Russia elections: Seeking Solutions in the Taliban Case Paradigm

The prospect of Russia having its parliamentary elections tampered with this fall forces us to start preparing for non-recognition of their results and searching for a policy of communication with the illegitimate Russian regime. As a result, we might face another case similar to that of the Taliban where the latter de facto effectively control the country, while for other governments to formally recognize it would be contrary to democratic standards and values. This scenario repeats the situation of Russia’s neighbor, Belarus, where the unrecognized outcome of the latest presidential election has created an internationally illegitimate, but persistently aggressive and Kremlin-friendly dictatorship.

Elections in Russia will be just as rigged as the Belarus polls. Courts in Moscow have already barred two government critics from running for parliament. Opposition candidate Lev Schlosberg was disqualified for his participation in the January rally in support of the imprisoned opposition figure Alexei Navalny.

The Putin regime maintains its political dominance through “traditional” authoritarian tactics, such as control of the media, the use of government resources in favor of “pro-regime” candidates, orchestrated coercion of civil servants, and vote count doctoring.

There is no doubt that against the background of plunging government ratings and deteriorating quality of life of the population, the authorities will resort to voting fraud in the upcoming parliamentary election. As a confirmation of this assumption, Russia is already sabotaging the work of the OSCE observation mission. Thus, the Kremlin doesn’t even count on an objective assessment of the elections by international actors.

It would be wrong to agree with the opinion that the tools of election fraud are becoming less efficient. Even despite the apparent public fatigue from Putin’s rule, the regime’s governing system remains rather stable, while decision-making is based on manipulative vote count rather than people’s will. In turn, law enforcement and the repressive system have proved capable of effectively suppressing protest moods. All previous mass protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg, organized by opposition rallying politically active youths, were subdued within several hours. The longest-running protests in Khabarovsk have failed to spill even beyond the region, thus having no chance of spreading across the country.

Also worth taking into account is that throughout Putin’s reign, the government has built a propaganda system that is far superior to that set up by Goebbels in Nazi Germany, since Russia employs modern communication means. As a result, Russia’s population, for whom protests against their ruler are alien, according to their cultural code, are additionally vaccinated with the fear of seeing the repeat of the Syria civil war scenario or that of bloodshed in Ukraine, where Russia portrays its occupation as a result of mass protests encroaching on the country’s power. Thus, in reality, even total falsification of election in Russia will lead to no major public uprising.

The Kremlin has been also using state-level bribery to influence the voting process amid a deteriorating economy and falling incomes of own citizens. It is to this end that the government amid the election campaign showers pensioners with one-time cash bonuses to their social payments.

The goal of the current regime is to not allow even a single opposition figure entering the new parliament, because any opposition within state bodies legalizes dissent with the government’s line. For Putin’s regime, this would be unacceptable and could potentially destroy the monopoly of power, posing a threat of discussion and debate of the government’s moves. These risks are rooted in Soviet times, when criticism of the Communist Party was equal to a threat to the very regime, while the era of Glasnost launched by Gorbachev eventually buried the Soviet Union.

It is also necessary to understand that the next parliament convocation of parliament must ensure power transit. Thus, it must have in its ranks no opponents of Putin and this transit, which requires the appearance of absolute public support for Putin and his party. At the same time, the composition of the ruling party as such doesn’t matter, since it repeats the Soviet ideologeme “We say party – we mean Lenin.” Now it’s “…we mean Putin.”

The power regime in Russia is invulnerable to any influence from below. It has lost any flexibility, which, in fact, is its strength. The regime won’t allow even miniscule zones of freedom, therefore it will carefully monitor the elite reshuffle. According to our estimates, in the upcoming elections the Kremlin is focused on gaining 42-45% support for its party – but not through a legitimate vote count, but through doctoring the results and artificially reducing the turnout.

Preparations for the Russian parliamentary elections have put on the agenda the issue of international readiness to refrain from recognizing the new Russian parliament composition and further moves by the United States and the European Union amid illegitimacy of Russia’s legislative branch. There’s already no doubt that the elections this fall will be held in violation of democratic principles and international law. However, if we turn a blind eye to this outrageous fact , our claim of prioritizing democratic values ​​ will be naturally called into question.