According to Hungarian Justice Minister Bence Tuzson,The Hungarian government plans to withdraw from the International Criminal Court.
While Hungary hasn’t officially withdrawn as of now, there are speculative reasons why Orbán could be inclined to move in that direction or express skepticism toward the ICC.
1. Distrust of Supranational Institutions
Orbán has long positioned himself against international bodies that he claims infringe on Hungarian sovereignty, such as the EU and international courts. The ICC, being a supranational court, fits that mold.
2. Alignment with Authoritarian Trends
Some of Orbán’s close allies and ideological partners — like Russia, China, and Turkey — are not members of the ICC or have openly criticized it. Aligning with their stance allows Hungary to be part of an alternative geopolitical axis that resists Western institutional norms.
3. Protecting Allies from Prosecution
If the ICC were to pursue cases involving Hungary’s allies, such as Russia (especially over Ukraine), Orbán might reject the legitimacy of the court to shield his strategic relationships — particularly with Vladimir Putin.
4. Precedent of Politically-Motivated Prosecutions
Orbán and his government have criticized Western institutions for what they perceive as politically biased actions. Some populist and nationalist leaders argue that the ICC is used by the West to punish non-Western leaders, particularly from Africa or countries outside NATO.
By rejecting or threatening to quit the ICC, Orbán can appeal to his nationalist voter base by casting himself as a defender of Hungary against “foreign interference” — especially on issues like migration, national security, or judicial reforms.
In case of withraw Orban can face Consequences:
- Loss of credibility within the EU
- Closer alignment with non-Western powers
- Damage to Hungary’s international image on human rights and rule of law.
The chance of Viktor Orbán withdrawing Hungary from the International Criminal Court (ICC) is low to moderatein the near term — but not unthinkable, especially if certain political or geopolitical pressures align.
the Chance Is Relatively Low (for now) because of:
- Hungary Is Still Part of the EU
Leaving the ICC would be a major red flag for Brussels. It would isolate Hungary even further within the EU and possibly trigger additional political and legal retaliation. Orbán tends to push boundaries within the EU framework without formally breaking away. - Hungary Has No Immediate ICC Cases or Exposure
Unlike leaders or states with direct ICC investigations (like Russia or Sudan), Hungary doesn’t currently face any active scrutiny. So there’s no urgent legal incentive to withdraw. - Withdrawal Is Politically Costly
Quitting the ICC could backfire internationally, damaging Hungary’s credibility, foreign investment climate, and diplomatic ties beyond Europe.
🔺 However It’s Still Plausible (in the medium to long term):
- Orbán’s Growing Alignment with Russia
If the ICC pursues more aggressive investigations or arrest warrants related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Orbán might use that as a reason to discredit the court — especially if Hungary is pressured to act on such warrants. - Trend Toward Sovereigntism
Orbán is part of a broader populist-authoritarian wave skeptical of international institutions. If that trend deepens — and especially if Trump returns to the White House and withdraws U.S. support for the ICC — Orbán could feel emboldened to follow suit. - Domestic Political Theater
If Orbán needs to stir nationalist sentiment or distract from domestic issues (e.g. corruption, economic stagnation), attacking institutions like the ICC could be a useful rhetorical tool.
🎯 Estimated Probability (Next 2–3 Years):
- 10–20% chance of formal withdrawal
- 50% chance of increased anti-ICC rhetoric or non-cooperation in specific cases (especially involving Russia or migration)
Likelihood: Moderate (10–20% in next 2–3 years)
While not imminent, Orbán may consider an ICC withdrawal or de facto non-cooperation as part of a broader sovereigntist strategy, especially if:
- The ICC intensifies efforts to prosecute Russian officials for Ukraine-related crimes
- EU pressure on Hungary increases over rule-of-law issues
- U.S. global leadership declines or shifts (e.g., under a second Trump presidency)
Motivating Factors
- Political Alignment: Orbán has deepened ties with non-Western regimes, particularly Russia. He may reject ICC jurisdiction as a way to shield allies.
- Nationalist Messaging: Criticizing global institutions fits Orbán’s domestic narrative of defending Hungarian sovereignty.
- Strategic Hedging: Withdrawal could be used as leverage in negotiations with the EU or as a diversion from domestic issues.
Consequences for the EU
- Erosion of EU Normative Unity: Hungary’s withdrawal would challenge the EU’s human rights and international law commitments.
- Diplomatic Fallout: It could embolden other populist leaders and strain coordination on international justice.
- Precedent Setting: Other EU states under populist rule may follow Hungary’s example.
NATO Implications
- Security Coordination Risks: Withdrawal could complicate legal frameworks for NATO operations, including accountability and interoperability.
- Reputational Damage: NATO’s democratic identity may be questioned if a member actively rejects international justice mechanisms.
Recommendations for the EU and NATO
- Diplomatic Engagement: Quiet, sustained dialogue with Hungary to stress the ICC’s relevance and reduce confrontational dynamics.
- Contingency Planning: EU legal teams should prepare for scenarios of ICC withdrawal and draft coordination protocols.
- Strategic Communication: Reaffirm the importance of the ICC in maintaining a rules-based international order.
- Internal Pressure: Link EU funding mechanisms (e.g., Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation) to continued participation in international treaties.
- Alliance Cohesion: NATO should develop soft pressure tools (e.g., internal forums, political signaling) to preserve shared commitments.
Hungary’s potential withdrawal from the ICC would represent a symbolic rupture with the post-WWII international order that the U.S. and EU have supported for decades. While not likely in the short term, the trajectory of Orbán’s governance suggests that such a move is within the realm of possibility. Proactive engagement, conditionality mechanisms, and alliance-level dialogue are essential to pre-empt this scenario and reinforce international justice norms.
