2021 Uzbek presidential elections will probably bring the victory to the current leader of the country, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. At the previous elections, he won 88% in a virtually uncontested vote. On October 24, Uzbekistan will hold its presidential elections. In case of Mirziyoyev’s victory, Russia will retain maximum influence over Tashkent.
As of presidential elections procedure, Mirziyoyev duplicates the policy of his predecessor Karimov. Upon defeating the opposition forces in 1993, in the next four presidential elections in Uzbekistan, Karimov’s opponents were only central-government controlled parties’ nominees.
Mainly, it happens because of the Uzbek current legislation stipulating that only registered political parties have an exclusive right to nominate their candidate for presidential elections. This law allows the authorities to control both the nomination of the candidates for the head of state position, and ‘birth’ of the opposition on the political scene generally: the movements of uncontrolled politicians are not registered. Moreover, party representation is allowed to nominate independent candidates only with the central government’s approval.
Thus, due to the candidates’ registration restrictions the authorities could make formal concessions as for equal access to campaign opportunities, especially on television; campaign budget allocation, and election trips across the country. As a result, while introducing democratic standards in the election campaign the Uzbek government retained full control over the process.
Since 2007, the government party candidate has been traditionally nominated by the Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party (ULDP).
After Karimov’s death in 2016, incumbent President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was also nominated by the ULDP. In the upcoming elections Mirziyoyev runs from this very party.
Alisher Qodirov, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, the current leader of the nationalist Uzbekistan Revival Democratic Party, is the most well-known out of four nominal opponents of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. He makes anti-Russia statements but probably he uses this trick to distract the opposition electorate from criticizing the authorities. Undoubtedly, Qodirov is a puppet in the hands of the Uzbek authorities.
The other two candidates – Bahram Abduhalimov, the Social Democratic Party Adolat, and Narzullo Oblomurodov, the Ecological Party – are academician politicians. However, only few people knew them before the presidency campaign. Thus, they are solely technical figures who are supposed to ‘democratize’ undemocratic election process. In 2006-2008 Abduhalimov served as the interethnic relations and religious affairs state adviser to former President Islam Karimov. Narzullo Oblomurodov worked in the Secretariat of the Presidential Administration of Uzbekistan for some period of time.
The fourth candidate is Maqsuda Vorisova, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. She is a professional doctor; she stepped on the political stage in 2020 after getting a parliamentary mandate. Vorisova’s nomination is more about gender equality that the central authorities of Uzbekistan want to demonstrate worldwide.
On the vote eve, authorities tightened media freedom restrictions by ensuring that opposition candidates were not listed. In March, Uzbekistan criminalized online insult to the president.
The authorities could demonstrate their commitment to real reforms by allowing candidates who do not share the government’s views to run in the campaign, but they did not agree. The country’s government has yet to implement a number of long-standing OSCE recommendations: particularly, on some aspects of fundamental freedoms of association, assembly and expression, as well as restrictions on electoral rights, civil observation of elections and registration of political parties.
Thus, the political system of Uzbekistan follows the example of Kazakhstan. On one hand, the strengthening of Mirziyoyev’s power by himself and appointing his relatives to influential positions (his younger son-in-law, Otabek Umarov, is the deputy head of the presidential security service) duplicates the policy of the ex-President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev. However, on the other hand, the Uzbek pattern reflects the general trend of authoritarianism and authoritarian style management among countries of Central Asia. Whatever it jeopardizes the current regime it is not prohibited.
The denial of self-nomination institution in both countries is explained by the desire to avoid any risks that might lead to current leader’s defeat.
The fundamental problem of Central Asian democracy is the ideological weakness of the opposition who concentrates on criticizing the authorities more than on preparing an alternative program and action plan.
