Russia’s Africa Corps: Wagner’s Successor in Africa (2022–2025)

In 2023, following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny and subsequent death, Moscow moved to restructure Wagner’s operations in Africa under direct state control. The result was the creation of the “Africa Corps” – a new Russian paramilitary formation fully subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). This Africa Corps has effectively taken over Wagner Group’s African footprint since late 2023, ensuring Russia’s presence on the continent endures even as the Wagner brand is phased out. Crucially, this shift means the Kremlin can no longer distance itself from the actions of its mercenaries: by bringing these fighters “inside the house” of the MoD, Russia has lost the plausible deniability it once enjoyed with Wagner.

By 2025, the Russia-led Africa Corps maintains a presence in at least six African countries that were previously key Wagner theaters. These include the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Libya, Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, with smaller engagements or outreach in others like Equatorial Guinea and prospective deals in Togo, Benin, and Cameroon.

.Key country deployments and roles:

Country	Russian Forces Presence (2022–2025)	Estimated Personnel	Roles and Activities
Mali	Wagner active 2021–2023; Africa Corps took over by mid-2025. Wagner announced “mission complete” and withdrawal in June 2025, replaced entirely by Africa Corps.	~2,000 combined Russian personnel at peak (circa 2024); after Wagner’s exit, ~1,000 Africa Corps remain.	Combat operations against jihadist insurgents and Tuareg rebels (e.g. in northern Mali) alongside local forces; training and advising Malian troops; regime protection in Bamako for the ruling junta. Heavy weaponry (tanks, IFVs) delivered to support counterinsurgency.
Central African Republic(CAR)	Wagner present since 2018; partial leadership turnover by MoD but Wagner units still active through 2024. Ongoing negotiations to replace Wagner with Africa Corps, with host resistance to full transition.	~1,500–2,000 Wagner mercenaries (2023–24). As of late 2024, few Africa Corps units formally integrated (Wagner fighters not forced to sign MoD contracts in CAR).	Elite protection of President Touadéra and government (Wagner serves as personal guard); combat against rebel groups (Wagner credited with halting a rebel offensive on Bangui in 2021); securing mineral assets (gold and diamond mines in exchange for concessions). Africa Corps focus would be on training if deployed – a point of contention as CAR authorities want fighters, not just trainers.
Libya	Wagner forces (1,000+ at peak) backed General Haftar’s LNA in eastern Libya (2017–2023). After 2023, Wagner fighters in Libya were absorbed into Africa Corps under Russian MoD oversight.	Several hundred (exact numbers not public). Wagner contingent (approx. 800–1,200) fully reflagged as Africa Corps by 2024.	Securing military bases in Libya’s east (e.g. Al-Khadim airbase) for Russian use; supporting LNA forces (logistics, artillery, advisors) in Libya’s civil conflict; establishing air and naval footholds on the Mediterranean. Eastern Libya is now a critical logistics hub for Russia, used for refueling and as a potential alternative to bases in Syria.
Sudan	Wagner presence since 2017 focused on gold mining and support to Sudanese security forces. In 2023, Wagner reportedly armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its conflict against Sudan’s army. By early 2024, the Kremlin shifted to backing Sudan’s regular army (SAF) in exchange for a Red Sea base deal.	~300 Wagner personnel (estimate in late 2022) under Prigozhin-linked company “M Invest”. No official Africa Corps deployment announced (Sudan operations now managed state-to-state).	Resource security (guarding gold mines and smuggling routes in Sudan); Military assistance (training and advising Sudanese forces). In 2023–24 the role was covert arms supply to RSF, then pivoted to negotiating a naval base at Port Sudan via the Sudanese Army. The situation is fluid; Africa Corps’ formal structure in Sudan remains unclear.
Niger	No Wagner presence prior to 2023. After the Nigerien coup in July 2023, Russian MoD officials engaged the new junta. The first Africa Corps contingent arrived April 2024 at Niamey’s base (formerly used by U.S. forces).	~100 Africa Corps instructors as of April 2024; reportedly expanded in mid-2024 and plans to grow further.	Training of Nigerien troops, e.g. in drone operations; advising junta on security; preventing Western intervention (the presence helped deter ECOWAS or French military action post-coup). Likely also protecting key regime sites in Niamey.
Burkina Faso	No Wagner presence pre-2022. After the September 2022 coup, Russia courted the Traoré junta. Africa Corps deployment began Jan 2024, with a team of 100 landing in Ouagadougou.	100 troops initially, planned to increase to ~300 in 2024. Africa Corps established a base at Loumbila near the capital.	Regime protection for President Ibrahim Traoré; training and joint patrols with Burkinabè forces against jihadist insurgents. The mission is largely instructional and to fill the void left by expelled French forces, while shoring up the junta’s security.
Others (Emerging)	Equatorial Guinea: Small presence reported – a handful of Africa Corps instructors protecting senior officials and training local forces (since 2023). Cameroon: No forces deployed, but Moscow has signaled interest in defense cooperation (talks in 2023–24). Mali–Niger–Burkina alliance: Africa Corps coordinates with the tri-state Sahel alliance for collective defense. Prospective: Togo and Benin have signed military cooperation agreements with Russia in 2025, potentially paving the way for future Africa Corps deployments on the Gulf of Guinea coast.	–	Political influence and footholds: In Equatorial Guinea, the presence secures a friendly government and perhaps access to ports. In Togo/Benin, agreements include joint exercises and port calls for the Russian Navy. These moves underscore Russia’s aim to gain Gulf of Guinea port access (for hydrocarbons and maritime routes) and to embed influenceeven in coastal West African states.

Table 1: Russia-led Africa Corps deployments in Africa (since 2022), including estimated troop numbers and primary roles. Wagner Group forces (pre-2024) are noted where relevant, as Africa Corps has largely subsumed Wagner’s operations.

As Table 1 shows, the geographic center of gravity for Africa Corps is the Sahel region and Central Africa. Mali has been a major theater, with the largest number of Russian fighters engaged in active combat, whereas in Niger and Burkina Faso the deployments have (so far) been smaller and focused on advisory roles. In CAR and Libya – where Wagner had established deep roots – Russia has been more cautious in the transition, maintaining continuity with existing Wagner personnel to avoid losing local influence. Notably, in CAR, President Touadéra insisted on retaining Wagner advisers as his bodyguards and was reluctant to accept a full replacement by Africa Corps. This gradual handover is reflective of Wagner’s long-standing personal ties in countries like CAR and Mali, which the Kremlin is trying not to disrupt. In fact, it is estimated that 70–80% of Africa Corps personnel are ex-Wagner members, a deliberate effort to carry over Wagner’s local experience and relationships into the new structure.

Russia is also expanding into new locales via the Africa Corps framework. After a string of coups in the Sahel (Mali 2020/21, Burkina 2022, Niger 2023) ousted pro-Western regimes, Moscow seized the opportunity to insert military advisors and forge partnerships with the juntas. By 2025, Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov – the point man for Africa Corps – was shuttling between Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougouto deepen ties and plan enlarged deployments in all three countries. Simultaneously, Russia pursued military cooperation deals on Africa’s Atlantic coast: a defense pact with Togo (July 2025) including training and intelligence-sharing, and negotiations with Benin for port access and naval visits. These moves suggest that Africa Corps is not only inheriting Wagner’s existing footprint but is poised to extend it to strategically significant areas (Gulf of Guinea ports, for example) that Wagner never reached.

Russia’s strategic objectives in Africa have both persisted and evolved since 2022 under the transition from Wagner to Africa Corps. At a high level, Moscow’s aims can be summarized as: political leverage, economic gain, and military-strategic positioning. The approach, however, has shifted from the semi-deniable, entrepreneur-driven Wagner model to a more centralized, state-driven effort under the Africa Corps.

Political Objectives – Regime Influence and Alliances: Russia seeks to prop up friendly regimes and cultivate new allies as part of a broader “anti-neocolonial” positioning in Africa. Under Wagner, Prigozhin built personal relationships with leaders in Mali, CAR, Libya, Sudan, etc., trading security services for influence. Since 2022, and especially post-2023, the Kremlin has doubled down on this playbook but with tighter oversight. Africa Corps deployments come alongside diplomatic and informational outreach – for example, re-opening Russian cultural centers (“Russian Houses”), creating a new Foreign Ministry department for Africa, and launching the African Initiative media front to shape pro-Russian narratives. A key political goal has been to form a bloc of Sahel countries aligned with Moscow. Russia actively encouraged the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) and is supporting it economically and militarily so it can attract other nations to the fold. This alliance is presented by Russia as a sovereign “third way” free from Western influence, and Africa Corps serves as the on-the-ground guarantor of regime security for these juntas. In sum, since 2022 Russia’s political strategy evolved from opportunistic deals (Wagner securing one country at a time) to a more coordinated regional strategy – leveraging Africa Corps, state corporations, and propaganda to knit together a pro-Russian bloc and undermine Western (especially French and US) presence in Africa.
Economic Objectives – Natural Resources and Revenue: Gaining privileged access to Africa’s natural resources remains a central Russian aim, but the means of doing so are adjusting under Africa Corps. Wagner had secured lucrative concessions – gold and diamonds in CAR, gold in Sudan, oil and gas and farmland deals in Mali, etc. – often as informal payment for services. Under Africa Corps (a state-run outfit), Russia has started to formalize some of these arrangements. For example, in Niger, Moscow’s interest in uranium deposits (vital for nuclear fuel) is a known factor in its courtship of the coup government. In Mali, shipments of grain and oil, and promises of investment, have been offered alongside security assistance – indicating a broader political-economy package rather than just mercenaries-for-mines. However, one notable evolution is that Russia now expects cash or state contracts to fund Africa Corps operations, rather than off-the-books resource swaps. In CAR, Russian officials asked the government to start paying for Africa Corps services in cash (amounting to millions of dollars), which Bangui balked at – preferring to continue compensating with mining rights. This tension shows the shift from Wagner’s quasi-business venture (where Prigozhin’s firms profited from mines) to Africa Corps as an extension of the Russian state, which wants host nations to foot more of the bill (or at least sign formal economic deals beneficial to Moscow). In essence, economic extraction remains a motive – Russia still prizes gold, diamonds, timber, and now uranium and strategic minerals – but the process is becoming more state-to-state. Additionally, Russia uses Africa Corps presence to open doors for its state-owned companies: Rosatom pitching nuclear plants in the Sahel, Rosneft and others seeking oil/gas rights, and construction of infrastructure like railways or bases that can yield commercial advantages.
Military and Geostrategic Goals: Militarily, the initial goal of Wagner was to provide expeditionary counterinsurgency support on the cheap, enhancing Russian global clout without direct Russian Armed Forces engagement. By 2022, with Wagner expanding and the Ukraine war raging, the Kremlin began to see Africa also in strategic terms: ports, bases, and lines of communication. Since the transition to Africa Corps, these strategic goals have become more explicit. Port access in the Gulf of Guinea and Red Sea are prime objectives. The Russian Navy has already used Conakry (Guinea) for weapons shipments into the Sahel, and Russia is negotiating access to Port Sudan on the Red Sea (a decade-long ambition). Likewise, potential use of Lomé (Togo) or even a base in São Tomé would project Russian naval power into the Atlantic, threatening NATO’s southern flank. Another goal is securing air logistics routes across Africa. Africa Corps has helped Russia expand airbase usage from Syria into Africa – e.g., the buildup of bases in eastern Libya (Al Jufra, Benghazi) that could substitute for Syria’s Hmeymim if needed. There are discussions of even establishing a permanent Russian base in CAR (something CAR has lobbied for, offering to host up to 10,000 Russian troops). While CAR is not geographically strategic, such a base would cement Russia’s role as the security guarantor for that regime and provide depth for operations across Central Africa. Broadly, since 2022 Russia’s military objectives in Africa have evolved from simply gaining ad-hoc presence to building a sustainable infrastructure (bases, agreements, supply lines) that can endure long-term and be leveraged in global power projection. The Africa Corps is the vehicle for this, being closely integrated with Russia’s defense establishment and thus able to coordinate larger strategic moves – something Wagner acting independently could not fully do.

In summary, the shift from Wagner to Africa Corps marks a move to align African operations with Russia’s state strategy. The goals of securing allies, resources, and strategic positioning remain, but the execution is now more systematic and overtly tied to the Kremlin. Africa Corps was merely part of a grand scheme… originally designed for operations not only in Africa, but in all the countries of the global south”, signaling that this is just the beginning of a more ambitious Russian expeditionary posture.

The Africa Corps’ organizational structure represents a significant change from Wagner’s model. Wagner Group was a private network built around Prigozhin’s ventures and ex-military commanders, operating with Kremlin assent but not formal Kremlin command. In contrast, Africa Corps is a creature of the Russian state,created within the MoD’s chain of command. Key features of its composition and structure include:

Leadership and Command: Africa Corps was established under the direction of Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and General Andrei Averyanov (head of the GRU’s special operations). These two senior officers are publicly identified as in charge of Africa Corps, underscoring that it is tethered to Russia’s official military hierarchy. Yevkurov in particular played a mediating role during the Wagner mutiny and then personally traveled to Wagner outposts (Syria, Libya, CAR) to inform mercenaries that the MoD was taking over. The operational command in Africa is less openly documented, but the Corps claims its field leadership is drawn from elite units of the Russian Army and ex-PMC cadres. Indeed, several Wagner veterans have transitioned into Africa Corps command roles: for example, Andrei “Kep” Ivanov and Alexander “Ratibor” Kuznetsov – former Wagner commanders in Mali – reportedly signed on with Africa Corps along with their men. By absorbing such figures, the Corps benefits from continuity in local operations while ensuring they report up through MoD channels.
Recruitment and Personnel: Unlike Wagner’s secretive recruitment, Africa Corps conducts relatively transparent recruitment through official channels. It has an office website and uses some of Wagner’s former social media pages to attract fighters. Early recruitment was funneled through MoD-linked private outfits like “Redut” and “Konvoy”, which acted as conduits to sign up volunteers after Wagner’s mutiny. Many recruits are Russian Army veterans enticed by promises of high pay (~€3,000/month), full health insurance, and equal benefits to those fighting in Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defence estimated in May 2024 that Africa Corps had “more than 2,000 regular soldiers and officers” in its ranks. This indicates the Corps is composed primarily of active-duty or contract soldiers under MoD, not freelancers. However, a large portion of its manpower also comes from Wagner holdovers. As noted, 70–80% of Africa Corps fighters are ex-Wagner – essentially the same individuals reflagged. By late 2024, Wagner personnel in Africa were given a choice: disband or join Africa Corps. Many opted to join, while others left; in Mali, for instance, hundreds of Wagner fighters simply rolled over into the new unit to continue their mission under Moscow’s direct authority. There is also evidence Africa Corps may recruit some local auxiliaries or regional fighters. J Africa Corps was attempting to recruit African militants (possibly integrating fighters from friendly militias) to bolster its ranks, although this is not yet a large-scale element of the force.
Units and Formations: While termed a “Corps,” the Africa Corps in practice appears to be a multi-battalion task force rather than an army corps in size. Its fighters are organized into units tasked to different countries. For example, the contingent in Mali operates as a cohesive group (with sub-units for north Mali operations vs. Bamako security), and the contingent in Burkina Faso was initially described simply as “100 instructors” – effectively a company-sized deployment. In Mali, concurrent deployments of Wagner and Africa Corps in 2024 functioned in parallel – Wagner units in the northern front, Africa Corps units around central Mali and Bamako. After Wagner’s exit, those elements likely merged. We also see special formations like the “Bears Brigade” mentioned as cooperating with Africa Corps. The “Bears Brigade” (or “Bear Brigade”), according to Le Monde, is another Kremlin-controlled paramilitary outfit activated in Africa after Prigozhin’s demise. It may consist of Chechen or other specialized troops and has been noted in the same theaters as Africa Corps. This suggests Africa Corps isn’t a single monolithic unit but rather the umbrella for several MoD-run paramilitary formations. These include the core Africa Corps units (often branded on Telegram as “Korpus Afrika”) and allied formations like the Bear Brigade or MoD-affiliated PMCs (Redut, etc.), all coordinating under the MoD’s Africa command. The structure is far more integrated than Wagner’s sprawling enterprise; Africa Corps personnel wear Russian military insignia (its sleeve patch bears the outline of Africa and a sword) and are legally treated as Russian servicemen on foreign deployment. In November 2024, the UK even sanctioned Africa Corps as a destabilizing “Russian mercenary group”, underscoring that it’s recognized as a direct successor to Wagner in structure and intent.
Chain of Command and Control: The command-and-control now runs straight to Moscow. Whereas Wagner’s operations could be somewhat autonomous (with Prigozhin often freelancing and only loosely coordinating with Russian foreign policy makers), Africa Corps must align with the MoD and Kremlin directives. This centralization has trade-offs: it eliminates “independent power centers” like Prigozhin – fulfilling Putin’s post-mutiny mandate of zero tolerance for rogue actors – but also potentially slows decision-making on the ground. Local commanders of Africa Corps have less personal latitude than Wagner’s did; they can’t, for instance, undertake a mining venture or political deal without Moscow’s approval. However, this also means better logistical support and coordination. The Russian military is actively working to ensure supply lines for Africa Corps, e.g. using Syrian and Libyan bases for airlift, and constructing new infrastructure in Mali (expanding an airfield in Bamako next to Africa Corps HQ) to support long-term operations. The result is a more professionalized force, but one whose actions (and misdeeds) tie directly back to the Russian state.

In essence, Africa Corps’ structure is “old wine in a new bottle” – it contains much of Wagner’s personnel and fulfills a similar function, but under a new label and tighter controls. An analyst from RUSI observed that “there is no difference [from Wagner]… it was always an operation of Russian services, Prigozhin was just the manager”, and now that management has been firmly reasserted by the MoD. The implication for host countries is that dealing with Africa Corps is openly dealing with the Kremlin’s military – as a Malian security source noted, “Wagner yesterday or Africa Corps today, our point of contact remains the same: the Kremlin.”.

One of the stark changes since Wagner’s rebranding as Africa Corps is a shift in operational roles and tactics. Wagner forces in Africa (2017–2023) were often employed as frontline combat units, directly engaging insurgents and rebels, and using brutal tactics to achieve battlefield gains. By contrast, Africa Corps – at least outside of Mali – has emphasized training, advising, and low-risk security tasks over high-intensity combat. This transformation can be summarized in several points:

From “Dirty Work” to Training and Advisory: Wagner gained infamy for its “direct action” missions – fighting insurgents in CAR’s forests, conducting search-and-destroy sweeps in Mali (like the notorious Moura operation where hundreds of civilians were allegedly executed), or deploying snipers and artillery in Libya. These often involved heavy casualties and human rights abuses. Africa Corps, being MoD-run, has generally avoided such high-risk, high-atrocity operations, likely to minimize both casualties among its troops and international scrutiny. In West Africa, except Mali, Africa Corps teams have largely stuck to training local forces, fortifying bases, and protecting VIPs. For example, in Niger and Burkina Faso, the Russians are instructing soldiers in drone usage, marksmanship, and patrolling, rather than independently hunting militants in the fieldwarontherocks.com reuters.com. A France 24 report noted that as of 2025, Africa Corps personnel in the Sahel (outside Mali) were not engaging in frontline combat at all, focusing instead on building the capacity of their host armies. An African security analyst predicted that Africa Corps “will probably do much more training of [host nation] soldiers than Wagner did”, which aligns with early evidence from Mali and CAR. This approach reflects a lowered risk appetite by Moscow – training missions are less likely to lead to disaster or war crimes scandals than combat operations.
Exceptions – Mali (and to a degree, CAR): In Mali, Africa Corps has been drawn into combat out of necessity. When Wagner fighters in Mali launched a disastrous offensive into rebel-held Tinzaouaten in mid-2024 (suffering a bloody ambush), Africa Corps units subsequently reinforced the Malians on other fronts. By early 2025, Russian deliveries of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to Mali telegraphed that Africa Corps might enter counterinsurgency battles directly. Indeed, Africa Corps troops have since incurred casualties in Mali – for instance, being targeted by Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM, which reportedly killed several Russians in ambushes. Mali appears to be an outlier where Africa Corps not only trains but “supports host in kinetic operations” on a significant scale. This is likely because the threat level (multiple insurgencies) and Wagner’s prior role force Africa Corps to fill a combat function or risk Mali’s junta being overrun. In CAR, it remains to be seen how Africa Corps will operate if/when fully deployed. Wagner forces there actively fight rebels alongside FACA (Central African Army) – something CAR’s government values highly. However, unlike Wagner, which fights rebels… Africa Corps is more focused on training,” which could become a point of friction if rebels surge and Russian trainers refrain from intervening directly. The likely scenario is Africa Corps in CAR would still have to do force protection and limited strikes (e.g. guarding mining sites and using drones or artillery to repel rebel attacks), but perhaps not roving search-and-destroy missions as Wagner did. The overall trend is clear: Africa Corps is inherently more risk-averse and hands-off in combat than Wagner was, except where absolutely required.
Security and Guard Duties: Another evolving role is protecting key installations and leaders. Wagner was often tasked with personal security for presidents (Touadéra’s guard in CAR, high officials in Mali). Africa Corps continues this but as part of a formal mission. In Burkina Faso, the very first statement was that Russian servicemen arrived to “ensure the safety of the country’s leader” (President Traoré). In Mali, even while Wagner units fought up north, Africa Corps units entrenched in Bamako to secure the capital and train the presidential guard. We’ve also seen reports of Africa Corps (or affiliated guards) in Equatorial Guinea, explicitly there to protect President Teodoro Obiang and family. This signals a role shift toward what one might call “Praetorian” services – i.e. bolstering regime security against coups or assassination, which aligns with Russia’s political objective of regime stability (for friendly regimes). These guard roles are less manpower-intensive and less likely to cause inadvertent civilian harm, aligning with Africa Corps’ leaner posture.
Resource Protection and Military-Enabling Operations: Wagner was deeply involved in securing resource extraction sites – guarding mines in CAR and Sudan, and escorting convoys of minerals. Africa Corps is expected to inherit this function in a more formalized way. For example, if Africa Corps fully takes over in CAR, one of its tasks will be securing gold and diamond mining operations for Russian companies (which in the Wagner era was done by Wagner’s “securité” arm). Similarly, in Mali, Wagner was reportedly granted rights to gold exploitation at one point; under Africa Corps, any such economic venture would likely be reframed as a government-to-government agreement with Russian firms, with Africa Corps troops protecting the sites as “military advisors.” Thus, the operational role of resource protection endures, but perhaps under the guise of training local mine security or protecting economic projects. Additionally, Africa Corps engages in “military enabling” tasks like electronic warfare support and weapons deliveries. An AP investigation found that sanctioned Russian ships delivered tanks, APCs, artillery, and even electronic warfare systems to West African ports in 2023–24, likely to equip Africa Corps deployments and their host armies. Organizing and managing these arms transfers is an operational role that the MoD-backed Africa Corps is well-suited for (Wagner did smuggle weapons too, but now it can be done with state logistics under a veneer of legality).
Information Operations and Political Warfare: Wagner was notorious for running troll farms, disinformation campaigns, and even election interference (e.g. in Madagascar, Libya) through Prigozhin’s media wing. Post-2023, Russia established “African Initiative” and other state-coordinated media to continue influence operations. While this is not Africa Corps per se, Africa Corps personnel have participated in “hearts and minds” efforts – giving interviews to African media, appearing in uniform as friendly instructors, and helping organize local pro-Russia rallies. The Corps’ presence is accompanied by a narrative: that Russia (and its Africa Corps) are “sovereignty providers” freeing African countries from colonialism. This messaging ties their military role to a political influence campaign. In effect, Africa Corps’ operational footprint includes psychological operations in tandem with the Russian state – something Wagner did more clandestinely. Now it is often out in the open, with Telegram channels like “Korpus Afrika” posting photos of Russian instructors handing out aid or Russian soldiers dancing with locals, etc., to build goodwill. This soft-power dimension is a new emphasis as Russia tries to legitimize its military presence in the eyes of African publics (to varying success).

In summary, the nature of missions undertaken by Russia’s Africa Corps has tilted toward supportive and stabilizing roles (for regimes) rather than the outright combat and shock-troop roles Wagner was known for. The notable outcome is that Africa Corps typically deploys in smaller numbers and engages less in daily fighting – “Moscow has seen it doesn’t need to deploy many soldiers” to achieve its aims. Instead, a few hundred “instructors” can prop up an allied regime and let the local army do the bulk of the fighting (even if that army’s effectiveness is questionable). This is by design: . Wagner, too, ultimately prioritized regime security, but it often masqueraded as counterinsurgency. Africa Corps makes the regime-protection role more explicit, while offering training as the carrot for hosts. The trade-off is that this lighter footprint has, so far, made little impact on improving security for the populace at large – a point we evaluate next.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the Africa Corps in achieving Russian strategic interests and its impact on host countries yields a mixed picture. On one hand, Russia has largely succeeded in maintaining and even expanding its influence in Africa post-Wagner; on the other, the presence of Russian mercenaries (by any name) has often correlated with deteriorating security and governance outcomes in the host nations.

From Russia’s perspective, Africa Corps has been strategically effective in key ways:

Preserving Russian Influence: The primary goal of ensuring that Moscow “does not lose Africa” after Wagner’s downfall has been met. Despite Prigozhin’s death and Wagner’s formal disbandment, Russian military presence remains entrenched in all the critical states Wagner was involved in. In Mali, for example, Wagner’s exit could have created a vacuum; instead, Africa Corps seamlessly filled it, and Mali’s junta continues to align with Russia(e.g. President Assimi Goïta’s visit to Moscow in mid-2025 to deepen defense ties). In CAR, although negotiations were rocky, Russian influence is undiminished – President Touadéra still relies on Russian security advisors and has little choice but to work with whatever Kremlin-approved personnel are present. Even in countries new to Russia’s orbit like Burkina and Niger, within months of their coups the juntas openly embraced Russian training and sidelined Western partnerships. By late 2024, France had been completely ousted from Mali, Burkina, and Niger, its troops and even ambassadors expelled, while Russia swiftly became the “partner of choice” for those regimes. This is a significant geopolitical win for Moscow – achieved at relatively low cost via Africa Corps deployments. The Corps also helped Russia play spoiler to Western interests: for instance, after the Niger coup, Africa Corps presence at a base formerly housing U.S. drones was a propaganda coup, showing Niamey turning from Washington to Moscow. Similarly, Africa Corps advising Mali and Burkina in pushing UN peacekeepers out (Mali forced the UN mission’s withdrawal in 2023) aligns with Russia’s goal of supplanting multilateral and French-led efforts. In forums like the U.N., these African states have increasingly toed pro-Russian or non-aligned positions, which is exactly what the Kremlin hopes for as it pursues a “long game in Africa” to build a coalition against Western dominance.
Securing Economic and Military Agreements: Africa Corps has been a catalyst for new deals that advance Russian interests. The presence of Russian troops often precedes the signing of lucrative agreements: e.g., Maliordering military helicopters and weapons from Russia (with deliveries facilitated by Africa Corps logistics); Niger expressing interest in Russian help to exploit its uranium (after Africa Corps arrived, Russia inked a draft agreement on mining cooperation); Burkina Faso discussing the Wagner/Africa Corps assisting in mining and possibly getting a stake in resource projects as part of security arrangements (per regional reports). Additionally, Russia has used Africa Corps as a selling point for arms exports – showcasing its equipment in the field to African officers. The steady flow of arms shipments to Sahel clients, noted earlier, not only boosts Russia’s defense industry but also binds those armies closer to Russian maintenance and training pipelines (creating long-term dependency). Another strategic gain is potential basing: negotiations for a Red Sea naval base in Sudan advanced in 2023–24, with Sudan’s de facto leader Gen. Burhan agreeing “in principle” to a Russian base at Port Sudan in exchange for weapons – a deal made more feasible by Wagner/Africa Corps playing both sides of Sudan’s conflict and ultimately backing the side that controls the coast. In Libya, Africa Corps inherited positions that may one day support a formal Russian base in eastern Libya (e.g. in Benghazi or Tobruk). A RUSI study concluded those Libyan ports are Moscow’s most likely backup if Syria’s Tartus is lost – and indeed Russia’s post-Assad recalibration included boosting its Africa logistics (Yevkurov visited Algeria in late 2024 to explore port access there). All these indicate strategic dividends: Russia, via Africa Corps, has expanded its military footprint and locked in resource access in ways that seemed unlikely a few years ago. The Corps has also helped institutionalize Russia’s role – e.g., by supporting the Sahel Alliance’s planned joint force, Russia positioned itself as the external power underwriting a new regional security architecture.

However, on the question of impact on host nations’ stability and security, the results are largely negative or at best inconclusive:

Worsening Security Trends: Empirical data show that in countries where Wagner/Africa Corps operates, violence has not diminished – in fact, it often increased. In Mali, for instance, ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) reports that “violent events involving insurgent groups had almost tripled since 2021, when Wagner began operations”. Instead of quelling the jihadist insurgency, the arrival of Russian mercenaries coincided with militants expanding their attacks and even reaching the capital region (JNIM attacked near Bamako in 2024 for the first time in years). Wagner helped Mali’s army score some short-term gains against rebels (e.g., briefly seizing the northern city of Kidal), but at the cost of driving tuareg separatists and jihadists into a closer alliance against the state. As Wagner/Africa Corps committed mass atrocities (such as the Moura massacre in March 2022, or summary executions of civilians in 2024), they further alienated local communities. This has “led to increasingly complex security challenges” – an arguably self-defeating outcome where insurgencies gain recruits from a resentful population. A senior U.S. defense official noted that now the Russians are “on the inside” in Niger and Mali, they have to “prove themselves” in counterterrorism – but they haven’t. To date, no major jihadist group in the Sahel has been defeated by Russian-supported forces; rather, the militants have grown stronger in Mali and Burkina, and Niger’s insurgent threats persist (though Niamey’s coup leaders have prioritized regime survival over offensive ops). The security vacuum left by departing Western forces has not been filled by Africa Corps in terms of actual counterinsurgency. A striking statistic: in Mali’s central regions, the withdrawal of French and UN troops combined with Wagner’s limited reach led to many areas losing any security presence, enabling jihadists to roam freely despite the Russian “support.” Africa Corps, with only a few hundred men in Mali by 2025, cannot cover the territory the UN’s 15,000 peacekeepers once did.
Regime Stability vs. Citizen Security: Africa Corps has been effective at one thing – securing the regime in power (so far). None of the juntas in Mali, Burkina, or Niger have been toppled since leaning on Russian support (though the time frame is short). In CAR, President Touadéra’s grip on power was solidified with Wagner’s help (e.g. winning a constitutional referendum in 2023 amid tight security and alleged voter intimidation by Russian-provided forces). To that extent, Russia’s mercenaries have stabilized regimes – often authoritarian stability at the expense of democratic process. But for the countries’ overall stability, the picture is grim. Internal conflicts continue or are metastasizing. Mali’s government, for instance, lost control of additional northern territory in 2023 when Tuareg rebels relaunched a rebellion, citing Mali’s deal with Wagner as one provocation. By late 2023, those rebels had overrun several military camps after Wagner units withdrew to regroup. This underscores that the Russian model of counterinsurgency – heavy force with limited troops – has not pacified conflicts; if anything, it has failed to address root causes and sometimes aggravated them. Even regime stability is not guaranteed long-term: reliance on an external patron can breed complacency and corruption, weakening the national army’s initiative. There are reports that in Mali and CAR, local troops often refuse to go on operations unless accompanied by Russians, having become dependent on their tougher methods (or air support). Should the Russians leave abruptly (for example, if Moscow’s priorities change), these regimes could be more vulnerable than before. In a word, the presence of Africa Corps has been a Band-Aid, not a cure, for the security ailments of these states.
Human Rights and Public Backlash: One measurable impact has been continued human rights abuses, now directly tied to Russia. Human rights organizations have documented that Africa Corps personnel, much like Wagner, are implicated alongside local forces in atrocities. For example, Human Rights Watch reported a massacre in Mali’s central region in late 2024 where Malian soldiers with “white” (foreign) fighters killed dozens of civilians. The UN Human Rights office noted arbitrary executions of villagers in early 2025 by Malian troops “accompanied by foreign military personnel”rand.org. These are thinly veiled references to Wagner/Africa Corps. Such incidents fuel anti-government and anti-Russian sentiment among affected communities (especially among groups like the Fulani who have been targeted). While urban populations in Bamako or Bangui may still chant pro-Russia slogans in rallies orchestrated by authorities, the rural populace experiencing the conflict often sees the Russians as just another abusive force. This dynamic can undermine the legitimacy of the host government – exactly the opposite of the stabilization intended. Internationally, these abuses have eroded any goodwill Russia might have been trying to build as an “anti-colonial liberator.” Instead, Russia’s reputation is increasingly that of a destabilizer. Western officials have been quick to point out that civilian deaths have spiked under Russian watch. Even some African civil society voices are now wary: reports from CAR indicate local opposition figures accusing the government of mortgaging the country to foreign mercenaries who commit abuses and exploit resources.
Economic and Governance Strain: The presence of Africa Corps also brings economic costs and governance dilemmas. In CAR, as detailed earlier, Russia’s demand that the government start paying in cash for Africa Corps illustrates a strain on national budgets. These are poor countries; diverting millions to pay foreign soldiers (or giving away mining rights worth even more) can fuel resentment in the military and population, especially if tangible security improvements aren’t seen. Moreover, regimes propped up by mercenaries may neglect genuine reforms or power-sharing needed for lasting peace. For instance, Mali’s junta has largely shunned internal dialogue with rebels or communities, relying on force majeure with Wagner/Africa Corps help – a strategy that has led to stalemate and partition, not victory. The “victor’s peace” Wagner imposed in parts of CAR – brutal suppression of rebels without addressing grievances – is tenuous, and conflict has continued at a lower intensity. Essentially, Africa Corps can freeze conflicts, but not resolve them. As one diplomat observed about Wagner in CAR: it enabled the government to recapture towns but the rebels simply melted away into the bush, waiting out the mercenaries. This remains true under Africa Corps: it can drive insurgents back temporarily, but cannot eradicate them or win hearts and minds.
Long-Term Risks for Russia: While effective in the short term for influence, Africa Corps’ approach may carry long-term risks for Russian interests too. By being the official face of these interventions, Moscow is now directly accountable for any failures or blowback. If, say, a junta collapses or a massacre by Africa Corps triggers international sanctions, Russia bears the blame. Already, the EU and UK have sanctioned Africa Corps and related entities for their role in human rights violations and destabilization. Should popular opinion in an allied country swing against the Russians (as can happen if promises go unfulfilled or abuses pile up), Russia might suddenly lose its foothold – as happened to France in these very countries. There is an ironic scenario where today pro-Russian crowds could tomorrow demand Russia’s exit if the security situation keeps worsening. As of 2025, that hasn’t manifest broadly – largely because alternative partners (France/West) are either absent or still unpopular due to colonial memory – but it’s a concern. In sum, Africa Corps has achieved Russia’s immediate strategic aims (influence, resources, denial of Western access), but it is not delivering security to ordinary Africans and may be planting seeds of future instability that even Russia could struggle to manage.

Net Assessment

Overall, Russia’s Africa Corps has been tactically and strategically effective for the Kremlin in the short run, but its impact on host nation stability is largely deleterious. It keeps friendly regimes in power and expands Russia’s reach (the “long game” in Africa is on track), yet it does so while fueling conflict dynamics that could lead to protracted insurgencies and state fragility. Moscow appears to accept this trade-off: its priority is geopolitical influence, not nation-building.. In the logic of the Kremlin, if Africa Corps entrenches Russian presence and kicks out the West, it is serving its purpose – even if jihadists roam and civilians suffer in the countryside (issues viewed as secondary).

For the host nations, however, the initial welcome some of their citizens extended to Wagner/Africa Corps (“Wagner fever” in Mali, Russian flags at Niger’s coup rallies) is confronting a harsh reality: security has not improved materially, and in some areas has worsened. The promised “sovereign” path with Russian help is looking more like state capture by a new patron, as critics argue. Notably, no African conflict where Wagner/Africa Corps is involved has reached a sustainable resolution – CAR’s war festers at a low burn, Mali’s insurgencies are spreading, Sudan descended into a brutal civil war partly abetted by Wagner arms, and Libya remains unstable.In conclusion, the Russia-led Africa Corps has successfully maintained Russia’s presence and strategic interests in Africa after Wagner, expanding to new theaters and tightening Kremlin control. Structurally, it represents a more accountable (to Moscow) and consolidated force, one that has rebranded Russia’s intervention as official policy rather than shadow activity. But this very officialdom means Russia owns the outcomes in a way it didn’t before. Thus far, those outcomes include entrenching autocratic regimes and extracting resources, but also continuing conflict and human costs. The true test of Africa Corps’ effectiveness may lie in the coming years: can it actually stabilize a place like Mali or CAR on Russia’s terms, or will it merely hold the line until either the local adversaries overwhelm its limited numbers or the host societies reject its presence? For now, the Africa Corps is digging in for the long haul, betting that its low-cost, regime-centric model will secure Russia’s interests – even if peace and stability for Africans remain elusive.