As Victory Day approaches, there is a growing risk that the Kremlin may stage or exploit a terrorist act inside Russia to blame Ukraine and reinforce wartime propaganda. Historically, the Russian state has used false-flag operations—often with civilian casualties—as tools to manufacture legitimacy, rally domestic support, and justify escalatory policies. May 9, a sacred holiday in Russian political culture, provides an ideal platform for such a psychological operation.
The likelihood of a false-flag terrorist attack on or around May 9th, 2025 is moderate to high (estimated 60–70%) based on current information operations, narrative groundwork, and internal security posturing. The most probable targets are public gathering places, military parades, or transport infrastructure. The goal: frame Ukraine as a terrorist state, justify further escalation in Ukraine, and weaken Western support for Kyiv.
I. Why May 9th? The Strategic Utility of Victory Day
Victory Day is Russia’s most emotionally potent holiday—commemorating the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. Under Putin, it has evolved into a sacred nationalistic ceremony, often used to:
- Consolidate public support,
- Signal international defiance, and
- Justify war as a continuation of the “Great Patriotic struggle.”
In 2025, with the war in Ukraine dragging on and public fatigue mounting, a powerful narrative jolt is useful. A false-flag operation timed to coincide with Victory Day:
- Creates a unifying enemy image (“Ukrainian terrorists”),
- Delegitimizes any Ukrainian calls for peace or ceasefires, and
- Strengthens calls for total mobilization or harsher repression of dissent.
II. Possible False-Flag Scenarios
1. Bombing of a Regional Parade
- Target: Military or youth parade in a regional city (e.g., Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov).
- Narrative: Ukrainian agents or saboteurs targeted Russian children and veterans.
- Tactical Benefit: Easier to stage outside Moscow; less security scrutiny.
2. Attack on Public Transport
- Target: Metro station, intercity train station, or airport.
- Precedent: 2010 Moscow Metro bombings; 2004 Beslan siege began with transport hijacking.
- Narrative: “Ukraine exports terror to peaceful Russian cities.”
3. Drone or Missile Strike with Faked Origin
- Target: Russian cultural site or administrative building.
- Technique: Launch from Russian soil using Ukrainian-style drone; forge telemetry to link Kyiv.
- Goal: Convince international audiences Ukraine is targeting civilians directly.
Assassination Attempt on a Mid-Level Official
- Target: Regional governor, military veteran, or symbolic public figure.
- Method: Small IED or poisoned gift.
- Narrative: “Ukraine’s Western handlers target Russia’s historical memory.”
Fabricated Cyberattack Causing Chaos
- Target: Russian railway or oil infrastructure blamed on Ukrainian hackers.
- Purpose: Disrupt civilian systems and shift blame while mobilizing cyber response.
4. Fabricated Terror Cell Discovery
- Action: FSB “uncovers” a Ukrainian sabotage group just before May 9.
- No real attack, but arrests and televised confessions are used for narrative purposes.
- Benefit: Lower risk, maximum media impact.
III. Historical Precedents of False-Flag Operations in Russia
🔸 1999 Apartment Bombings
- Officially blamed on Chechen terrorists; evidence later pointed to FSB involvement.
- Used to justify the Second Chechen War and secure Putin’s rise to power.
🔸 2002 Nord-Ost Theater Siege
- Although Chechen terrorists were involved, questions remain over the heavy-handed FSB tactics and prior intelligence knowledge.
- Used to rally public support and justify hardline policies.
🔸 2023–2024 Alleged Ukrainian Cross-Border Raids
- Russian state media accused Ukraine of sabotage operations; Western analysts identified staged or exaggerated events near Belgorod and Bryansk.
These precedents show a clear pattern: the Russian state has repeatedly used violence—real or manufactured—as a domestic control and foreign policy weapon.
IV. Strategic Goals of a May 9 False Flag
- Blame Ukraine for civilian bloodshed, shifting international focus from Russian war crimes.
- Discredit Western aid to Ukraine, especially ahead of U.S. and EU elections.
- Justify internal crackdowns on dissent, especially in big cities.
- Create pretext for military escalation, including possible strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, Western embassies, or NATO logistics chains.
V. Probability Estimate
| Factor | Assessment |
| Historical precedent | High likelihood |
| Strategic utility for Kremlin | Very high |
| Public mood (war fatigue) | Growing pressure to create rallying event |
| Security preparation | Reports of drills and troop movements in major cities |
| Propaganda groundwork | State TV increasingly referring to “Ukrainian terrorism” |
Overall probability: 60–70% chance of false-flag narrative or action around May 9.
VI. Possible Locations
| City | Reason for Selection |
| Belgorod | Close to Ukraine, semi-militarized, plausible deniability |
| Voronezh | Large symbolic value, active in military logistics |
| Volgograd | Soviet patriotic symbolism, soft security infrastructure |
| Moscow | High symbolic value, though higher risk of exposure |
| St. Petersburg | Often used for controlled narratives and elite attention · Kazan – Multi-ethnic population and symbolic Muslim-majority city to stir broader narrative.· Rostov-on-Don – Military-adjacent, logistical hub near Ukraine.· Metro stations or Victory Day concerts in Moscow – lower probability due to tight security but high-impact potential. |
In fact, occupied territories (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson) and Crimea are very plausible locations for a false-flag provocation on May 9.
Reasons to Expect False-Flag Attacks in Occupied Territories or Crimea
1. Lower Political Risk
- Provocations in occupied regions carry fewer domestic political consequences for Moscow.
- If something “goes wrong” (e.g., civilian deaths, operational exposure), it can be framed as a front-line tragedy rather than an FSB failure in Russia-proper.
2. Military Plausibility
- Victory Day events in occupied cities can be portrayed as “symbolic targets” for Ukraine.
- Russia can claim that Ukraine tried to “disrupt May 9 celebrations” in Sevastopol, Donetsk, or Melitopol — sites laden with Soviet nostalgia.
3. Propaganda Power
- Any attack in Crimea, in particular, could be framed as “an attack on sacred Russian soil”, raising patriotic outrage.
- Falsely linking Ukraine to the bombing of Victory Day parades would serve as a rallying cry for Russian mobilization and justification for further escalation.
4. Operational Control
- Russia fully controls the narrative and the security environment in the occupied territories. They can:
- Plant explosives or stage an attack with no independent oversight.
- Manipulate witnesses and evidence.
- Block international observers or journalists.
5. Precedents
- In 2022 and 2023, there were high-profile staged assassinations and explosions in Donetsk and Luhansk areas blamed on Ukraine, often without proof.
- Russia used similar tactics in Chechnya and Georgia to justify military actions.
- The first analysis focused on maximum propaganda impact inside Russia, assuming a civilian target on Russian soil (e.g., Moscow or Belgorod) would generate stronger emotional response nationally.
- However, the occupied territories are more “controllable” environments, where Russia can manipulate everything — including international reactions.
Most Likely Occupied Locations for a False-Flag Provocation
- Sevastopol – military symbolism, naval base.
- Donetsk city center – already militarized, heavily propagandized.
- Melitopol or Mariupol – could be framed as “Ukraine punishing liberated cities.”
- Simferopol – civilian concentration, media reach.
VII. Consequences of a False Flag Operation
Domestic:
- Surge in pro-Kremlin sentiment
- Justification for mass mobilization
- Criminalization of dissent under “anti-terror” pretext
- · Boosts regime’s legitimacy, potentially enabling martial law or further censorship.
- · Suppresses protest by invoking national trauma.
- · Allows for intensified military mobilization.
International:
- Strained Ukrainian diplomacy—pressure to defend innocence
- Challenge to Western media and intelligence to respond quickly
- Potential weakening of international aid to Ukraine in key countries (e.g., Germany, Italy, U.S.)
- · Fractures Western support if the event is believed or not swiftly debunked.
- · Accelerates disinformation campaigns, especially in the Global South.
- · Triggers retaliatory acts or pretexts for strikes on Ukrainian civilian areas, framed as “justice.”
Strategic Risks:
- Escalation spiral if used to justify attacks on NATO border regions (e.g., Poland’s logistics hubs)
- Risk of triggering retaliation or cyber operations from Ukraine or third parties
- Credibility blow to Western allies if the narrative is accepted uncritically
A false-flag terrorist attack on May 9 is not just possible—it is tactically rational for a Kremlin increasingly boxed in by a protracted war, domestic unrest, and Western pressure. Victory Day provides a dramatic stage for narrative warfare, and history suggests that when Moscow seeks legitimacy, it often turns to manufactured martyrdom.
The West must preemptively warn against manipulation, enhance intelligence sharing, and be ready to call out deception fast and publicly. In today’s hybrid war, the truth is as much a battlefield as the Donbas.
U.S. and Ukrainian Counter-Options
- Preemptive intelligence leak: If Western intel suspects a false-flag op, leaking details before 9 May could neutralize the Kremlin’s narrative.
- Rapid forensic counter-narrative: U.S. and Ukraine must be prepared to challenge any claims with satellite or SIGINT evidence.
Global diplomatic campaign: Frame the attack as “a second Ryazan” and expose the playbook.
A false-flag terrorist operation in Russia—especially one staged for maximum psychological and political effect—would likely be orchestrated or overseen by one or more of the following Russian state security and military-intelligence agencies:
1. FSB (Federal Security Service) – Primary Candidate
- Role: Domestic security, counterintelligence, internal control.
- Precedent: Widely suspected of orchestrating the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings and the Ryazan “training exercise” to justify the Second Chechen War.
- Capabilities: Has networks, agents, and authority across all Russian regions; can operate without judicial oversight; can stage, investigate, and narrate an event entirely under its control.
- Motivation: Protect regime stability, create pretext for repression or escalation, discredit opposition or foreign actors.
✅ Most likely lead agency for any false-flag attack on Russian soil.
2. GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff)
- Role: Military intelligence, covert operations abroad, sabotage, assassinations (e.g., Skripal poisoning).
- Strength: Operates more flexibly than FSB abroad and sometimes inside Russia with plausible deniability.
- Use case: Would more likely assist with technical or coordination support, especially if the operation has a military angle or is aimed at shaping foreign perceptions.
🔶 Possible support player in conjunction with FSB.
3. SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service)
- Role: Espionage, propaganda, and covert operations outside Russia.
- Use case: Could be involved in shaping the international narrative or preparing disinformation for export if the false flag is part of a global information campaign.
🔹 Unlikely to be operational on the ground, but could shape post-attack messaging.
4. National Guard (Rosgvardiya)
- Role: Internal suppression, riot control, facility security.
- Use case: May be used after the false-flag event to control crowds, suppress protests, or impose curfews—especially under martial law conditions.
5. Presidential Administration (specifically the Directorate for Social Projects and Internal Policy)
- Role: Narrative design, disinformation, public mood management.
- Use case: Would not execute the operation but would shape the messaging and blame assignment (e.g., quickly linking Ukraine or the West).
Conclusion:
- The FSB is the most likely executor of any domestic false-flag operation.
- The GRU may provide technical assistance or coordination.
- The SVR and Kremlin propaganda units will manage the external blame game.
