In between 2021 and July 2023, Russia’s governance system has experienced serious changes, mainly caused by events that have weakened the leadership position of President Vladimir Putin and hurt reputation of some stalwarts from his circle. The key factors that have changed the level of their influence and close connection with the President are the following:
• Strengthening international sanctions against Russia since the first days of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.The impact of sanctions and frozen Russian assets abroad have weakened the support of Putin’s business circle, forcing them to seek for tactical alliances with individuals who have increased their influence in the Kremlin.
• The breakdown in Vladimir Putin’s health since 2020; it provoked power imbalance, a decrease in Putin’s personal activity and control of the situation, and an increase in the using the President’s body doubles.
• Putin’s health condition and mental state affected by the medications raise concerns of the President’s environment about the stability of the regime and make them contribute their main efforts into self-preservation in power and security guarantees to skip international persecution in case of the termination of Putin’s powers.
• The threat of international criminal prosecution of the Kremlin leadership changes their behavior, decreasing their effectiveness as political leaders.
Nikolai Patrushev is Russia’s biggest beneficiary of the situation at the present time. Hailing from the KGB, he retains Putin’s trust and shows himself as capable of maneuvering between checks and balances in the country. Putin is aware of his interest to transfer the power to his son, Dmitry Patrushev, the Minister of Agriculture. This fact poses no threat to the Russian president due to the difficult process of Patrushev’s formal presidential candidacy. Thus, the Kremlin sees Patrushev as a guarantor of maintaining the status quo power.
Dmitry Patrushev is being considered as a possible candidate for the position of Russian Prime Minister after the 2024 elections.
Yuri Kovalchuk has been Putin’s business partner since 1996. According to our estimates, he retained his influence on the President and his decisions. His close connection to Putin is based on their common views: anti-liberalism and hostility to the West, mysticism, conspiracy theories and anti-Americanism narratives. Yuri Kovalchuk has impact on Putin’s decisions that make him as influential as Patrushev without state office and authority
In fact, Patrushev and Kovalchuk are the only two people who influence decisions of the President.
Viktor Zolotov is Putin’s former bodyguard and sparring partner in boxing and judo; one of Putin’s confidant. The influence of Zolotov has increased after Prigozhin’s rebellion. This fact is proved by the intention to transfer armored vehicles to Russia’s National Guard.
Sergei Shoigu has distanced himself from the president. He is in the most vulnerable figure. Shoigu understands that he will inevitably bare responsibility for corruption and embezzlement in the Russian armed forces, as well as the failure of the military operation against Ukraine. It will happen if Putin loses his powers. Russia’s major losses in Ukraine will undoubtfully cause a deep social crisis in the future, which will require the punishment of the responsible figures. Shoigu, the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the operation are likely to be labeled as responsible for the failures and war crimes. Thus, Shoigu seeks to keep the position of defense minister as long as possible, it gives him temporary immunity while Putin remains his position. We believe that the chance that Putin dismisses Shoigu is extremely low. First of all, Putin is afraid of a mutiny in the army, which explains his hesitations to punish the generals involved in Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion. Having Shoigu in office there are all chances to neutralize attempts for a military coup. Secondly, Shoigu was part of Putin’s inner circle before the war against Ukraine began. Despite leaving the inner circle of the President, Putin will not let Shoigu go, because he appreciates his loyalty that Putin sees as a priority personal characteristic. However, Shoigu will obviously continue to lose power and close connection with the President.
Gennady Timchenko is Putin’s friend and the owner of the VolgaGroup investment group. It is likely that following Prigozhin’s rebellion, Timchenko’s position has weakened, in particular, because of the Kremlin’s demand to liquidate the PMC Redut controlled by Timchenko.
Sergei Sobyanin is the mayor of Moscow and the head of Rosneft state oil and gas giant; he maintains a high level of Putin’s trust due to the need to control the capital region during the 2024 elections. He embodies capital, business and peaceful Russia, rather than the warring nation. Upon the rebellion his influence somewhat declined due to close connection with the Shoigu-Timchenko group.
Alexander Bortnikov, the Director of the FSB, who still has Putin’s trust but who is not influential enough to challenge the Russian leader or give him advice. It is explained by the fact that Nikolai Patrushev informally runs the service while Bortnikov performs only managerial functions. It is rumored that for a several years Bortnikov has been showing a strong desire to retire. However, it is unlikely that Putin will fire him. The President is satisfied with the situation in which the department is controlled by close stalwarts: one of them is not politically ambitious (Bortnikov), and the other one, Patrushev, is the most trusted and close person in the circle.
Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, whose level of influence has dropped but nevertheless he is influential enough to have impact on the appointments of his protégés, for example, Turko Daudov, Russia’s permanent representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Yakub Zakriev, general director of ‘Danone Russia’.
Perhaps, it happened for two key reasons:
* low performance of Akhmat units in the war against Ukraine;
* tactical move to wait for the power struggle in the Kremlin to pass. Kadyrov’s weak position during Prigozhin’s rebellion in June 2023 proves this idea. We think that rumors about Kadyrov’s poor health were spread on his behest in order to avoid risks while struggling for power in Moscow. Kadyrov’s critical health problems cannot be ruled out, but his trip to Dubai was intended to distance himself from the rebellion until the situation was settled. Despite the fact that Kadyrov did not support the rebellion publicly, his passive position shook the Kremlin’s confidence in him.
Sergei Naryshkin is the Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. His loss of influence in the Kremlin is shown by his personal participation in smear campaigns. His public speeches over the past year and a half contain statements discrediting him as the head of intelligence service abroad. Such Russian domestic audience-addressed campaigns prove that the Kremlin does not take Naryshkin seriously despite his presidential ambitions.
Dmitry Medvedev, ex-president of Russia and deputy head of the Security Council (Patrushev), has lost his influence completely. It happened due to alcohol abuse against the backdrop of inadequate political ambitions and a desire to return the chair of the President of Russia. The alcohol addiction, the desire to demonstrate the influence and draw Putin’s attention make him deliver speeches threatening to use nuclear weapons and demonstrating a full readiness to confront the West. However, Medvedev desperately became the lame duck of Russian politics who has lost influence and seriousness in the Kremlin.
Thus, the number of people involved in decision-making process and state administration has been drastically reduced. The federal government started working with a minimal contact with the President. The loss of collegiality in the government is slowly leading Russia to the Politburo-model state existing in the last years of the USSR era.
Sergei Kiriyenko serves as the head of the political block of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. Kiriyenko has known Vladimir Putin pretty well since the 1990s; there was the time when he was holding higher position in the state hierarchy. Informally Kiriyenko communicates with the Russian leader on first-name terms; no jealous moments between them have ever arisen. He is responsible for the ideological park working in the interests of Putin’s personal rating. Moreover, he is in charge of the 2024 elections preparation. He retains significant influence over Putin. His positions within the analyzed period have been preserved due to a specific range of his competence. Kiriyenko was given the task of providing Putin with 80% of support in the elections.
Billionaire brothers Arkady and Boris Rotenberg – Arkady is a childhood friend of Vladimir Putin and one of the main ‘kings of the state order’. On the rebellion day he left Russia and flew from Moscow to the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku. At the same time, the plane of Arkady’s brother, Boris Rotenberg, another Russian billionaire, was still on territory of Russia. Probably, the influence has been dropped significantly.
Igor Sechin is the head of the PJSC NK Rosneft, Putin’s close friend. Reportedly, he could support the transfer of power in favor of Governor of the Tula Region Alexei Dyumin. At present time, because of dropping oil sale financial revenues, his influence has declined. It is clearly demonstrated by a failed attempt to appoint his own creature, Igor Dyachenko, as the governor of the Krasnodar Region. Probably, Sechin’s interest in such an appointment is explained by the fact that the President stays in the region (Sochi) more and more often. It shows indirectly that partially Sechin has lost direct operational access to Putin. It could happen due to accusations against him of leaking the materials about tortures in the Russian penitentiary system; it is rumored that Sechin put a hand in the leak with the aim to take the post of deputy prime minister of the security cabinet.
Mikhail Mishustin is the prime minister of the Russian Federation; he plays the role of a technocrat with no strong political ambitions. Depending on the political and economic situation development, he may be promoted in the spring of 2024. According to the Russian Federation Constitution a prime minister is Putin’s official successor. He is a compromise figure lobbied by Arkady Rotenberg. This fact makes the President be wary of Mishustin and control him in order to avoid a coup attempt, because the constitutional power transfer to the prime minister in case of Putin’s incapacity will keep the power of Putin’s current circle and prevent from violent scenarios of political struggle. Thus, on one hand Putin’s entourage is trying to maintain good relations with Mishustin, and on the other hand, the President is doing his best to prevent Mishustin from building his own group in power and increasing the prime minister’s personal rating.
