The Kremlin power reshuffle amid the war in Ukraine and Putin’s disease 

Power races in the Kremlin still shake the air amid Putin’s health problems. May 12-15, the Russian president underwent cancer surgery. Taking into consideration the flights of the presidential fleet aircraft, Il-96-300, and the Sochi control center, we may conclude that upon the surgery Putin was sent for the rehabilitation to Sochi, the very city where he used to be treated.

In this context, The Independent newspaper, which has a connection with the Russian oligarch Alexander Lebedev (affiliated with so called ‘Deep KGB, a group of former KGB officers who continued to work for the Russian special services and connected the Soviet KGB elite with the Russian government after the USSR collapse with following general geopolitical and geo-economic goals), published information that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSS) had distributed a ‘secret note’ instructing the heads of Russian administrative regions to put down any attempt of spreading President Putin’s incurable disease rumors. The same newspaper wrote that Putin’s swollen face and unsteady walk might be side effects of the medical therapy.

Therefore, the mentioned publication may indicate that the FSS group, close to Nikolay Patrushev, the Russian Security Council Secretary, acts quite the opposite by sharing information about Putin’s health problems.

Earlier Russian media and social networks informed that on the eve of the surgical operation, Putin appointed Patrushev as his deputy for the rehabilitation period. According to unverified information, Patrushev is the person who makes routine decisions in the Kremlin.

It means that the power configuration in the Kremlin has changed since the war in Ukraine started.

Previously, there were enough reasons to believe that the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was a key figure influencing Putin’s decisions. Moreover, our analysts take such monopolized influence and access to the president as a military coup sign.

However, the failure of the Russian military operation in Ukraine, the loss of the Russian flagship at sea, and catastrophically tainted international image of Putin (his regime compared with Hitler’s rule), which will get worse in case of prolonging war in Ukraine, have distanced Russia’s military leadership from the President.

These positions went to the Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev (a representative of ‘Deep KGB’), who has been increasing his influence over the past 3 years. He managed to weaken the position of Alexander Bortnikov, the director of the FSS, and increase his own influence on this service.

It is obvious that despite successful surgical operation, Putin’s health will continue to deteriorate due to progressing Parkinson’s disease and the dementia it caused. We still keep to the predictions that general health will not allow Putin serving publicly as president until the end of the year. His mental and physical changes will be so clear that they can break the power vertical, especially at the regional level. In this regard, some representatives of Putin’s entourage are proactive in forming the basis to justify the change of influence centers in the Kremlin (power reshuffle). We believe that this work is coordinated by the majority of the regime representatives, probably, including Putin himself, who in this manner keeps power control over the whole country.

This process must:

• maintain the regime;

• prevent significant changes in the power and influence of each team member at the first stage;

• contribute into the elites’ consolidation around the leader, who turns into a symbol of the Motherland in the fight against an external enemy;

• provide for some correction work such as reforms to strengthen the power vertical.

Probably, in a while this scenario will fail because of inability to maintain the top power configuration after Putin’s retirement. Putin has built the power vertical by himself using personal agreements and compromising materials. When Putin steps down from the presidency there will be no chances to ensure and guarantee those agreements. Moreover, some players will try to improve their own positions that will ultimately lead to competition and possible power reshuffle. Putin will be incapable to transfer his high ratings he had in some country’s development periods, even with the help of the state propaganda machine.

Therefore, in the future, the Kremlin will face the problem of the legitimacy of a successor who has no real public support. In addition, he is unlikely to get it because of security sphere associations and negative public emotions. As for now, ‘Deep KGB’ seeks to maintain its influence when Putin leaves. However, it will have to build new configurations that can be based on the Putin’s regime old players mainly. It is highly unlikely to see new faces on the political arena since no member in the team of the Russian president had a chance to show himself as a strong public leader. Positive public emotions and support would require a revolutionary agenda proposal that runs contrary to the conservative goals of ‘Deep KGB’ that has already turned into the Russian analogue of the IRGC.