Russian Sabotage of NATO’s Subsea Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea

Russian Sabotage of NATO’s Subsea Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea

Russian attacks on subsea infrastructure in the Baltic region requires a careful blend of factual evidence, historical context, and strategic communication.

Russia is engaging in provocations in the Baltic Sea with the goal of declaring it a Russian internal sea and escalating tensions with NATO.

A Russian ship damaged three underwater communication cables between Estonia and Finland. Two of these cables belong to the telecommunications company Elisa, while the third belongs to CITIC Telecom CPC. According to our assessments, the deliberate damage to subsea communications in the Baltic Sea serves several purposes:

DALL·E 2024 12 27 06.54.03 A detailed map of the Baltic Sea region highlighting key incidents of sabotage on subsea infrastructure. The map includes marked locations for the Nor
  1. Provoking Conflict with NATO Countries: We believe that Russia is seeking to escalate tensions with NATO countries. Although in the event of a conventional conflict, NATO would have a clear advantage, the Kremlin is convinced that it could escalate the threat of nuclear conflict to the highest level, invoking scenarios from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and force the Alliance to capitulate under the threat of mutual destruction. We raised this possibility in early 2022, noting the Kremlin’s intent to rework Cold War-era scenarios in a new context.
  2. Increasing Leverage in Upcoming Negotiations: We are also convinced that Moscow wants to raise the stakes ahead of upcoming negotiations with the West and approach them from a position of strength. Earlier, we pointed to the high likelihood of a military conflict between Russia and Estonia.

This narrative underscores Russia’s ongoing strategy of destabilization in the region, aimed at weakening NATO and strengthening its own bargaining position on the international stage.

During the Cold War, the USSR engaged in activities to surveil and potentially sabotage undersea NATO infrastructure, but there are no confirmed instances of direct attacks on subsea infrastructure such as undersea communication cables or pipelines. Instead, Soviet actions were often focused on intelligence-gathering and preparations for potential conflict scenarios.

Known Soviet Activities Related to NATO Subsea Infrastructure:

  1. Surveillance and Tapping of Undersea Cables:
  1. The Soviet Navy operated specialized submarines and vessels designed for deep-sea operations, such as the Priz class and the Delta IV submarines.
  2. These assets were used to map undersea cable routes and sometimes attempt to tap into them for intelligence purposes.
  3. A well-known example is the U.S. counterpart’s Operation Ivy Bells, where the U.S. tapped Soviet undersea cables, highlighting the importance of undersea infrastructure during this era.
  4. Preparation for Sabotage:
  5. Soviet forces developed capabilities to sever or disrupt undersea cables in the event of war. This included the use of mini-submarines and divers trained for underwater demolition.
  6. Monitoring NATO Movements:
  7. The Soviet Union often used submarines to shadow NATO naval operations, which sometimes included reconnaissance of undersea infrastructure.

While these actions reflect a high level of Cold War tension and competition, no publicly disclosed evidence points to the USSR launching an outright attack on NATO subsea infrastructure during peacetime. Such an act would have risked escalating tensions into open conflict, which both sides were generally keen to avoid.

  1. Changing the Status of the Baltic Sea: There is a high likelihood that Russia seeks to revise the international status of the Baltic Sea, following a scenario similar to that of the Sea of Azov, declaring it an internal sea of Russia. To achieve this, the Kremlin needs a conflict that would allow for a localized military operation in the region, asserting that its rights to use the Baltic’s waters for its own interests are being infringed upon.

This shift in strategy would mark a significant escalation, as Russia would seek to reassert control over critical maritime routes and potentially disrupt NATO’s strategic access to the region. The provocation could be framed as a defensive measure to protect Russia’s perceived maritime interests, but the underlying aim would be to further destabilize the region and challenge international norms.

4. Potential Motivations

  • Rhetorical Strategy: Russia could use such a declaration as a propaganda tool to rally domestic support or create a narrative of defiance against NATO and the West.
  • Negotiation Leverage: A provocative claim could be a bargaining chip in broader geopolitical negotiations.
  • Such a move would likely result in severe consequences, including expanded sanctions, increased NATO military presence in the Baltic, and heightened regional tensions.
  • International law and global opinion would strongly oppose any such declaration, as it undermines established maritime norms.
  1. Development of Sabotage Tactics on NATO Subsea Infrastructure: Since 2020, Russia has been developing tactics for sabotage on NATO’s subsea infrastructure. Initially, this involved the use of forces and assets from the Russian Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), but starting in 2023, commercial vessels have been increasingly used. We believe the greatest threat comes from joint operations between Russia and its allies and partners. For example, the captain of the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3, which was suspected of damaging underwater telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea, turned out to be a Russian citizen. The damage caused disruptions to communications, and Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius suggested it could have been a deliberate act of sabotage.
  2. Russian Intelligence Involvement: According to the Wall Street JournalYi Peng 3 received instructions from Russian intelligence. The West’s measured response to such acts of sabotage, in our view, encourages Russia to continue these operations. On November 21, the Russian ship Mercury arrived in the Kattegat Strait between Sweden and Denmark, where it conducted electronic surveillance near the Chinese vessel. It is reported that Mercury transmitted encrypted information to a command center in Kaliningrad.

This narrative underscores the evolving nature of Russian tactics in the region, combining both military and commercial assets in an effort to undermine NATO’s subsea infrastructure. The involvement of Chinese vessels and Russian intelligence points to a coordinated effort to disrupt critical communication and energy networks, while the West’s restrained response could embolden further provocations.

Russia’s use of civilian vessels, rather than naval ships, to attack infrastructure in the Baltic Sea is a strategic choice that aligns with its broader approach to hybrid warfare. Here are the key reasons for this tactic:

1. Plausible Deniability

  • Civilian vessels provide a cover for covert operations, making it harder to attribute attacks directly to the Russian government or military.
  • By using vessels that appear to be engaged in legitimate activities (e.g., fishing, cargo transport), Russia can create uncertainty about responsibility for the attacks.

2. Avoiding Direct Military Confrontation

  • Deploying naval ships in such operations could be seen as an act of war or direct aggression, escalating tensions with NATO and Baltic states.
  • Civilian vessels lower the risk of provoking a strong military response from NATO, which would be obligated to defend member states under Article 5. 

3. Economic and Operational Efficiency

  • Civilian vessels are cheaper to operate and more abundant than military ships, allowing Russia to conduct operations with less investment.
  • They can blend into commercial traffic, making it harder for surveillance systems to detect suspicious activity.

4. Exploiting Gaps in Surveillance

  • Civilian vessels are often subject to less scrutiny than military ships, allowing them to operate closer to critical infrastructure without raising alarms.
  • This tactic exploits gaps in maritime monitoring systems, particularly in busy shipping lanes like the Baltic Sea.

5. Psychological and Strategic Impact

  • The use of civilian vessels blurs the line between military and civilian actions, complicating the response of targeted nations and international organizations.
  • It creates fear and uncertainty, which are hallmarks of hybrid warfare, by making it difficult to predict and counteract future attacks.

6. Avoiding Accountability

  • Civilian vessels can be operated by private entities or third-party actors, creating layers of separation from the Russian government.

This makes it easier for Russia to deny involvement and muddy the waters in international investigations.

Thus, there is a high likelihood that Russia has agreements with several countries from the “Axis of Evil” to use their commercial fleets for subversive operations against subsea infrastructure, with the goal of weakening the defense and economic potential of Western countries.

Russia’s use of civilian vessels, rather than naval ships, to attack infrastructure in the Baltic Sea is a strategic choice that aligns with its broader approach to hybrid warfare. Here are the key reasons for this tactic:

1. Plausible Deniability

  • Civilian vessels provide a cover for covert operations, making it harder to attribute attacks directly to the Russian government or military.
  • By using vessels that appear to be engaged in legitimate activities (e.g., fishing, cargo transport), Russia can create uncertainty about responsibility for the attacks.

2. Avoiding Direct Military Confrontation

  • Deploying naval ships in such operations could be seen as an act of war or direct aggression, escalating tensions with NATO and Baltic states.
  • Civilian vessels lower the risk of provoking a strong military response from NATO, which would be obligated to defend member states under Article 5.

3. Economic and Operational Efficiency

  • Civilian vessels are cheaper to operate and more abundant than military ships, allowing Russia to conduct operations with less investment.
  • They can blend into commercial traffic, making it harder for surveillance systems to detect suspicious activity.

4. Exploiting Gaps in Surveillance

  • Civilian vessels are often subject to less scrutiny than military ships, allowing them to operate closer to critical infrastructure without raising alarms.
  • This tactic exploits gaps in maritime monitoring systems, particularly in busy shipping lanes like the Baltic Sea.

5. Psychological and Strategic Impact

  • The use of civilian vessels blurs the line between military and civilian actions, complicating the response of targeted nations and international organizations.
  • It creates fear and uncertainty, which are hallmarks of hybrid warfare, by making it difficult to predict and counteract future attacks.

6. Avoiding Accountability

  • Civilian vessels can be operated by private entities or third-party actors, creating layers of separation from the Russian government.
  • This makes it easier for Russia to deny involvement and muddy the waters in international investigations.

Russia’s attacks on subsea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea are often attributed to a mix of strategic, economic, and political motives:

1. Strategic Disruption

  • Subsea cables and pipelines are critical for communication and energy flow in Europe. Disrupting these assets can create instability and economic harm to nations reliant on them, particularly EU and NATO members.
  • Targeting this infrastructure could also undermine European unity by creating energy shortages or communication blackouts.

2. Energy Weaponization

  • The Baltic Sea hosts key pipelines like Nord Stream, which transport natural gas from Russia to Europe. While Russia profits from these pipelines, it has also used energy as a geopolitical tool.
  • Damaging infrastructure may signal to Europe that its energy security is at risk, particularly as the EU seeks alternatives to Russian energy.

3. Military and Geopolitical Leverage

  • Subsea attacks can test NATO’s response, highlighting vulnerabilities and assessing alliance cohesion.
  • These actions may serve as a warning or deterrence, showcasing Russia’s capabilities to target critical infrastructure.

4. Information Warfare

  • Even the threat of attacks on subsea infrastructure contributes to psychological and economic pressure. It may also fuel misinformation, creating uncertainty about the source or scale of the damage.

5. Retaliation and Provocation

  • Russia might target subsea assets as retaliation for Western sanctions, military aid to Ukraine, or other perceived hostilities.
  • Such attacks may provoke NATO into action, which Russia could then exploit for propaganda purposes.

Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea have heightened concerns about the security of undersea infrastructure, with several cases of damaged cables and pipelines raising suspicions of deliberate sabotage.

Notable Incidents:

  • Balticconnector Damage (October 2023): The Balticconnector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia was damaged, leading to disruptions in energy supply. Authorities are investigating the cause, with some suspecting sabotage.
  • C-Lion1 Cable Incident (November 2024): The C-Lion1 undersea internet cable, crucial for connectivity between Finland and Germany, was severed, underscoring the vulnerability of critical offshore infrastructure. 
  • Estlink-2 Power Cable Damage (December 2024): The Estlink-2 undersea electricity cable connecting Finland and Estonia was damaged on Christmas Day. Finnish authorities detained the Russian-linked tanker Eagle S on suspicions of involvement in the incident. 

Geopolitical Context:

The Baltic Sea region has become a focal point of geopolitical interest and conflict, with increased hybrid activities, including acts of sabotage and the use of unidentified drones. 

Russia’s alleged involvement in these incidents is seen as part of a broader strategy of hybrid warfare, aiming to disrupt critical infrastructure and create instability among NATO and EU member states. Such actions test the resilience and response capabilities of these alliances, potentially undermining their unity and security.