno-Ugric people, the Tatars are the third largest ethnic group. The Finno-Ugric people also live on the territory of the Turkic republics of the Volga region. For example, the Mari largest number beyond the territory of the Republic of Mari El lives in Bashkortostan, the southern neighbor of Tatarstan (about 100,000 people). The nationalist organizations of Mari El and Udmurtia have close ties with similar organizations in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Here we should add close historical relationship between peoples. For example, the Meadow Mari was-well integrated into the Tatar society during the 15th and 16th centuries despite different relationships with it at different periods. Traditionally the Udmurts also have military alliances with the Tatars. Thus, the role of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in terms of self-determination of indigenous peoples is seen in the Finno-Ugric republics as crucial. If the autonomist or separatist movements succeed in economically developed Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the Finno-Ugric republics will experience a sharp rise in nationalist movements that under certain conditions can be supported by Kazan.
As of now, the Kremlin follows a fairly straightforward policy regarding the Finno-Ugric peoples resulted in increasing pressure on the local population and creating conditions for the fastest assimilation. However, to our mind, it has the opposite effect.
Therefore, separatist sentiments among the Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia are rooted from Moscow’s policy regarding the development of these territories and the level of pressure on local ethnic groups. The general federal processes related to the national and separatist movements’ development have a significant impact. The elites of Tatarstan can play the most important role here.
