The existing indicators point to the Kremlin preparing subversive operations against Finland.” Although A deliberate, large-scale Russian conventional attack on Finland remains unlikely in 2025–27, given Russia’s force commitments and degraded conventional capacity. However, hybrid coercion, repeated air/sea incidents, and electronic warfare against Finland and NATO’s Nordic–Baltic flank are highly likely and persistent, with non-trivial escalation risk if a kinetic incident causes casualties on either side.

NATO’s north has hardened since Finland joined the Alliance on April 4, 2023, and Helsinki is markedly boosting defense (toward 3% of GDP by 2029, and reconsidering anti-personnel mines), while Russia is running Zapad-2025 and expanding cross-border pressure tools (airspace probes, GNSS jamming, migration weaponization). These increase contact points where miscalculation can occur

Northern Fleet/Kola remains the crown jewel (nuclear, subsurface, long-range strike). Modernization continues but faces resource and schedule constraints; nuclear signaling persists. GNSS/EW activity from Kaliningrad and the Baltic has intensified, degrading civil and military navigation regionally. NATO member with a 1,340 km frontier with Russia; ramping defense spending toward 3% GDP, expanding border security toolkit against instrumentalized migration, and onboarding F-35As (first aircraft completed in late 2025; first deliveries to Finland in 2026).

Russian doctrinal or official rhetoric reframing Finland as a “hostile platform” for NATO strike assets; public threats to place additional non-strategic nuclear systems in the Northwest. Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s Security Council deputy chair, compared Finland to Nazi-era Germany—citing the former swastika symbol of the Finnish Air Force—while warning that Finland’s NATO membership and exercises pave the way for aggression against Russia.

Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, declared that Finland is preparing a springboard for an attack on Russia. He announced that Moscow intends to begin construction of fortifications along the Finnish border, saying the decision was made on the instructions of President Vladimir V. Putin and is directly tied to Finland’s entry into NATO. General Andrei Kartapolov, head of the Russian parliament’s defense committee, accused Finland of embracing Nazism, employing Moscow’s familiar formula: NATO membership and the determination to preserve sovereignty and independence from Russia are cast as hallmarks of a “Nazi” policy. The fact that such accusations preceded both the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine points to Russia’s information campaign laying the groundwork for openly hostile actions Finland.

Япония на Востоке, и Финляндия на Западе все быстрее становятся рассадником фашизма!
При этом фашизмом называется что?
Правильно подготовка оборонительных сооружений на границе с психбольницей "Россия". pic.twitter.com/8iuLz5MU8p
— FAKE OFF (@fakeofforg) September 9, 2025

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes that this rhetoric mimics the justifications Russia used for its invasion of Ukraine, specifically tapping into mythic narratives about WWII, alleged Russophobia, and existential threats. Belarus/Russia Zapad-cycle narratives that explicitly name Finland in scenarios. Russian administrative moves in Murmansk/Leningrad oblasts: mobilization decrees, expanded border-zone restrictions, or legal steps to ease cross-border “hot pursuit.” (inference based on past pre-escalatory patterns).

Northern Fleet readiness spikes: surge deployments from Severomorsk bases; unusual submarine egress patterns; forward staging of Iskander/S-400/S-300V4 near the border.Air activity: increased Bear/Backfire runs along Gulf of Finland, repeated airspace violations or radar-off flights; concurrent EW/GNSS jamming windows mapped to routes over the Baltic and Lapland. Exercise masking: Zapad-style snap inspections, bridging, logistics dumps, and medical units within jump range of Finnish crossings.

Two substantial illicit arms caches were uncovered in the Kouvola region—including the neighborhoods of Koria and Voikkaa, both located less than 14 km from the Russian border. At the Koria site, authorities discovered 110 unregistered firearms, over 100,000 rounds of ammunition, five military grenades, eight grenade launcher detonators, and anti-tank rounds—marking Finland’s largest-ever seizure of its kind. The Voikkaa location involved another weapons and explosives cache at a residence owned by a former law enforcement officer turned collector; some items were destroyed on-site via controlled detonation. The placement of weapons caches may indicate preparations for sabotage operations in Finland. We believe such operations could be carried out by illegal migrants pushed across the border from Russia, by combat groups infiltrating Finnish territory, or by paramilitary sleeper cells already inside Finland composed of Russian nationals residing in the country. In 2014, such stockpiles were used in the Donbas to quickly arm Russian combat groups and local separatists.
While both cases involved individuals—one with prior military service, the other with a law enforcement background—the magnitude, proximity to the border, and parallel timing raised alarm due to national security sensitivities. These stockpiles may signify serious breaches in national weapons control. Large-scale unregistered arsenals—especially involving military-grade hardware—pose a grave domestic threat, providing means for possible sabotage or terror. That both individuals had prior ties to defense or law enforcement suggests insider knowledge or loopholes may have been exploited. Being so close to Russia, these arsenals invite speculation about cross-border coordination or influence—especially amid heightened geopolitical tensions post-Finland’s NATO accession. Although no public intelligence directly links these cases to Russian hybrid warfare, the scenario inevitably raises questions about exploitation of Finnish vulnerabilities in the grey zone. The wide range of weaponry—including grenades and anti-tank munitions—implies capability for high-impact acts, requiring urgent law enforcement and prosecutorial responses.

Russian Military Buildup Nearby: Satellite imagery confirms that Russia is heavily expanding military infrastructure in areas such as Kandalaksha (Murmansk region), Sapernoye (Karelian Isthmus), and Petrozavodsk. These developments include new barracks, engineering units, and expanded troop capacity—raising Finnish concern.

Finland continues to grapple with hybrid threats—significant among these is the alleged weaponization of migration. These arms seizures may intersect with that context, even if indirectly.

While there’s no definitive evidence these stockpiled weapons relate directly to Russian operations, the scale, proximity to the border, and backgrounds of those involved elevate the discoveries from criminal to strategic concern.

Cyber/EW: persistent GNSS jamming affecting airports, ports, and SAR; targeting government networks; information ops amplifying Finnish domestic fault lines
Maritime harassment: AIS spoofing, pipeline/cable probing in the Baltic Sea during NATO maritime patrol surges

Plausible Conflict Pathways

Chronic Hybrid Coercion (High likelihood: ~65–75%)
Continued GNSS jamming, cyber intrusions, disinformation, and migration weaponization, punctuated by brief airspace/sea-space provocations. Goal: raise Finnish security costs, test NATO’s north. (Multiple corroborated patterns 2024–25
Serious Border Incident, Limited Kinetics (Low–Moderate: ~20–25%)
An interception goes wrong (mid-air or over the Gulf of Finland) or a fatal exchange at a crossing or maritime asset. Short, localized firefight; rapid NATO crisis management; Moscow denies intent. Zapad-type activity raises this risk window
Deliberate Conventional Offensive vs. Finland (Very low: ~3–5%)
Requires redeployment and logistic depth Russia currently strains to field while fighting in Ukraine and covering other theaters; would trigger NATO’s graduated response and risk a wider Baltic–Arctic war—a cost Russia likely seeks to avoid. Nuclear signaling would accompany any such move.

Judgments & Outlook (2025–2027)

Most likely: sustained gray-zone pressure with episodic spikes—manageable but risky.
Most dangerous: a fatal air or maritime incident during a jammed-GPS window that triggers NATO consultations and rapid force moves—escalation through accident. (Today’s Polish drone incursions illustrate the environment-wide hazard.)
Least likely but not impossible: a localized Russian combined-arms attack to test NATO’s resolve—costly and strategically unsound for Moscow while engaged in Ukraine and trying to shield Kola assets

Russia–Finland Conflict Risk Matrix (2025–2027)

Scenario	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk
Hybrid Coercion (GNSS jamming, migration weaponization, cyber ops)	High (65–75%)	Medium	High
Border/Airspace Incident (fatal intercept, maritime clash, sabotage at crossing)	Low–Moderate (20–25%)	High	Medium–High
Localized Conventional Offensive (limited attack on border posts or Finnish infrastructure)	Very Low (3–5%)	Very High	Medium
Strategic War in the Nordic–Baltic region	<2%

Finland shares a 1,340 km frontier with Russia—the longest between any EU/NATO state and Moscow except Norway’s much shorter Arctic border. This border runs through sparsely populated, forested terrain—ideal for clandestine infiltration, sabotage, and hybrid activity.
Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 transformed the security map of the High North. NATO now has a direct land border abutting Russia’s Kola Peninsula, home to the Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarine bastion. For Moscow, this represents a strategic vulnerability.

Finland’s decision to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO is a direct rejection of Russian influence, similar to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic turn.
Moscow often frames Finland as a test case—if Russia can destabilize a new NATO member, it sends a warning to other neighbors (Sweden, Moldova, Georgia) that sovereignty from Moscow comes at a high cost.

Finland already faced waves of instrumentalized asylum seekers at its eastern border in 2023–25, orchestrated by Russia and Belarus. This is a classic hybrid tactic also used against Poland and Lithuania.
The presence of Russian expatriates provides a potential recruitment pool for paramilitary sleeper cells, a method consistent with Moscow’s past operations in Crimea and Donbas.

Satellite imagery shows new Russian fortifications and troop facilities in Karelia, Murmansk, and the Karelian Isthmus—signaling preparation for sustained military pressure.
Zapad Exercises: Large-scale drills (Zapad-2025) regularly rehearse scenarios involving Finland and the Baltic states, blurring the line between training and war preparation.

Thus, Russia has a pattern of preparing the informational and logistical battlespace:
- 2014: stockpiles in Donbas, propaganda about “Nazis.”
- 2022: accusations of genocide, NATO threats.
- 2025: similar narratives now directed at Finland.
This continuity suggests Finland is already being woven into Moscow’s escalation playbook.

We are convinced that Finland is a prime Russian target because it represents:

A new NATO frontier undermining Russia’s security buffer.
A symbolic defeat for Moscow’s sphere-of-influence doctrine.
A geographic vulnerability for covert and hybrid operations.
A propaganda focus, with Nazi-labelling rhetoric that has historically been a prelude to aggression.

The combination of rhetoric, weapons discoveries, migration pressure, and military buildup indicates that Finland faces sustained Russian subversive operations, with the risk of escalation through hybrid tools, border incidents, or sabotage.