Russia bears responsibility for the Nagorno-Karabakh war that was obviously caused by Moscow’s provocation to change the balance of power in the Caucasus. The use of military contingents disguised as peacekeepers to control the territories of geopolitical interest has become the part of Kremlin’s state policy.
The US State Department accused Russia of escalating and destabilizing the situation in Karabakh. In fact, he stated that the armed conflict in this region had appeared due to Moscow’s actions. According to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R.Clarke Cooper, Russia’s presence in Nagorny Karabakh provokes a ‘risk of destabilization’ in the region. R.Clarke’s position sounds the same with the Pentagon’s latest report conclusions positioning Russia as an invader country.
As R.Clarke says, in any place where Russian troops deploy there is a high risk of destabilization and a clear challenge to all involved states and parties. This opinion is absolutely true, for example, in the context of Russian military groups’ activity in Transnistria and Georgia (separatist puppet Abkhazia and South Ossetia). It was the so-called Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 who helped Russia attack Georgia and stop the process of the country’s rapprochement with the West after the Rose Revolution.
We remain confident that Russia was interested in escalating the situation in Karabakh and initiating a military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Kremlin pursued the goal to deploy a regular military contingent on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, strengthen its positions in the Caucasus, and take direct control over this unrecognized republic.
Strategically, Putin benefits from both sides weakened and keeps acting as a mediator during the negotiations resulted in Armenia absorption, an increase in the level of Azerbaijan’s loyalty to official Moscow, and Turkish positions weakening in the region.
The introduction of the Russian contingent into Karabakh has no influence on the status of Artsakh. It preserves the unrecognized republic status, and Azerbaijan does not get back the territories it lost in 1989 after the parliamentary decision of the Soviet Armenia. As a result of the concluded agreement, Armenia completely lost the opportunity to act in the region and got totally hooked of Russia. Moscow was the only country who benefited from the war: it took control over the territory of Artsakh, and got an opportunity to manipulate both Yerevan and Baku.
Clarke Cooper’s position is correlated with the latest statements by the Armenian leaders. During his radio address the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Russia was directly involved in large-scale losses in the Armenian army in Karabakh. He accused Moscow of its unserviceable weapons although the Russian party had guaranteed the effectiveness of the sold weapons. Official Yerevan also counted on Russian support within the CSTO, however, it did not receive it under cover up.
Thus, the deployment of the Russian contingent under the guise of peacekeepers on the model similar to Transnistria gives Moscow the opportunity to have a military base on the territory of Azerbaijan. It gives the go-ahead for repeating the analogue scenarios implemented in Georgia in 2008 with the aim to split the country and form unrecognized puppet republics on its territories under Russian control.
In order to take control over foreign territories the Kremlin will likely pursue the policy of deploying military contingents disguised as peacekeepers with no UN mandate. The post-Soviet countries, in particular, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic countries, are the territories where such scenarios are more than real.
