Deby’s dynasty is likely to continue ruling in Chad

Mahamat Déby is very likely to win the elections. Chad will see another Déby government. Thus, Chad’s future trajectory is at stake. If open political debate and alternative leadership are not fostered, the country risks reverting to historical patterns of rebellion and armed conflict as a favoured means of resisting and seeking power. This election should mark the end of the transitional phase, but several factors cast doubt on the likelihood that democracy will result.

Transitional president Mahamat Idriss Déby held a large meeting on the Place de la Nation. 

Prime minister Succès Masra, meanwhile, led a large convoy of cars and motorbikes through the city and was accompanied by a crowd of mainly young followers. 

The election will take place on 6 May 2024 and end a three-year transition period led by Mahamat Déby after the sudden death of his father, Idriss Déby Itno, in April 2021.

This objective has been pursued in four ways: violent oppression and intimidation; composition of the electoral institutions; approval of presidential candidates; and campaign strategies.

During the 30-year reign of the late Idriss Déby Itno, Chadians largely got used to a rather autocratic regime. Democratic liberties and the right to freedom of expression were repeatedly suppressed. Arrests of demonstrators were common. 

Some opposition leaders were killed. Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, for example, was killed in 2008. 

Since Mahamat Idriss Déby came into office, two incidents have shown that violence against opposition voices has continued – even more ruthlessly. 

The new constitution adopted in a controversial referendum in December 2023 demanded the creation of two electoral institutions before the electoral process. The institutions are L’Agence nationale de gestion des élections (National Election Management Agency) and the Constitutional Council. 

The election management agency is responsible for organising the election while the constitutional council vets candidates for the elections as well as the results. 

Mahamat Déby appointed members of these two bodies on 30 January 2024 for seven year terms, which means they might serve him in two elections. All of them were loyal to his father in the past and have been members of the former ruling party Mouvement Patriotique du Salut for many years. 

Former minister of justice and spokesperson of the former ruling party, Jean-Bernard Padaré, was appointed president of the constitutional council. Padaré was accused of corruption in 2014. 

Retired president of the supreme court Ahmed Bartchiret, also a member of the former ruling party, chairs the election management agency. 

In order to ensure his continuous grip on power, Mahamat Déby appointed faithful and long serving confidants of his father into these two important agencies for the management of the 6 May election. 

Disqualified candidates were given official reasons including an incorrect birth certificate or a missing document or photograph. 

As expected, the most prominent qualified candidates were Mahamat Déby and his prime minister, Masra. It will be the first time a president and the prime minister he appointed run against each other in a Chadian election. 

Other approved candidates include former prime-minister Albert Pahimi Padacké of the party RNDT Le Réveil. He served as prime minister to Mahamat Déby in 2021 and 2022. He previously served Mahamat’s father between 2016 and 2018. 

The only female candidate is Lydie Beassemda. She contested the presidency in 2021 and finished third. 

The regional origin of the approved candidates is also an indication of how Mahamat Déby’s transition is simply working to retain him in the presidency. Out of the 10 approved candidates, only Mahamat Déby and Yacine Abderamane Sakine of the minority party Parti Réformiste are from the northern region. The other eight candidates are from the southern part of the country. 

Chadians prefer to vote for politicians from their own region. Based on this projection, Mahamat Déby seemed poised to win most of the votes from the northern region while votes of the southern region would be split between the other eight candidates. 

Some voters may abstain from the polls as the opposition coalition Groupe de concertation des acteurs politiques (Concertation Group of Political Actors) and civil society groups like the Wakit Tama call for a boycott. They are challenging the legitimacy of the polls. 

Given this scenario, Déby could win the majority of the votes cast in the first round of voting. Should this not be the case, the constitution says there would be a second round of balloting between the first two candidates. The candidate with a simple majority wins the second round. 

All campaign promises do not differ greatly. They promise better living conditions – primarily the supply of electricity and water, education, more jobs and future prospects for the youth – as well as good governance, reconciliation and cohabitation. 

Mahamat Déby is additionally playing the stability card, which he has used throughout the transition period to justify his takeover and continuous hold on to power. 

Mahamat Déby’s candidature is backed by a broad coalition called Coalition pour un Tchad Uni (Coalition for a United Chad). It is made up of more than 200 political parties and more than 1,000 nongovernmental organisations. The coalition is led by the former ruling party Mouvement Patriotique du Salut. 

The opposition is accusing the coalition of using state funds for their campaign.

Masra, leader of the opposition party Les Transformateurs, was one of Mahamat Déby’s strongest opponents until his return to Chad in October 2023 and was later appointed as prime minister.

As a presidential candidate, he struggles to campaign as someone independent of the Mahamat Déby transitional government. ever. 

Former prime minister Padacké refers to precisely these points in his campaign and accuses Mahamat Déby and Masra of being incapable of managing the country. If elected, Padacké promises to run for only one term. He avoids mentioning the fact that he was part of the late Idriss Déby Itno’s government. 

Meanwhile, focus on the presidential elections distracts attention from the fact that neither parliamentary nor local elections are planned in the near future. It is likely that Mahamat Déby will follow his father’s example here too: legitimisation through presidential elections. Under the late Déby, the last parliamentary elections were held in 2011; local elections were only held once.