Removal of Presidential Term Limits in Chad: Who Benefits—and What Comes Next

After winning a disputed presidential election in May 2024 and consolidating a parliamentary majority, the presidency holds the legislative votes and coercive capacity to rewrite constitutional guardrails. Removing term limits converts transitional dominance into open-ended incumbency, with the lower house voting 171–1 to advance the package.Chad’s lower house has approved constitutional changes extending presidential mandates from five to seven years and removing term limits, a move widely expected to entrench President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno and the ruling elite. A final upper-house vote and promulgation are procedural hurdles, not hurdles in fact. This is the most consequential re-engineering of executive power since the 2024 transition elections—and it decisively narrows the space for alternation of power.  

1) Northern security-military networks (Zaghawa/Bideyat core, allied northern groups).
The Déby family’s historic base is among Zaghawa/Bideyat elites who have dominated the army, intelligence, and the praetorian guard since Idriss Déby’s era; term-limit removal consolidates their privileged access to command posts, procurement rents, and provincial governorships. Allied northern constituencies—Arab (Chadian Arabs), Kanembu/Bornu, Gorane (Toubou) and Wadai/Maba notables who align with N’Djamena—also gain, so long as they remain inside the ruling coalition’s patronage networks.  

2) The ruling party machinery (MPS) and presidential appointees.
The Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), which secured a dominant majority in the post-transition legislature, and the circle of presidential advisers, ministers, governors, and state-enterprise directors stand to keep—and deepen—control over budgets, oil-revenues allocation, security spending, and civil-service promotions under longer, unlimited cycles 

Entrepreneurs tied to security contracts, fuel and logistics, construction, and cross-border trade—especially those linked to northern patronage networks—benefit from predictability of access and reduced competitive threat from opposition-aligned regions. (This follows the well-documented pattern of elite capture and militarized political economy under the Déby system.)  

• Southern blocs (Sara/Ngambaye, Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjilé)—historically under-represented in security organs—are more likely to see continued marginalization, especially as the main opposition (including figures with a Ngambaye base) faces prosecutions and organizational pressure.
• Urban youth and civil society concentrated in N’Djamena and southern towns—already skeptical after the contested 2024 cycle—lose leverage for reforms tied to alternation and accountability.  

• Personalization of rule: Longer, unlimited terms hard-wire incumbency advantages (state media, administrative control, security services), making competitive turnover improbable. Expect further judicialization of politics(bans, prosecutions, asset freezes) against opposition figures and civic leaders 
• Ethnic politicization risks: Perceptions of northern dominance vs. southern exclusion may sharpen, heightening north–south cleavages and local conflict flashpoints (farmer–herder lines in the south; gold and trafficking corridors in the north-west/east 
• Security sector primacy: Budgets and careers will skew toward the army, DGSSIE/presidential guard, gendarmerie, and intelligence—reinforcing the regime’s coercive capacity while crowding out social spending.
• Opposition fragmentation and exile: With the most viable challengers weakened by legal cases and defections, the opposition’s ability to convert socio-economic discontent into electoral change diminishes. (The treatment of high-profile opponents illustrates the risk profile 

Party-system hollowing: Regional notables will transact access through the MPS or satellite lists, reducing ideological competition and deepening patron-client politics. Regional and international

• Sahel governance trendline: Chad’s move aligns with wider authoritarian consolidation across the central Sahel, with shrinking space for France/EU conditionality and a tilt toward non-Western partners—raising human-rights and security-sector-conduct concerns 
• Crisis response bandwidth: A more securitized presidency may be effective at short-term containment of rebellions or border threats, but at the cost of long-term legitimacy; if oil prices fall or subsidy pressures rise, protest risk spikes—particularly in the south.

1. Senate/upper-house approval and promulgation proceed; limited protests are contained; incremental co-optation of regional elites follows; international partners prioritize stability and counter-terrorism cooperation.  
2. Contentious stability (30–40%)
3. 
   Localized unrest in southern prefectures and N’Djamena; selective repression; ad hoc dialogue offers without structural concessions; donor pressure on rights cases but no reversal of the constitutional change 
4. Fragmentation shock (≤15%)
5. 
   Elite splits (within security services or northern notables) coincide with protests or a fiscal shock, producing a cabinet crisis or emergency decrees; external actors recalibrate ties; risks of localized violence rise.

•  Promotions/rotations that further concentrate command in Zaghawa/Bideyat hands or reward loyal Arab/Kanem/Wadai notables.  
• Judicial moves vs. opposition: New cases, bans, and media closures—especially in southern prefectures—signal hardening authoritarian trajectory.  
• Budget signals: Defense and interior outlays vs. social spending; procurement opacity.
• Local conflict metrics: Farmer–herder violence trends in Mayo-Kebbi, Logone, Tandjilé; banditry and artisanal-gold corridor incidents in Tibesti/Ennedi/Wadai 

External alignment: Further distancing from France/EU and deepening ties to Gulf/Eastern partners as political insurance.