Guyanese voters are choosing a president and the 65-member National Assembly Sept. 1, 2025), with control over a world-class offshore oil boom at stake. Observers from the Commonwealth, EU, OAS and the Carter Center are on the ground.
The main actors
- People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) – Incumbent President Irfaan Ali seeks a second term, running on visible infrastructure, social spending (e.g., free university), and continuity in oil policy
- A Partnership for National Unity (APNU / PNCR-led) – Aubrey Norton leads the largest opposition bloc, attacking the PPP on corruption, cost-of-living and the Exxon contract, which he now says he would renegotiate.
- Alliance for Change (AFC) – Running separately in 2025 under Nigel Hughes; aims to be a kingmaker if the race tightens.
- We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) – Newcomer led by Azruddin Mohamed, a businessman under U.S. OFAC sanctions; his run has sparked banking/compliance warnings at home.
- Smaller groupings (e.g., Forward Guyana Movement, WPA with APNU) could capture list votes and influence seat math.
Who is likely to win?
Pre-election reporting from major outlets judged PPP/C favored—on incumbency, spending, a divided opposition, and strong rally energy—while stressing voter dissatisfaction on inflation and inequality. Expect official tallies within days, per authorities.
Implication: If PPP/C wins a clear plurality, Ali remains president (see election rules below). If the opposition outperforms and clusters around APNU or a post-vote deal, executive control could flip.
How the presidency and parliament are decided
- Presidency: Guyana uses a list-plurality model. The party list with the most votes designates the president—there is no runoff
- National Assembly (65 seats): Proportional representation: 25 seats from 10 regional constituencies + 40 national “top-up” seats allocated by largest-remainder (LR-Hare) formula. 33 seats is a majority.
Parliament composition: what to expect (scenarios, not results)
- Scenario A – PPP/C single-party majority (most plausible pre-vote): Continuity cabinet; PPP controls the speakership and committees. Seat share likely resembles or modestly exceeds 2020 if opposition remains fragmented. Policy moves.faster.
- Scenario B – PPP/C plurality, slim majority via micro-parties: Minor partners gain leverage on anticorruption pledges, local-content tweaks, or social spending earmarks.
- Scenario C – Opposition plurality (APNU at core), AFC/WIN pickup: Executive flips; renegotiation rhetoric on the Exxon/Chevron-Hess framework intensifies; expect sharper fights over the gas-to-power project and revenue allocation formulas.
What would change in policy?
If PPP/C stays in power
- Energy & contracts: Contract continuity (Stabroek block), faster execution on gas-to-power, and large-scale infrastructure financed by oil revenues. Recent arbitration cleared the Chevron–Hess deal (Hess now under Chevron), reducing uncertainty in the operator group (Exxon 45%, CNOOC 25%, Chevron-Hess 30
- Social policy: Sustained spending on free tertiary education, housing and targeted cash transfers; incremental diversification (agro-processing, ICT).
If an opposition-led coalition wins
- Renegotiation push: Political pressure to revisit oil terms, local-content rules and project sequencing—raising near-term investor uncertainty and legal risks (arbitration exposure).
- Anti-corruption drive: New procurement scrutiny; possible reshuffles in regulators; more adversarial posture toward the executive’s flagship projects.
Risks & threat matrix (near term)
1) Electoral contention / protests
- Why: Large voter roll, tight margins, 2020’s disputed count still in memory.
- Risk: Protests, litigation, and recounts if margins are slim; reputational and market volatility. Observers deployedto mitigate.
2) Governance & compliance risk (sanctions spillover)
- Why: Presence of a sanctioned party leader (WIN); local banks already off-boarding related accounts.
- Risk: If sanctioned figures gain formal power, correspondent banking and FDI confidence could be hit.
3) Oil-sector policy shock
- Why: Calls to renegotiate the Exxon contract; delays to gas-to-power.
- Risk: Project slippage, arbitration, revenue volatility; however, the Chevron–Hess arbitration win lowered ownership uncertainty.
4) External security shock (Venezuela / Essequibo)
- Why: Border tensions remain elevated; U.S. naval posture near Venezuela has sharpened the regional security environment.
- Risk: Military incidents or hybrid pressure around the disputed Essequibo; investor risk-premia rise.
Bottom line
- Before results: The race is a referendum on who manages an extraordinary oil windfall. PPP/C entered favored, but counting and certification will decide the presidency and working majority.
- After results (what to watch):
- Margin & composition of the 65 seats (does any party clear 33 alone?).
- Early signals on oil governance (contract stance, gas-to-power timeline).
- The domestic calm test—statements by losers, courts, and GECOM.
- Border messaging from Caracas and Washington.
If you want, I can turn this into a one-page brief with a small seat-math explainer and a risk heat map you can hand to decision-makers.
What would change in policy?
If PPP/C stays in power
- Energy & contracts: Contract continuity (Stabroek block), faster execution on gas-to-power, and large-scale infrastructure financed by oil revenues. Recent arbitration cleared the Chevron–Hess deal (Hess now under Chevron), reducing uncertainty in the operator group (Exxon 45%, CNOOC 25%, Chevron-Hess 30%).
- Social policy: Sustained spending on free tertiary education, housing and targeted cash transfers; incremental diversification (agro-processing, ICT).
If an opposition-led coalition wins
- Renegotiation push: Political pressure to revisit oil terms, local-content rules and project sequencing—raising near-term investor uncertainty and legal risks (arbitration exposure).
- Anti-corruption drive: New procurement scrutiny; possible reshuffles in regulators; more adversarial posture toward the executive’s flagship projects.
Risks & threat matrix (near term)
1) Electoral contention / protests
- Why: Large voter roll, tight margins, 2020’s disputed count still in memory.
- Risk: Protests, litigation, and recounts if margins are slim; reputational and market volatility. Observers deployedto mitigate
2) Governance & compliance risk (sanctions spillover)
- Why: Presence of a sanctioned party leader (WIN); local banks already off-boarding related accounts.
- Risk: If sanctioned figures gain formal power, correspondent banking and FDI confidence could be hit
3) Oil-sector policy shock
- Why: Calls to renegotiate the Exxon contract; delays to gas-to-power.
- Risk: Project slippage, arbitration, revenue volatility; however, the Chevron–Hess arbitration win lowered ownership uncertainty
4) External security shock (Venezuela / Essequibo)
- Why: Border tensions remain elevated; U.S. naval posture near Venezuela has sharpened the regional security environment.
- Risk: Military incidents or hybrid pressure around the disputed Essequibo; investor risk-premia rise.
- Before results: The race is a referendum on who manages an extraordinary oil windfall. PPP/C entered favored, but counting and certification will decide the presidency and working majority.
- After results (what to watch):
- Margin & composition of the 65 seats (does any party clear 33 alone?).
- Early signals on oil governance (contract stance, gas-to-power timeline).
- The domestic calm test—statements by losers, courts, and GECOM.
- Border messaging from Caracas and Washington.
If you want, I can turn this into a one-page brief with a small seat-math explainer and a risk heat map you can hand to decision-makers.
3. Regional and international context
- U.S. stance: Washington has explicitly backed Guyana’s sovereignty and has carried out joint patrols near Essequibo. This makes the dispute not just bilateral but a U.S.–Venezuela confrontation zone.
- CARICOM & OAS: Both regional blocs back Guyana. If elections are disputed or weaken the executive, Guyana’s diplomatic leverage in these forums may soften.
- China & Russia: Both are close to Caracas and may exploit post-election instability in Georgetown to undermine U.S. posture.
4. Risks & Threats
- Border militarization: More Venezuelan troop movements near the Cuyuni/Mazaruni or in the Atlantic EEZ.
- Energy security: Offshore drilling vessels could be harassed, raising investor risk premiums.
- Domestic vulnerability: If post-election protests erupt in Georgetown (as in 2020), Caracas might use the distraction to escalate claims.
- Information warfare: Venezuela could amplify narratives questioning the legitimacy of the Guyanese government, especially if results are contested.
- The election outcome directly shapes the Essequibo crisis.
- A PPP/C win strengthens Guyana’s legal/international strategy but also locks it tighter into U.S. protection, which Caracas sees as escalation.
- An opposition win might alter tone and pacing, but could embolden Venezuela to probe for concessions.
In both cases, the risk of confrontation increases if governance appears weak or contested after the vote—Caracas thrives on exploiting uncertainty.
More on this story: Venezuela and Guyana: the military conflict possible
More on this story: Annexation and ethnic confrontation: menaces for Guyana after the election
