The gap between the opposition United Party for National Development and ruling Patriotic Front in Zambia continues to widen, and distrust runs deep. Tensions between the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) have heightened in advance of the 2021 general elections.
Concerns over the electoral commission’s ability to manage the process give reason to worry about the diminishing likelihood of a fair election. Zambia’s status as a peaceful, democratic and free country is increasingly at risk. The 2021 election holds the potential to tip the balance if politicians aren’t careful and the international community pays little heed.
Zambia is one of the fastest eroding democracies in the world. Zambia has registered a remarkably rapid decline in the quality of democracy since the last election in 2016.
Following the untimely death of former President Michael Sata while in office, President Lungu assumed office to complete his term – after winning a presidential by-election – from the 25 of January 2015 to the 13 of September 2016. In 2016, President Lungu was then re-elected to serve a full term of 5 years in office. From this context, one would naturally deduce that Lungu has twice been elected to the office of president.
Article 106(3) of the 2016 constitution of Zambia asserts that “A person who has twice held office as President is not eligible for election as president”. This can be interpreted as the following: a person who holds the office of president in Zambia for two terms is no longer eligible for re-election for a third term. Again, this seems to rule Lungu out.
However, this all depends on exactly how one defines a “presidential term”.
President Lungu is determined to stay in power come what may, and will not allow legal niceties to stand in his way.
If Lungu gains a narrow and contested victory, as may well happen, the big question now is whether the opposition will be willing to take their complaints to a Constitutional Court that is widely viewed to be politically biased. If not, they may prefer to have their case heard in the court of public opinion and take their protests to the streets. This would be understandable, but would significantly increase the potential for political violence and instability.
The Constitutional Court asserted President Edgar Lungu did not complete a full term of office, as defined by Article 106(6), when he was elected in 2015 and that the relevant provisions in defining term of office should be read holistically. The outcome of this process is therefore that Lungu has been deemed eligible to run for election in the next presidential election in August 2021. However, this judgement seems to contradict the two-term limitation imposed by the 2016 Zambian constitution in Article 106(3).
As a result, the term-limit debate is likely to make the 2021 general elections – already set to be a close contest – even more controversial.
There is no great optimism about the next set of elections, due to take place in less than four months. The main concerns ahead of the polls are about the quality of the voters’ roll.
The electoral commission decided in 2020 to scrap the voters’ roll that had been in use for over a decade. It then allocated just 38 days to register more than 8 million people in the middle of the rainy season.
Zambia appears to have become more politically polarised along ethnic lines since 2016. This is in part due to regional voting patterns which appeared to have split cleanly along ethno-regional lines. In 2016, support for the ruling Patriotic Front and President Edgar Lungu was drawn predominantly from the largely Bemba-speaking north and Nyanja-speaking east of the country. The Patriotic Front’s support has traditionally come from Bemba-speakers. But Nyanja-speaking easterners have rallied around the Patriotic Front following Lungu’s rise. He originates from the east, has backing from prominent Nyanja-speakers and has elevated easterners in cabinet and government.
In comparison, the main opposition party’s support was drawn substantially from the Tonga-speaking southern and Lozi-speaking western regions. The so-called Bantu Botatwe (affiliated groups from the south and west) have long supported political parties that represent their economic and political interests, but these parties have never come to power or sponsored a president.
Since the 2016 elections, there has been a growing rhetoric of distrust from the ruling party towards the south and west of the country. Senior members of the ruling party have increasingly made disparaging remarks against citizens from those regions.
The cabinet and senior positions in the civil service and judiciary have been skewed towards people who come from the north and east.
There is almost no representation of people from the south and west of the country.
There are signs that significantly more citizens have been registered for the next poll in regions that support the ruling party. Meanwhile, far fewer voters have been registered in opposition-supporting regions.
These dynamics are worrying. For a long time Zambia has had a policy of regional balancing in key government appointments. This has largely held regional grievances in check.
However, perceptions of persecution of groups who have historically supported the opposition are deepening and may well become more entrenched with the elections.
Given the clear disparities in the recent registration numbers across regions, it is difficult to interpret them as anything but an attempt to pack the voters’ roll with ruling party supporters. The reluctance by the electoral commission to subject the roll to an independent audit – as it did in 2016 – increases these suspicions.
The Catholic Church, a key player in the country’s politics, has expressed deep reservations about the registration process.
This distrust of the election commission runs deep within the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.
Additional worries can be seen in the government policy that has used COVID-19 restrictions to curtail the opposition’sability to campaign. This includes demonstrations or party meetings even in private homes. Thus, there’s increasing concern about heavy-handed tactics by the police who have repeatedly used excessive force to disperse opposition gatherings. Two people were killed in Lusaka late last year when police opened fire on a crowd of opposition supporters.
- Police continued to use the Public Order Act, and other provisions, as well as threats and intimidation to clamp down on freedom of expression.
- Authorities continued to hinder journalists in their work and to clamp down on the independent media.
- The authorities also tried to restrict online broadcasting.
- PF members used violence to prevent the media from airing programmes which featured opposition leaders.
The ruling party introduced a new Cyber Security and Cyber Crime law. It has been roundly criticised as failing to meet basic human rights standards, further shrinking civic space and placing whistleblowers and journalists at unjustified risk.
The increasing impunity of ruling party-aligned “cadres” and their politicised accusations against civil servants and citizens is a growing concern, as much of the violence surrounding the 2016 election was perpetrated by these groups of young men who are sponsored by politicians.
