The 2025 elections in Burundi reflect a persistent pattern of controlled political pluralism under the veneer of electoral legitimacy. While overt violence has declined since the 2015 crisis, systemic manipulation and repression persist. Without meaningful reforms, the current trajectory risks entrenching authoritarianism under a democratic façade, with long-term consequences for both the Burundian people and regional stability.
- Burundi has experienced a complex post-conflict transition since the end of its civil war (2005), marked by periods of democratic promise and authoritarian setbacks.
2. Democratic Standards and Electoral Environment
- Legal Framework: Burundi’s Constitution allows for multiparty elections but has been manipulated in the past to extend presidential mandates (notably under Pierre Nkurunziza).
- Election Commission & Observers: The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) oversaw the elections. International observers were limited; most assessments came from regional bodies such as the AU and EAC.
- Pre-election Climate: Characterized by:
- Restrictions on opposition campaigning;
- Media censorship and threats to civil society;
- Allegations of ruling party using state resources;
- Presence of the ruling CNDD-FDD’s youth wing (Imbonerakure) intimidating opponents.
Assessment: The pre-election conditions fell short of international democratic norms. Opposition parties participated under duress, and freedom of expression was constrained.
3. Results and Voter Dynamics
- Outcome: CNDD-FDD candidate (possibly Gélase Ndabirabe or another successor to Évariste Ndayishimiye, depending on internal dynamics) claimed victory with a strong majority.
- Turnout: Officially high (around 70–80%), though independent verification was absent.
- Opposition Performance: Severely undercut by logistical obstacles and intimidation. Fragmentation among opposition groups also diluted their impact.
- Irregularities:
- Reports of ballot stuffing, lack of transparency in tallying;
- Suppression of real-time vote reporting.
Interpretation: The results solidified CNDD-FDD’s grip, but under highly questionable circumstances, suggesting more continuity than change.
4. Consequences and Implications
a. Domestic Political Landscape
- Ruling Party Hegemony: CNDD-FDD remains entrenched, but internal rivalries may intensify as factions vie for influence in a post-Nkurunziza era.
- Opposition Marginalization: Unless reforms occur, opposition movements may move toward radicalization or further fragmentation.
- Civic Space: Risks further constriction as the government continues securitizing dissent and expanding surveillance.
b. Democracy and Governance
- Democratic Backsliding: Continued erosion of electoral integrity, civil liberties, and institutional independence.
- Human Rights Outlook: Worsening, with watchdogs noting increasing repression, especially of journalists and activists.
- Potential for Reform: Some signals from President Ndayishimiye hinted at reform early in his term, but these have largely stalled.
c. Regional and International Consequences
- EAC Relations: Burundi’s elections will impact its regional credibility. East African partners may avoid overt criticism to maintain stability.
- International Aid & Diplomacy:
- The EU and U.S. have historically conditioned aid on democratic benchmarks;
- A flawed election may provoke renewed conditionality or quiet disengagement.
- Migration/Refugees: Political repression may trigger new waves of outmigration, impacting Rwanda, Tanzania, and DRC.
5. Future Outlook
- Short-Term: Stability likely due to political dominance and repression, but governance quality may further deteriorate.
- Medium-Term: Risk of disillusionment, elite fractures, or renewed unrest if grievances remain unaddressed.
- Path to Change: Would require:
- International pressure coupled with regional mediation;
- Empowerment of domestic civil society;
- Electoral and constitutional reforms.
Ethnic Groups Benefiting from the Elections
a. Hutu Majority (especially CNDD-FDD-affiliated)
- The Hutu ethnic majority—particularly those aligned with the ruling CNDD-FDD party—continues to benefit most from state patronage.
- Since the end of the civil war and the rise of the CNDD-FDD (a former Hutu rebel group turned ruling party), many state institutions, military ranks, and provincial posts have been dominated by loyalists from this ethnic group.
- CNDD-FDD uses ethnic solidarity and war legacy rhetoric to maintain loyalty and justify control.
b. Marginalized Tutsi Elites (Selective Inclusion)
- Although the Tutsi minority has historically dominated the military and bureaucracy (especially under earlier regimes), their influence has diminished under CNDD-FDD rule.
- However, select Tutsi elites who collaborate with the regime (e.g., in business or diplomacy) are strategically included to signal ethnic “inclusivity” and maintain elite co-optation.
- Their inclusion is tokenistic and pragmatic, not structural
2. Political Groups and Elites Benefiting
a. CNDD-FDD Power Brokers
- The party’s internal elite networks—composed of military veterans, provincial governors, security chiefs, and long-serving ministers—consolidate more power.
- Loyalty to the president and to the legacy of late Pierre Nkurunziza ensures continued access to state contracts, land deals, and protection from legal scrutiny.
b. Imbonerakure Leadership (Youth Wing)
- The Imbonerakure, CNDD-FDD’s powerful youth militia, plays a key role in electoral control and local intimidation.
- In return, their leaders receive local influence, jobs in administration, and access to informal revenue streams(e.g., bribes, market control).
- Their rise creates a kind of “militia-clientelism” system.
3. Business and Economic Actors Benefiting
a. Crony Capitalists Close to CNDD-FDD
- Businessmen and companies closely tied to the ruling elite—especially those involved in construction, agriculture, fuel importation, and mining (e.g., rare earths and gold)—benefit from non-transparent procurement, tax exemptions, and monopoly licenses.
- Examples include:
- Construction firms linked to military and political figures;
- Agricultural cooperatives led by ruling party allies;
- Fuel and import-export businesses benefiting from preferential exchange rates or border controls.
b. Informal Economy Intermediaries
- A shadow economy thrives in Burundi, particularly in fuel smuggling, cross-border trade, and informal markets.
- Key actors here often include individuals linked to security forces or provincial officials, who use the post-election calm to expand or solidify monopolistic control over trade routes.
4. Religious and Civil Institutions (Selected Winners)
a. Government-Aligned Churches and NGOs
- Churches or NGOs that support the CNDD-FDD narrative or avoid criticism receive official recognition, tax benefits, and access to donor channels.
- Some religious leaders were co-opted during the election process to urge stability and turnout, thereby reinforcing the regime’s legitimacy.
Summary Table of Beneficiaries
| Group | Type | Benefits Received |
| Hutu CNDD-FDD loyalists | Ethnic/Political | Government jobs, protection, influence |
| Tutsi co-opted elites | Ethnic/Political | Select appointments, business access |
| CNDD-FDD inner circle | Political | Power, immunity, economic dominance |
| Imbonerakure youth leaders | Paramilitary/Political | Jobs, informal power, revenue control |
| Regime-linked businessmen | Economic | Contracts, licenses, monopoly privileges |
| Informal sector brokers | Economic | Trade control, security force protection |
| Pro-regime religious groups | Religious/Civil | Legal favors, state support, donor access |
