Russian military intelligence is being held responsible for attempting to destabilize the situation in Romania by orchestrating mass protests in support of the pro-Russian presidential candidate Călin Georgescu. Riots Erupt in Bucharest After Central Electoral Bureau Rejects Călin Georgescu’s Presidential Candidacy. Evidence implicating Russian military intelligence includes Georgescu’s connection with mercenary Horatiu Potra, who is linked to figures associated with Russian influence. In September 2024, Potra flew from Moscow to Dubai, visited the Russian embassy, and was connected with “PMC Wagner.” In addition to Potra, Georgescu’s circle included Marin Burca, a former Foreign Legion fighter who collaborated with neo-nationalist movements and launched a joint business with Dorina Mihai. Mihai maintained contacts with Chechen military personnel, including General Zamid Aliyevich Chalaev, commander of the Chechen Interior Ministry’s special forces—an indirect tie to Ramzan Kadyrov. She posted photographs with Russian soldiers, including those who fought in the battles for Mariupol in 2022.
Dorina Mihai has repeatedly visited Chechnya and was recently spotted in Dubai alongside Chechen special forces. She has also publicly praised Vladimir Putin on social media.
The Romanian prosecutor’s office conducted a large-scale operation targeting Georgescu’s entourage. Law enforcement agencies carried out 47 searches in five counties, investigating 27 individuals. Potra’s group is suspected of establishing an organization with fascist, racist, and xenophobic characteristics, as well as of disseminating ideas and doctrines that promote such views in the public sphere. They actively used social networks to recruit like-minded individuals—a practice that aligns with Russian military intelligence methods for identifying and recruiting agents after February 2022.
On March 6, six individuals in Romania were arrested on suspicion of preparing a coup d’état and committing treason. They maintained contacts with agents from a foreign state, including in Russia, where they traveled several times to discuss their plans to seize power. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to expel two Russian diplomats from the country—the Military, Air, and Naval Attaché of the Russian Federation in Bucharest, as well as his deputy as Mil intel spies.
The group planned to withdraw Romania from NATO, adopt a new constitution, change the state symbols, dissolve existing political parties, and create a new government composed of their supporters. The strategic goal of the Russians is to weaken NATO and expel the Alliance from the Black Sea region.
Several indicators suggest possible Russian influence in mass protests in Romania:
- Coordinated Disinformation Campaigns:
- Researchers have identified social media operations that deploy narratives echoing known Russian propaganda tactics. These campaigns often push anti-EU, anti-NATO, and anti-Western messages, which can help mobilize protest movements.
- Digital Footprint Analysis:
- Studies of online activity during protest events have revealed networks of bots and coordinated accounts. Their behavior and messaging patterns resemble those seen in other Russian influence operations across Eastern Europe.
- Intelligence Assessments:
- Western intelligence agencies have warned that Russia uses hybrid warfare—including covert disinformation—to destabilize European nations. While details are typically classified, these assessments indicate that such tactics have been deployed in Romania.
- Comparative Tactics:
- Analysts note that the methods observed in Romania bear similarities to operations in other neighboring countries where Russian involvement is more clearly documented, suggesting a broader regional strategy.
- Domestic Concerns:
- Romanian officials and experts have expressed alarm over the surge of foreign-funded online propaganda, noting that such efforts appear aimed at influencing public opinion and inciting unrest.
Together, these indicators point to a pattern consistent with Russian hybrid tactics aimed at sowing discord and undermining Western cohesion. However, the precise extent of direct Russian involvement remains difficult to verify through open-source evidence alone.
Russia’s interest in destabilizing Romania can be understood through several strategic and geopolitical lenses:
- Undermining NATO and EU Unity:
- Romania is a key member of both NATO and the European Union. Destabilizing Romania can weaken the cohesion and effectiveness of these alliances, which Russia views as major counterweights to its influence in Eastern Europe.
- Hybrid Warfare and Influence Operations:
- Russia has long employed hybrid warfare tactics—combining disinformation, cyber operations, and covert political interference—to sow discord in neighboring countries. Destabilization helps create internal divisions that can be exploited to erode public trust in democratic institutions.
- Geopolitical Leverage:
- By fostering instability in Romania, Russia aims to create a more favorable security environment in its vicinity. This could limit the ability of Western powers to project influence in the region and might pave the way for increased Russian presence or influence.
- Exploiting Nationalist and Populist Sentiments:
- Russian-backed disinformation campaigns often amplify existing societal divides, including nationalist and populist sentiments. This can lead to political polarization, making it harder for the government to maintain a united front against external pressures.
- Destabilizing the Eastern Flank:
- A destabilized Romania could act as a “pressure valve” for Russian efforts to destabilize the broader Eastern European region. This would further complicate the security landscape for NATO, reducing the deterrence effect along Russia’s western border.
Overall, Russia’s interest in destabilization in Romania aligns with its broader strategy to weaken Western alliances, disrupt the political stability of neighboring states, and enhance its own strategic maneuverability in the region. The weakening of Romania would deprive Moldova of EU and NATO support, enabling the Kremlin to conduct more radical operations against Chișinău.
Earlier, we noted the involvement of Romanian Senator Șoșoacă with Russian military intelligence. The Kremlin had also planned to put forward her candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections.
More on this story: GRU operation in Romania points to crisis in Russia’s Intel community
Calin Georgescu is concerned about being labeled a pro-Russian politician for several interrelated reasons:
- Electoral Viability:
In Romania, public sentiment has grown increasingly wary of Russian influence, particularly in light of recent geopolitical events in Ukraine and longstanding historical tensions. Being perceived as pro-Russian could alienate voters who favor strong ties with the West, thus undermining his electoral prospects. - National Security Concerns:
Many Romanians view Russia with suspicion due to its past actions and ongoing regional policies. A pro-Russian stance can raise questions about a candidate’s commitment to Romania’s national security and sovereignty, especially among a public that prioritizes strong defense alliances like NATO. - Political Credibility:
In the current political climate, aligning with Russian interests can damage a politician’s credibility. It may lead to allegations of foreign interference or collusion, which can erode trust among constituents and within the broader political establishment. - International Relations:
Romania’s foreign policy is closely aligned with the EU and NATO. A reputation for being pro-Russian can strain relationships with these key allies, potentially affecting both diplomatic support and economic cooperation, which are vital for Romania’s future.
Overall, the concern is that a pro-Russian label would not only hinder his domestic political ambitions but also jeopardize Romania’s strategic alignment with Western institutions, a stance that has been central to the country’s post-Cold War identity.
More on this story: Russia tested an ability to block transport infrastructure by hybrid instruments
