Russia’s Shadow Fleet: Sanctions Evasion, Illicit Oil Transport, and Financial Secrecy
Russia actively uses a shadow fleet to circumvent international sanctions, transport oil, and evade financial oversight. One of the key tools in this scheme is the frequent alteration of vessel identification data—changing names, flags, and ownership. This allows them to conceal their true affiliation and continue illegal operations.
Below is a list of nine vessels that exhibit clear signs of belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet. These ships have repeatedly changed names and flags, docked at Russian ports to load oil, turned off their AIS tracking systems, operated without proper insurance, or are linked to sanctioned owners. These facts highlight the urgent need for coordinated efforts by the U.S., the U.K., the EU, and international regulators to combat the illegal fleet that finances Russia’s aggression.
Our researchers have identified key examples of vessels engaged in shadow activities, including:
- INVICTA (IMO: 9250543) – Over recent years, this ship has changed multiple names (NEOMI, WONDER AVIOR, MEGALONISSOS) and flags (Panama, Marshall Islands, now Guinea), a clear indicator of efforts to evade oversight.
- VIRAT (IMO: 9832559) – Has repeatedly changed its name (VALOUR, CRUDESUN) and flags (Haiti, Liberia, the U.S., now Panama).
- PICTOR (IMO: 9322827) – Has a long history of renaming (PERIA, IMPERIA, MINERVA ANTARCTICA, etc.) and switching between flags (Eswatini, Liberia, Cayman Islands).
- LADOGA (IMO: 9339313) – Switched to the Russian flag on April 5, 2024, clearly indicating its use in Russian oil transportation schemes.
- AMAX ARROW (IMO: 9419448) – Frequently changes names (TARGET, ADVANTAGE ARROW, HENG TAI) and flags (Malta, Panama, now Marshall Islands).
- EMINENT (IMO: 9383950) – Operates under the Panamanian flag, previously known as ELEGANCE, STAR PROSPERITY, CHAMPION PROSPERITY, pointing to attempts to obscure ownership history.
- BREEZE (IMO: 9305568) – Formerly SCF BALTICA, recently switched to the flag of São Tomé and Príncipe, a common tactic among sanctioned vessels.
- SAKHALIN (IMO: 9249128) – Has been sailing under the Russian flag since April 2024, after previously switching between multiple jurisdictions.
- CANGJIE (IMO: 9299680) – Changed flags from Liberia to India, another typical maneuver to obscure true ownership.
All of these vessels changed their flag or name after being placed on various sanctions lists.
Common Strategies for Evading Sanctions
- Frequent Name and Flag Changes – This allows vessels to bypass blacklists and continue operations.
- AIS Manipulation – Turning off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) enables vessels to disappear from tracking systems while at sea.
- Illegal Insurance Practices – Many of these ships operate without proper insurance or through front companies, violating international maritime regulations.
- Use of Shell Companies – Russia employs intermediary firms, such as “Invest Flot,” which has a suspiciously low registered capital of 10,000 rubles. Russian registries conceal the managers of this entity, but through electronic contacts, the involvement of Gennady Semenov—affiliated with another Sovcomflot structure, Novoshipinvest—can be traced. This company is also managed by the sanctioned “SKF Arktika.” A similar scheme is observed with “Southern Fleet.”
- Fake Safety Certifications – Shadow fleet vessels like Liteyny Prospect, Sakhalin, and Ladoga operate under falsified “maritime safety” documents issued by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. Additionally, tankers such as Liteyny Prospect, Ladoga, and Zaliv Baikal use insurance documents from the Moscow-based “Ingosstrakh.”
- Use of Lesser-Known Registries – Countries like Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Marshall Islands have weak regulatory oversight, allowing these fleets to operate outside international norms.
- Ship-to-Ship Transfers – Oil transported from Russian ports is transferred between vessels at sea, making it difficult to trace its origin.
Strengthening Global Measures Against Russia’s Shadow Fleet
Despite existing sanctions, Russia’s shadow fleet remains a serious threat to global security and economic stability. Therefore, the U.S., U.K., EU, and their partners must implement stricter measures, including:
- Stronger flag-state enforcement – Countries must rigorously monitor vessels that change their flag or name after 2022 to quickly identify potential violations.
- Increased penalties for insurers and port operators – Companies facilitating shadow fleet activities should face sanctions.
- Creation of an international database of suspicious vessels – This would prevent these ships from being repeatedly used for sanction evasion.
- Enhanced monitoring of ship-to-ship transfers in international waters – New mechanisms must be established to track such operations in key maritime regions.
This analysis clearly demonstrates that the vessels INVICTA, VIRAT, PICTOR, LADOGA, AMAX ARROW, EMINENT, BREEZE, SAKHALIN, and CANGJIE are part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which helps finance the country’s military aggression. Given this, the international community must unite to increase sanctions pressure, strengthen maritime oversight, and penalize all participants in these illicit schemes. Only coordinated action by the U.S., EU, and the U.K. can effectively block Russian oil flows and cut off funding for the Kremlin’s aggressive policies.
