On September 18, 2025, Vladimir Putin signed a decree relieving Dmitry Kozak of his duties as Deputy Chief of Staffof the Presidential Administration. The Kremlin says he resigned “at his own request,” and Russian business daily.
Kozak is considering a move into the private sector. The departure removes one of the last high-level technocrats sometimes portrayed as skeptical of the full-scale war, and appears to consolidate influence around Sergei Kiriyenko and other hard-line curators of Russia’s “new territories.” Expect less room for policy pragmatism, tighter information control, and continued emphasis on wartime mobilization of society
Kozak has worked with Putin since the St. Petersburg days and rose through senior roles (minister, deputy PM, Olympics coordinator, and since 2020 deputy chief of staff). His profile was that of a managerial technocrat trusted to execute complex projects.
Before February 2022, Kozak was widely viewed as a key Kremlin handler for Donbas/Ukraine policy. Since the full-scale invasion, Kiriyenko increasingly took over domestic-political control of occupied regions, while Kozak receded from view—an internal shift already noted in 2022–2024.
Why it matters: His exit symbolically shrinks the space for cautious voices in the Presidential Administration and further elevates the hard-line, political-technology wing that manages domestic control and “integration” of occupied Ukraine. Reports underscore Kozak’s earlier skepticism about the invasion—making his resignation read as a final defeat of technocratic pragmatism at the top. one-line presidential decree ended Kozak’s tenure; Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed he resigned on his own initiative. Kremlin-friendly coverage amplified RBC’s line that Kozak may go into business, implying a soft landing rather than punishment. Narrative in foreign press: Independent/Russian-exile outlets and Western media frame the move as the exit of a dissent-adjacent technocrat, and a win for Kiriyenko’s camp.
Since 2022, Sergei Kiriyenko has been the de facto curator of occupied Ukrainian regions, domestic political engineering, and youth mobilization projects. With Kozak out, there is even less counterweight to Kiriyenko’s methods (information control, ideological programming, electoral “management. The broader wartime power structure—security services + Presidential Administration’s political bloc—remains intact. Kozak’s exit neither moderates military aims nor changes the Kremlin’s risk calculus; if anything, it reduces the representation of technocrats who occasionally flagged costs.
Analysts note that Kozak’s departure is the fading of a cohort that once argued for limited, negotiated outcomes in 2022. That group is now largely sidelined or silent.
Kozak’s reported preference for settlement mechanics in early 2022 is now irrelevant to policy formation. Expect no Kremlin pivot toward genuine talks beyond tactical pauses or information operations.
- With Kiriyenko’s model entrenched, the regime will press on with electoral theatrics, passportization, and youth indoctrination in occupied areas. Kozak’s exit removes any residual, quieter “managerial” approach.
2) Domestic Politics
- Hard-line cohesion: Losing a respected fixer narrows the advice circle, increases groupthink, and elevates ideology over technocratic caution.
- Elite signaling: Allowing a graceful “resignation to business” signals that loyal, low-profile dissenters can exit without spectacle—as long as they remain apolitical thereafter.
- State-capital channels: If Kozak moves to business, he retains networks useful to the Kremlin. But he will likely avoid public policy roles, minimizing his influence over war-economy decisions.
Scenarios:
- Status Quo Hardening (Baseline)
Kiriyenko’s bloc consolidates; information-political control tightens; no meaningful negotiation opening. Probability: High - Technocratic Rebalancing (Low-Probability)
A new managerial figure partially fills Kozak’s vacuum to streamline wartime governance and rationalize expenditures. Probability: Low. - Shock-Driven Shuffle (Contingent)
A major battlefield or domestic shock forces reassignments across the Admin; still unlikely to restore a “pragmatist” lane. Probability: Medium-Low.
Kozak’s resignation is not a routine staffing change; it marks the institutional demise of a pragmatic channel inside the Presidential Administration. With his departure, Kiriyenko’s political-technology machine faces fewer internal constraints, increasing the likelihood of continued maximalist aims in Ukraine and deeper domestic control at home.
- Kozak = dealmaker. His Moldova playbook was elite bargains + formal frameworks: 2003 “Kozak Memorandum” (a federalization plan locking in Russian leverage) and 2019 PSRM–ACUM coalition engineering to sideline Plahotniuc—classic back-room diplomacy using economic carrots and status guarantees
- Kiriyenko = political-tech + hybrid pressure. Since 2022 he’s extended his domestic “political bloc” methods into the near abroad, including the Transnistria/Gagauzia tracks—prioritizing proxy parties, cash operations, clergy/NGO networks, Telegram/TikTok amplification, and street-pressure options over negotiated settlements.
- Kremlin priorities shifted. Wartime securitization favors fast, deniable levers (influence + disruption) over slow constitutional engineering. Kiriyenko’s rise institutionalizes that shift
- Toolbox changed. Russia has less economic leverage in Moldova than in the 2000s–2010s; the cost-effective pathis now information ops + illicit funding to swing votes and coalitions. (See the cash-and-disinfo ecosystem around Ilan Șor’s “Victory/Pobeda” bloc
- Election calendar forces immediacy. With parliamentary elections on 28 Sept 2025 and EU accession on the line, Kiriyenko’s machine optimizes for near-term seat gains (or post-vote destabilization), not long-horizon settlements. Chişinău and partners openly warn of active Russian interference.
- Kozak-style plays you’d expect (but are now secondary): elite brokerage, gas/trade side-deals, and “neutrality”/federalization narratives to bind Chișinău—useful, but too slow for this cycle.
- Kiriyenko-style plays you should actually watch:
- Money ops (vote-buying/“social aid” channels) and illicit external financing for pro-Kremlin lists (Șor’s Victory and fellow travelers).
- Platform warfare (Telegram/TikTok farms), church-mediated messaging, and targeted agitation in Gagauzia and Russian-speaking locales.
- Post-election pressure options (legal challenges, street mobilization) if results don’t favor Moscow.
- Kozak sought durable influence via negotiated architecture and elite compacts.
- Kiriyenko seeks rapid electoral arithmetic and narrative dominance, even at the cost of turbulence. For this election, bet on the Kiriyenko model driving Moscow’s hand.
More on this story: Building a Fifth Column: Russia’s Shift in Moldova’s Political Landscape”
Kozak vs. Kiriyenko on Moldova (2025 cycle)
| Dimension | Dmitry Kozak | Sergei Kiriyenko |
| Core method | Elite bargains & legal-constitutional engineering (e.g., 2003 “Kozak Memorandum” federalization design; 2019 PSRM–ACUM power-sharing to unseat Plahotniuc). | Political-tech + hybrid pressure: proxy blocs, illicit financing, clergy/NGO/Telegram-TikTok networks, rapid street-pressure options; minimal appetite for drawn-out talks. |
| Instruments | Negotiated status deals; gas/trade carrots; troop-presence “guarantee” clauses; international window-dressing. | Disinformation at scale (incl. “Matryoshka” botnet), church channels, diaspora manipulation; money ops& vote-buying via Shor-linked structures. |
| Time horizon | Long-term, structural lock-in. | Short-term electoral arithmetic; post-vote leverage. |
| 2025 election posture | Secondary: the “federalization/neutrality” narrative exists but is slow to deliver seats now. | Primary: maximize seats for pro-Kremlin lists and/or shape post-vote turbulence; target Sep 28 vote and after. |
| Evidence this cycle | Historic: 2003 memorandum; 2019 coalition brokering. | Current: EU sanctions on Victory/Pobeda & associates for vote-buying/disinfo; Sandu’s warnings on priests + botnets; OSCE EOM deployed for Sep 28. |
Moldova Election-Week Risk Matrix (Sep 28–Oct 5, 2025)
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Triggers / Indicators (watch) | Notes / Mitigation Pointers |
| Coordinated disinformation surge (diaspora targeting; fake “foreign media” content; clergy-amplified messages) | High | High | Spikes of identical narratives across Telegram/TikTok; Orthodox clergy messaging lines mirror Kremlin talking points; sudden “polls” of dubious origin | President Sandu flagged priests + “Matryoshka” botnet; prepare real-time debunks + diaspora channels |
| Illicit financing / vote-buying tied to Shor networks (Victory/Pobeda ecosystem) | High | High | Reports of “social aid,” transport reimbursement schemes; sudden cash flows to local operatives | EU listed Victory/Pobeda & affiliates Jul 15 for such activity—expect repetition; empower CEC & prosecutors, document cases quickly |
| Cyber disruptions (CEC sites, media, gov portals) around results and OSCE presser | Medium–High | Medium–High | DDoS on election infra; cloned sites; credential phishing | CSIS & ISW warn of hybrid interference; harden comms through Sep 29 OSCE EOM presser window. |
| Diaspora suppression tactics(e.g., bomb-threat hoaxes abroad, polling-site disruptions) | Medium | High | Coordinated “security alerts” targeting foreign polling centers; viral scare content | Echoes 2024 patterns Sandu cited; pre-arranged counter-messaging with host states & embassies |
| Gagauzia-focused agitation / micro-protests and legal challenges on count | Medium | Medium–High | Parallel “citizen observers,” rapid injunctions vs. CEC; clergy/political figures fronting rallies | EU & Reuters reporting on pervasive interference; rapid legal defense & transparent recount protocols |
| Narrative of “stolen election” → street mobilization post-results | Medium | High | Simultaneous calls across Victory/Our Party channels; bussed-in support | Prepare de-escalation lanes & visible policing; document provocateurs; OSCE visibility helps |
| Transnistria info-ops spillover | Low–Medium | Medium | Tiraspol media pushes “federalization/neutrality” as only solution; provocations framed as “protecting minorities” | Treat as narrative shaping more than kinetic threat this week; track cross-posting into national feeds. (Analytical inference based on past playbooks.) |
- —peak period for disinfo, legal games, and street-pressure attempts.
Quick watcher’s checklist (operational) for Moldova’s SIS:
- Social platforms: Track coordinated content bursts on TikTok/Telegram; archive and attribute (“Matryoshka” signatures, clergy pages).
- Money trails: Monitor community “aid” distributions & transport schemes in districts tied to Victory/Pobeda; sync with EU listings.
Institutions: Stress-test CEC/party result servers; brief media on verified result channels pre-Sep 28.
