Challenges of Great Power Competition

Challenges of Great Power Competition

After about 16 years of preoccupation with counter-terrorism, the United States officially declared in its National Security Strategy of 2017 that it is reorienting its focus on great power competition and challenges that Russia and China pose

Joe Biden returned to the White House, this time as a President, and used his first address before a global audience to declare that “America is back”. Many translated this as the pursuit of a unipolar approach to preserve the international order which would intertwine the revitalization of American democracy inside the United States to the defense of its high values ​​outside. Internationalism and interventionism were the logical consequences of such an approach.

Accordingly, it was assumed that Biden might revive the devil’s axis of George W. Bush through polarizing the world with the US-led democracies on the one hand and authoritarian governments led by China and Russia on the other. Also, many analysts expected President Biden to severely pressure these strategic rivals by forming a coalition of democracies to stress the importance of human rights. But domestic and international conditions have drastically changed Biden’s strategy.

Biden has woken up to the fact that the United States’ ability to contain Russia and China has been decliningThe reason for this can be traced to the escalation of domestic conflicts and the increasing polarization of the two major parties within the US political system after President Trump took office, as well as Russia and, in particular, China’s advances in military and economic domains.

As a result, President Biden has taken a more pragmatic approach to confronting these two countries in order to assert American power and defend democracy across the globe. The hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan without consulting Europeans, the Quad alliance, and recently the AUKUS security deal are all indicative of a post-Atlantic rather than a transatlantic pragmatism.

This pragmatism has made the return of US foreign policy to the devil’s axis highly unlikely. Nonetheless, of the two main rivals, China is the leading candidate for the devil’s axis as for the last few years almost all US government strategic documents have called China a long-term strategic rival to the United States, referring to the implications of China’s economic and technological rise. Although it is a bilateral confrontation, US-China relations have a global scope and therefore strongly affect the relations of other world powers, regional mechanisms, the functioning of international institutions, and even the bilateral and multilateral relations of many countries. The strategic rivalry between China and the United States has become a paradigm in international relations and has consequently shifted the United States’ foreign policy strategy from a transatlantic to a post-Atlantic one. This means that not only Europe’s role but also NATO and Russia’s strategic roles have diminished in the United States’ foreign policy. 

Many foreign policy experts have also expressed their worries over a Sino-Russian entente. China and Russia share common motives for cooperation including countering US leadership and spread of democracy, undermining strategic stability in areas under US influence, stealing intelligence, and spreading misinformation. Nevertheless, China-Russia relations are not strategic. Although their economic and military ties have strengthened, their positions in the international system and their differing views toward international order are different. Moreover, due to Russia’s lingering suspicion of China exploiting the imbalance of relations, China’s growing independence from advanced Russian military technology, divergence in diplomatic matters, and ultimately Russia’s concern about China’s activities in Central Asia their relations are not sustainable. Thus, ties between these two actual rivals cannot last long and more conflicts between these states are not far-fetched.  

To deal with these authoritarian states, the United States should start from home and ease partisan tensions. For example, Biden should urge Congress to swiftly confirm his nominees for the State Department roles which have been left vacant due to partisan clashes. This problem has not only severely impaired our capacities to conduct diplomacy and to cooperate with allies, but also has interrupted strategic decision-making in dealing with competitors. Beyond our borders, in the face of great power rivalry, Biden must rebuild and redefine old and new alliances and restore the United States’ lost credibility and trust. Consequently, the restoration of transatlantic bonds with Europe should be based on a multilateral approach where instead of marginalizing allies their priorities and interests are respected. Also, the United States should use the imbalance of relations between China and Russia to further weaken this fragile relationship by easing tensions with Russia.