Covert arms transfer schemes for terrorism network

Covert arms transfer schemes for terrorism network

In 2017-2018, Gen Nicholson claimed Russia had conducted a series of exercises on the Afghan border with Tajikistan. “These are counter terrorism exercises,” said Gen Nicholson, “but we’ve seen the Russian patterns before: they bring in large amounts of equipment and then they leave some of it behind.” The implication is that these weapons and other equipment are then smuggled across the border and supplied to the Taliban.

This arms supply scheme is typical not only for the Taliban, but also for the IS in Syria in 2015-2018. Modern weaponry supply for Taliban fighters might be a part of a Russian bounties deal as well.

Our analysts came across a 24 minute video titled “Robnaak War-4” of Tehreek-e-Taliban fighter (Taliban’s Pakistani branch) armed with Russian SVDM sniper rifle. The upgraded Dragunov sniper rifle was first presented at the Innovation Day at Russia’s Defense Ministry in the fall of 2015. So, this one was delivered from Russia after 2015. SIPRI confirms none SVDM was delivered to either Tajikistan or Pakistan, thus the rifle was directly transferred by the Russians to the Taliban or was moved to Russian military facility in Tajikistan and further transferred to the Taliban directly or through Tajiks, as Gen Nicholson stated.

Tehreek-e-Taliban fighter speaking in bengali with a sniper rifle SVDM, Twitter.
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In December 2016, Kasım Jangalbagh, Kunduz police chief, claimed that a large number of Russian-made weapons seized in combat, unidentified helicopters, found in border areas, were the most reliable evidence of Russia’s assistance. Jangalbai says that, Molla Abdülkasım, the Taliban governor in this area, is in constant contact with the Russians.

Kunduz is also the base of operations for two Afghan businessmen who American intelligence officials say acted as middlemen in the bounty scheme between Russian intelligence officers and Taliban fighters.

On March 28, 2017, the Times of Islamabad, the Pakistani edition, released the report on the visit of Colonel-General Sergei Istrakov, Deputy Chief of Russian General Staff, to northern Waziristan (Pakistan), invited by General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Joint Staff Headquarters. His youngest sibling, Ahmad Mahmood Hayat served as a Director General in the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI).

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Russian delegation visited North Waziristan. PHOTO by ISPR, 2017.


At the same time, several Afghan media claimed that Russian delegation visited several Taliban training centers in the tribal zone (South Waziristan) near the Durand Line. “They [the Russian delegation] have been seen at Taliban training centers along with the Pakistani military,” said General Assadullah Sherzad, commander of 303 Police Zone, overseeing the entire police force in eastern Afghan provinces. Amid this, Russia’s MFA looks logical to deny these statements through Russia Today propaganda network, engaged in Psyops.

At the end of March 2017, Afghan senators expressed concern about the lack of inspection of trucks crossing the Durand Line. Thus, this site is in fact ideal for carrying weapons to Afghanistan.

The Taliban leadership is an agent of the ISI, and the majority of the Taliban organization in Afghanistan are agents of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan. All of these relationships present opportunities and challenges to stopping or reducing Pakistan’s support of the Taliban.

In January 2018, President Trump announced that the U.S. had suspended military aid to Pakistan based upon information that the ISI provided direct military and intelligence aid to the Taliban that resulted in the death of U.S. soldiers. Some reports also indicate that elements of Pakistan’s major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban.

All eight Talibs interviewed (seven field commanders and one senior intermediary) believe that the ISI has heavy influence on their leadership, four of whom believe that this amounts to control. One of the southern commanders claimed: ‘If anyone rejects that the ISI backs or controls the Taliban, he has a mental problem … all our plans and strategy are made in Pakistan and step by step it is brought to us, for military operations or other activities.

Colonel-General Istrakov took part in lots of major actions by Russia abroad. Ukraine’s government claims he coordinated Russian troops in Donbas. There is evidence he took part in the war in South Ossetia, Georgia in 2008.

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Gen. Istrakov (right) and the Presidentof unrecognized Russian-puppet state South Ossetia Bibilov, 2019, Sputnik.

General Istrakov, therefore, is highly likely affiliated with the Russian GRU and well experienced in coordinating Moscow with terrorism network and paramilitary units. This fact adds to the assumption that Istrakov visited Taliban facilities in Pakistan and his contacts were mediated by people from Pakistan.

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Russian fighter Sergey Astahov, 1965, equipped with the same modification SVDM sniper rifle on Donbas, Ukraine, InformNapalm.

In 2016 Istrakov took part in a joint “Anti-Terror Military exercise between Russia and Pakistan.

The photo shows the Russians arriving on a cargo aircraft. They do not carry hand arms, so the weaponry is on board of the Russian aircraft. However, video from Russian state mil TV Zvezda shows Russians with their weapons during this exercises. Thus, the Russians could have brought some weapons to Pakistan not as part of official export supplies.

Arms transfer schemes by the Russians leaving the weapons behind were also recorded in Palmyra, Syria.

The video obtained after the Russian military base had been seized near Palmyra by the ISIS in December 2016, proves an assumption that ISIS counterattacks followed by the grab of the base area might be viewed as a scheme to transfer weaponry and ammunition.  

The video shows a lot of weaponry left behind at the base: at least one S-60 (57 mm) automatic anti-aircraft cannon; four ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons; spare barrels for ZU-23-2; UR-83P portable minefield breaching mount; PGO-7 optical sights for RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher; GSh-23L aircraft cannon; stacks of ammunition boxes (250 pieces, about 350,000 7.62×39 rounds); high-explosive tank shells (125mm); probably, at least one “Kord” machine gun (12.7mm). Also, plenty of small arms (approximately 200 pieces total, on the ground and in the boxes, mainly 7.62mm AKMS rifles and 30-40 brand new AK-74U rifles) and 20 DShKM large caliber (12.7mm) machine guns have been seized. This means that ISIS would find almost everything at this base fitting for their mobile guerrilla tactics and satisfying all its needs: DShKM heavy machine guns for “jihad-cars” (which terrify Assad’s troops), ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons for gun trucks, RPG grenades and a large quantity of small arms and ammunition. BMP-97 “Vystrel” and several trucks9 were caught up among the seized military equipment.

Frame-by-frame analysis gives reasons to claim that the military equipment at the base did not have any combat signs: there are no bullet holes, glass and tires are intact. This indicates there had been no fight before the base was abandoned, and there were no attempts to destroy weaponry and ammunition. Considering possible air strikes, as well as the elimination of ammunition and the military equipment destruction in retreating, the scheme is highly probable to be used to transfer arms to ISIS.

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Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said that Russia has done nothing in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). “They haven’t done anything,” Carter told NBC’s “Meet the Press.” Carter said Russia’s efforts in the war against ISIS are “virtually zero.”

PHOTINT and OSINT analysis indicates that IS-militants have got Russian-made weapons. A significant part of it fell into the hands of terrorist organizations as war booty, as the consequence of fighting with government troops of Assad. The other part was grabbed from Hezbollah units. At the same time, the origin of some weapons cannot be attributed to war booty.

Thus, there are documentary data proving that the units of ISIS use Russian RPG-29 “Vampire” in the fight against armored vehicles. The product entered service with the USSR Armed Forces only in 1989 and was not mass-produced, thus excluding the possibility of export supplies in the Soviet era. The product is not in service with the Russian Armed Forces, it is just exported. In 2010, “Planta” Chemical Plant of Nizhny Tagil considered the possibility to upgrade the ammunition through its capacity amplification. RPG- 29 was registered to have been used by Russian forces against the UAF in Donbas, Ukraine.

RPG-29 captured in Syria.

Arms supplies to terrorism network staging attacks on the United States are the grounds for the Congress to address the matter of recognizing the countries making such supplies as state sponsors of terrorism.