The standoff over the New START arms-control treaty underscores a serious threat to the United States from Russia.

With treaty visibility gone, allies relying on the U.S. nuclear guarantee face more uncertainty, while the United States must budget for hedge capabilities and monitoring alternatives (national technical means, open-source, and allied intelligence), all of which are pricier than treaty-based transparency.

On Sept. 22, 2025, President Putin said Russia would observe New START’s central limits for one additional year after the treaty expires on Feb. 5, 2026—if the U.S. reciprocates. Helpful if honored, but it does not restore inspections or full notifications, so opacity—and the risks above—remainOn Sept. 22, 2025, President Putin said Russia would observe New START’s central limits for one additional year after the treaty expires on Feb. 5, 2026—if the U.S. reciprocates. Helpful if honored, but it does not restore inspections or full notifications, so opacity—and the risks above—remain.

New START (2010) — the essentials

• What it does: Caps each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed ICBMs/SLBMs/heavy bombers (with a total of 800 deployed + non-deployed launchers/bombers). It also set up robust verification: detailed data exchanges, telemetry sharing, and up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections per year (10 “Type One,” 8 “Type Two Who signed/when: Signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on April 8, 2010; entered into force Feb. 5, 2011. It was extended once (in 2021) to its current expiration on Feb. 5, 2026
• Verification & compliance turbulence (2020–2024)
• Inspections paused during COVID (2020), never fully restored. In Feb. 2023, Russia suspended participation, halting inspections and routine treaty notifications; the U.S. labeled that suspension “legally invalid” and adopted countermeasures, including withholding some data

The state of play now (2025)

• With the treaty set to expire on Feb. 5, 2026, expert consensus has warned of a looming “life after New START” period without legally binding ceilings or on-site verification unless a successor arrangement is reached.  
• Sept. 22, 2025: President Vladimir Putin said Russia will stick to New START limits for one additional year after expiry—if the U.S. does the same—framing it as a bridge to possible dialogue. (Inspections remain suspended.)  

Why it matters

• Strategic stability: New START has been the last remaining U.S.–Russia nuclear arms control treaty, keeping deployed strategic forces at the lowest verified levels since the 1960s and providing predictability through data exchanges and inspections. Its loss risks a faster, less transparent arms competition
• Crisis management: Even when inspections were paused, the treaty’s notifications/data proved valuable for avoiding miscalculation; their curtailment increases ambiguity 

Watch points (next 12–18 months)

1. Reciprocity on the “one-year” pledge: Whether Washington and Moscow both hold deployed forces at New START ceilings after Feb. 5, 2026
2. Talks on a follow-on: Any movement toward a post-New START framework (caps, transparency, non-strategic nukes, and new systems). Thus far, progress has been minimal 
3. Verification substitutes: If inspections remain off, look for proposals to revive data exchanges/notifications or craft interim transparency steps.  

If you want, I can turn this into a one-page brief with a timeline, key numbers box, and “scenarios after Feb 2026.”

After Moscow suspended its participation in the treaty in 2023—citing Washington’s support for Ukraine and U.S. sanctions—strategic stability was thrown into doubt. Russia not only effectively shut down inspection and dialogue mechanisms, it also lowered the threshold for nuclear use, creating a new tier of unpredictable risk for the United States. With an arsenal of more than 5,400 warheads, over 1,700 of them deployed, Moscow retains the ability to inflict severe damage on the United States while signaling a readiness to wield the nuclear card as a tool of political coercion. This is not merely a departure from a regulated system; it is a deliberate attempt to confront the United States with a mounting danger.

A key element of the threat is Russia’s bid to destabilize the global security environment by playing on fears of nuclear escalation. Its actions erode the nonproliferation regime, fuel an arms race, and create conditions in which the United States must contend with both Russia and China at once. Scrapping the treaty would open the field to a new, unrestrained competition, placing Washington under dual pressure—from a Russia that is lowering the bar for nuclear use and from a China that is expanding its forces. For the United States, that means not only higher defense spending but also rising anxiety among allies who rely on the American nuclear umbrella. By this logic, Russia becomes the principal source of danger, stoking instability and making the future of global security ever more uncertain.

Russia is deliberately undermining U.S. strategic security by using the nuclear factor as leverage. Its unilateral suspension of New START in 2023 signaled a refusal to honor international commitments and a determination to dismantle the arms-control framework that had served U.S. interests. Abandoning joint inspections and meetings has effectively deprived Washington of mechanisms for verification and transparency, increasing the risk of sudden and uncontrolled Russian moves. The result is a climate engineered by Moscow in which the United States operates amid uncertainty and reactive decision-making—conditions that heighten its exposure to nuclear blackmail.

At the same time, the Kremlin is trying to turn nuclear weapons into a political instrument, imposing its own rules of the game on Washington. A lowered threshold for use, paired with demonstrative military activity, cultivates an atmosphere of strategic instability and fear. This allows Moscow to cast itself as an unpredictable actor ready to take dangerous steps that erode allied confidence in American leadership. In doing so, Russia not only destabilizes the international security picture, it also consciously chips away at U.S. authority on the global stage, forcing Washington to expend resources on constant crisis response rather than on long-term strategy.

Key Points:

• Manufactured tension: Russia is deliberately using the nuclear issue to keep relations with the United States under constant strain. Exiting New START and rejecting inspections stripped Washington of core tools to monitor Moscow’s behavior. That unpredictability keeps the United States in a state of strategic uncertainty and raises the risk of uncontrolled escalation.
• Lowered threshold, political leverage: Russia’s move to reduce the threshold for nuclear use signals a readiness to employ this capability not only militarily but politically. For the United States, that means unrelenting pressure that unsettles domestic opinion and alarms allies. The Kremlin seeks to impose its own strategic logic, compelling Washington to spend resources on reactions—creating a new dimension of nuclear coercion.
• Cultivated unpredictability: By presenting itself as willing to take risky—even seemingly irrational—steps, Russia fosters instability that forces the United States to proceed with extreme caution. That dynamic benefits Moscow by weakening American leadership in the eyes of partners and enabling the Kremlin to rattle the pillars of collective security long anchored by U.S. credibility.
• Arms-control unravels, arms race looms: Undermining the arms-control architecture opens the path to a renewed nuclear buildup. In this scenario, Washington must counter not only Russia but also a steadily expanding China. The Kremlin is playing that card explicitly, trying to push the United States toward costly rearmament that drains resources and blunts U.S. capacity on other fronts.
• Strategic fog as a tactic: Russia aims to destabilize the broader security environment by suggesting that any dialogue is futile unless Washington yields. Such tactics corrode trust in international institutions and blur the rules of the road. Forced to operate amid uncertainty, the United States must respond to moves that can alter the balance of power overnight—undermining the predictability on which American security policy rests.
• Eroding U.S. leadership: In the long view, the Kremlin’s objective is not merely to deter the United States but to diminish its standing as a guarantor of global stability. The systematic dismantling of agreements and the instrumentalization of nuclear threats reflect a purposeful strategy. Moscow is not seeking compromise; it is cultivating chaos in which the United States loses the initiative—leaving Russia as the prime beneficiary, with greater room for maneuver.