Moscow’s latest foreign policy statements and their disinformation campaign observed amid the aggravation of the security situation in Europe are associated with the confrontation boiling between the key political institutional players: the GRU military intelligence, the FSB security agency, and the political intel team of the SVR foreign intelligence service. Their confrontation is deepening under the influence of the following factors: the approach of the expected power transfer in Russia, tentatively scheduled for 2024, and the internal imbalance of the country’s political system, which is mainly the result of the struggle between the so-called “siloviki,” or the government’s defense and security bloc.
In October 2020, signs became obvious of Putin’s weakening influence on the government institutions and increasing competition among law enforcement agencies in the struggle for power and budget funding.
In January 2022, such signals became even louder. For example, the Chechnya leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who had previously expressed full loyalty to Putin, voiced statements hinting at his presidential ambitions.
Foreign Minister Lavrov’s behavior also casts doubt on the stability of the regime and points to certain attempts at maneuvers. This is evidenced by the fact that it’s Lavrov’s deputies who have been voicing the most radical statements, while their chief stands aside, perhaps considering a possibility to leave Russia behind in favor of a job somewhere abroad.
Russia’s foreign policy is shaped by the efforts of at least two groups, one of which is raising the stakes in confrontation with the West, while the other is trying to smooth out possible consequences, albeit in the interests of their own claims to power. The first group plays to increase external risks, enjoying a monopoly in the area of defense to expand own influence over President Putin. Defense chief Sergey Shoigu and his GRU today have taken up a niche that was once occupied by the GRU head, Ivan Serov, who was a mainstay for Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The Kremlin’s attempt to replicate the Khrushchev-era Caribbean crisis may be indicative of the GRU’s significant dominance over the Kremlin’s decision-making process and, as a result, Shoigu’s fierce struggle for presidency.
The second group plays the role of a “fire brigade,” which demonstrates to Putin their readiness to resolve the crisis, sparked by the other group, at the same time weakening the latter’s positions. In this regard, there is a possibility that, by analogy with Khrushchev’s case, Putin may be eventually removed from office by a more moderate group of senior security operatives.
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Despite the fact that these groups do not coordinate their actions, it is likely that in certain issues, they do just that, mainly in matters related to domestic politics.
The political activity of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu appears to be unprecedented. In fact, before 2014, it would have been impossible as Putin was the sole center of influence in Russia. Shoigu’s presidential ambitions are aimed at reducing Putin’s influence, provoking even harsher confrontation among the security forces.
Power in Russia has never been transferred as a result of democratic elections. Leaders come and go as a result of either power transfer or “palace coup.” The chiefs of security agencies have the greatest potential to be elected as the leader’s successor or to set up a quiet coup. Thus, the intensification of the ongoing struggle between them may be an indicator of a likely power transfer in Russia.
This struggle is accompanied by massive psy-ops and disinformation campaigns aimed both at international and domestic audiences. The purpose of such operations is to boost anxiety among the population and demoralize people by exaggerating external threats. Such campaigns replace pre-election agitation, yielding fruitful results for top security bosses. After all, they must prepare public opinion for the power transfer and justify why the presidential chair is once again occupied by someone from the “siloviki” group.
The outcome of the ongoing squabbles within the Kremlin will determine Russia’s further development. It is unlikely that even with moderate officials coming to power, Russia will embark on the path of democratic development. In the event that Putin’s rule ends, the next president will represent one of the existing security agencies, who sooner or later will revitalize Russia’s confrontation with the West in order to consolidate the population and ensure his continued rule. Thus, the only way to minimize the threats coming from Russia is to work toward its economic exhaustion and strip the government of any opportunities to maintain an offensive (including nuclear) potential.
