On June 18th, 2021, the Iranians are going to the poll to vote for the next president after eight years of Hassan Rouhani’s leadership. The Islamic Republic of Iran is holding the election to select its thirteenth president when the country faces a significant economic crisis and a widespread public distrust for the Government.
What we know about this election is that presumably Iran will have a conservative president loyal to the regime and with limited power. In the list of few candidates due to Guardian Council’s purge emerges the figure of Ebrahim Raisi, who has the support of conservative and rigid politicians, has ties with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and has the prestigious title of sayyid (a descendant of Islam’s Prophet Muhammad).
Since the candidates are only four because the Guardian Council rejected around 600 nominees and in the last days some politicians decided to retire, many Iranians are losing their faith in the electoral process because they believe that this presidential election is organised to favour Ebrahim Raisi, who has a strong connection with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. If the last presidential elections were marked by the lowest turnout (42.6%), there is the risk that fewer people will go to the poll this time even though Khamenei has several times invites the Iranians to express their preference at the polls. This current trend of political apathy reflects the adverse socioeconomic conditions in which the Iranians live characterised by high unemployment, price increase, economic recession and a general scepticism for the political leadership seen as a ‘caste’ that fights only for its welfare, forgetting the rest of the population.
Even though Iran resumed enriching uranium, all the candidates during the electoral campaign declared their commitment to discussing with the United States the restoration of the Nuclear Deal. Khamenei’s support to the Nuclear Deal and Tehran’s necessity to improve its socioeconomic conditions worsened by the recent U.S. sanctions imposed in 2018 by the Trump Administration and the pandemic might indicate a positive outcome for Iran-U.S. negotiations and the regime’s necessity to have a president who sustains this process. In this context, we could read the rejection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s candidature, a former Iranian president who characterised its Government with a strong anti-Americanism and vehemently promoted the implementation of the national nuclear program.
This election can scarcely change the Iranian strategy in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, because the region is Tehran’s lebensraum (vital space) as Central Asia where Iran is trying to play a significant role in partnership with China and Russia to counter the United States, especially after the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Therefore, although Iran must face the domestic crisis as the Iranians hope, we might expect that Tehran will continue to promote its presence in the Middle East, Central Asia and also in the Caucasus, looking at a reinforced partnership with China to increase its export and commercial trade thanks to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and with Russia to counter the Western presence and Turkey’s rising role in Eurasia.
If this election is marked by a low turnout and the future Iranian president will be a conservative regime loyalist, the Islamic Republic of Iran might experience in the future high social tensions as happened in 2019 since the Iranians seem no to be particularly interested in foreign policy now because they are looking for economic reforms, corruption fight, and infrastructural projects that might create job opportunities and attract foreign direct investments (FDIs). In addition, the Iranian conservatives want to slow down the Nuclear Deal to give a political result to the possible new conservative president. Furthermore, before proceeding with the agreement, Tehran probably wants to await the outcome of the Russia – United States summit and the following talks between the United States and China to be able to discuss the issue with its strategic allies, thus negotiate agreements with a clear vision of the balance of power.
