Why Russia Fears Peace: Economic, Social, and Political Risks of Ending the War in Ukraine

Russia is not interested in ending the war in Ukraine due to threats in the social and economic spheres. Previously, we noted that the failure of negotiations in Washington between the U.S. and Ukraine might have occurred because the Russians were not ready to sign a peace agreement. We are convinced that the Kremlin leadership, which in its composition and function has become increasingly similar to the Politburo of the late Soviet Union, fears that ending the war with Ukraine could lead to consequences similar to those following the end of the war in Afghanistan in 1989.

The return of Soviet veterans from the Afghan war (1979-1989) had significant social consequences in the Soviet Union and later in post-Soviet states:

1. Rise in Crime: Many veterans, struggling to reintegrate into civilian life, became involved in criminal activities. Their combat experience made them valuable recruits for emerging organized crime groups in the 1990s, contributing to a surge in violence and crime in post-Soviet societies.
2. Social Alienation: Afghan war veterans (known as “Afghantsy”) often felt neglected and misunderstood by society and the government. They faced difficulties finding employment and lacked sufficient mental health support, leading to widespread issues of isolation and mental health crises.
3. Homelessness and Poverty: Economic hardships and inadequate support from the state led to poverty among many veterans. Some became homeless, while others struggled with substance abuse, particularly alcohol.
4. Mental Health Crisis: Many veterans suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a condition not widely recognized or treated in the Soviet Union at the time. This contributed to high rates of depression, suicide, and substance abuse.
5. Political Activism: Discontent among veterans helped fuel political movements. Many veterans became vocal critics of the government, participating in protests and supporting nationalist and opposition groups, contributing to the social and political instability of the 1990s.
6. Impact on Families: The war’s psychological toll also affected veterans’ families, leading to domestic violence, family breakdowns, and generational trauma.

The Afghan war’s legacy created a generation of disillusioned and marginalized veterans, which is a scenario the Kremlin may fear repeating with veterans of the war in Ukraine.

Since 2023, Russia has seen a sharp rise in violent crimes among individuals who returned after participating in combat operations in Ukraine. A similar surge in crime was observed in the 1990s after soldiers returned from Afghanistan. These individuals formed the backbone of criminal groups in the post-Soviet space, committing violent crimes due to their combat experience. The Russian authorities involved a large number of convicts serving prison sentences in the war in Ukraine. Therefore, we believe that these individuals will likely continue their criminal activities after demobilization. Their involvement in numerous war crimes in Ukraine suggests that the brutality of their offenses may persist.

While ending the war may slightly reduce state orders for the defense sector, this reduction will impact employment, as will the demobilization of some military units. This will increase pressure on the Russian job market.

We also believe that ending the war will lead to the disclosure of data on Russian personnel losses, creating negative political pressure on the country’s leadership. It will also result in public discontent among veterans of this war regarding the military and political leadership’s actions in terms of supply and management.

Russia may not want a peace agreement for several reasons:

1. Strategic Interests: Russia aims to maintain its influence in Ukraine and the broader region. A peace agreement that solidifies Ukrainian sovereignty could undermine Moscow’s geopolitical goals.
2. Economic Incentives: The Russian military-industrial complex benefits financially from ongoing conflict through budget allocations and corruption schemes. Peace could threaten these revenue streams.
3. Political Leverage: The conflict in Ukraine allows Russia to exert pressure on the West and test NATO’s resolve. Keeping the situation unstable could serve Moscow’s broader foreign policy objectives.
4. Domestic Politics: The Kremlin may use the war to rally nationalist sentiment at home, distract from internal issues, and maintain control over the population.
5. Avoiding Accountability: A formal peace agreement might lead to international investigations into alleged war crimes and human rights abuses, increasing the risk of accountability for Russian leaders.
6. Economic Sanctions: Russia might not want to engage in a peace process that requires concessions that could lead to prolonged or intensified sanctions, potentially harming its economy.
7. 4. Social Unrest and Discontent
8. Veterans returning with unaddressed grievances—such as inadequate pay, poor conditions, and mistreatment by commanders—could become politically active and critical of the government.
9. Protests and unrest could emerge, driven by veterans and their families, similar to the social movements that followed the Afghan war.
10. 5. Increased Pressure on Social Services
11. The state may struggle to meet the social and medical needs of returning soldiers, especially if the economy is under strain from sanctions and the costs of war.
12. Veterans and their families might place additional pressure on already stretched social welfare systems.
13. 6. Potential for Paramilitary Movements
14. Disenchanted veterans could be recruited into nationalist or extremist groups, contributing to internal instability and violence.
15. Former soldiers could also be used by political factions as enforcers or in private military companies, maintaining their militarized lifestyle.