Djibouti’s Presidential Age Limit Abolition: Internal Dynamics and Implications

In late October 2025, Djibouti’s National Assembly voted unanimously to abolish the constitutional provision barring anyone over 75 from running for president. This move removed the last legal obstacle preventing President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh – now 77 years old and in power since 1999 – from seeking a sixthterm in the April 2026 elections. The amendment, passed by all 65 lawmakers present, deletes the age cap (previously set at 75) from the 1992 Constitution. Under Djibouti’s constitutional procedure, such a revision can either be approved by referendum or, at the president’s discretion, ratified by a supermajority vote in parliament. In this case, President Guelleh is expected to forego a referendum and endorse the change, given the two-thirds majority threshold was easily met. A final confirming parliamentary vote is scheduled for early November 2025 as a formality. The swift and unanimous approval highlights the internal dynamics of Djibouti’s political system – one marked by dominant-party rule, tight elite cohesion, and constrained opposition – which together enabled the removal of the age limit with virtually no institutional resistance.

Background: Djibouti’s Political Structure and Past Constitutional Revisions

Djibouti is a unitary presidential republic dominated by a single ruling coalition. President Guelleh wields sweeping powers and has governed virtually unchallenged since taking office in 1999. Real political competition is minimal – while a multiparty system exists on paper, the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP) coalition, led by Guelleh’s party (the RPP), maintains an authoritarian hold on power. Opposition parties operate under severe constraints; critics and journalists face harassment, and elections are neither free nor fair by international accounts. The National Assembly (parliament) is effectively a rubber-stamp body: in the most recent 2023 legislative polls, the UMP won 58 of 65 seats amid an opposition boycott, and a small token opposition party took the remaining 7 seats. This hegemony has given President Guelleh near-total control over constitutional and legislative changes.

Constitutional revisions are not new in Djibouti’s political history. The current constitution, adopted in 1992 during a period of tentative political opening, originally imposed both term limits and an age limit on the presidency. Until 2010, the president could serve at most two terms of six years each, and candidates had to be between 40 and 75 years old. However, as President Guelleh approached the end of his second term, these rules were altered to extend his reign. In April 2010, the parliament approved sweeping constitutional amendments unanimously, removing the two-term limit and shortening presidential terms from 6 to 5 years. This change paved the way for Guelleh’s third term in 2011. At the same time, the 2010 reforms abolished the death penalty and even envisaged creating a new Senate (an upper house), though the Senate has never actually been established. Crucially, the 2010 amendments left the age 75 cap intact – likely because it was not an immediate impediment to Guelleh (who was in his early 60s then). By winning re-elections in 2011, 2016, and 2021, Guelleh took full advantage of the removal of term limits, securing a fourth and fifth term. With the president now in his late 70s, the age limit had become the final constitutional barrier to indefinite incumbency. The October 2025 vote to abolish the age ceiling follows this pattern of tailored constitutional change, effectively enabling what many critics describe as “presidency for life” for Guelleh. In sum, Djibouti’s leadership has repeatedly revised the constitution to consolidate power – first by ending term limits in 2010, and now by scrapping the age restriction in 2025.

The 2025 Amendment: Legislative Process and Parliamentary Approval

The process of amending the constitution in Djibouti is relatively straightforward given the regime’s tight grip on the legislature. The initiative for the age-limit amendment came as President Guelleh signaled interest in another term, and the compliant Parliament moved swiftly to oblige. On Sunday, October 26, 2025, the National Assembly convened to vote on removing Article 23’s upper age limit clause. All 65 lawmakers present voted in favor, reflecting a unanimous consensus in the chamber. This unanimity was unsurprising – Guelleh’s UMP and its allies hold an overwhelming majority of seats (and effectively all seats since the main opposition boycotted elections). Even the nominal opposition members in parliament did not voice dissent; either they were co-opted into backing the regime’s line or they abstained from attending, resulting in no votes against the bill. The Speaker of the Assembly, Dileita Mohamed Dileita, announced the result and noted that the amendment had been backed by every deputy in attendance. (Dileita – himself a former prime minister – is an influential politician from the minority Afar community, which underscores that even minority representatives within the regime’s ranks supported the change.)

According to Djibouti’s constitution, a revision can be finalized in one of two ways: (1) approval by a national referendum, following a simple majority support in parliament, or (2) approval by the president and a second parliamentary vote with at least a two-thirds majority . In this case, path (2) was chosen. After the Assembly’s initial unanimous vote, President Guelleh can simply sign off on the amendment instead of calling a referendum. The Speaker indicated that a second and final vote by Parliament – largely a formality – would occur on 2 November 2025 to confirm the change . The two-thirds threshold is easily met by the UMP’s dominance (even if all 65 MPs weren’t present, the ruling party alone holds more than enough seats to surpass the roughly 44 votes needed). Thus, the mechanism of approval has essentially been a rubber-stamp process, with no suspense about the outcome. The probability of passage was effectively 100%, given the tightly controlled political environment. Indeed, Djiboutian lawmakers have a track record of unanimous votes on issues important to the president – as seen in 2010 when term limits were abolished without a single dissenting vote.

Notably, by opting not to hold a referendum, the regime avoided any test of public opinion on this sensitive change. A referendum could have opened a (limited) space for public debate or at least revealed the level of popular support. The president’s decision to bypass it implies either confidence that the parliamentary route is smoother or fear that a plebiscite might expose discontent. As one prominent critic, Alexis Mohamed (a former advisor to Guelleh who resigned recently), observed: the current Parliament is “neither legitimate nor representative of the popular will.” He challenged authorities to hold a referendum to “measure the sharp popular rejection” of President Guelleh’s continued rul e . However, given the regime’s history of tightly managing elections, it was predictable that the age-limit removal would be handled inside the loyal Assembly, with no unpredictable public vote. In sum, the legislative process was expedient and entirely in-house: the executive and its supermajority in Parliament coordinated to rewrite the constitution in a matter of days, underscoring the centralized and uncompetitive nature of Djibouti’s political system.

Beneficiaries of the Change: Guelleh and the Ruling Elite

The primary beneficiary of abolishing the presidential age cap is President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh himself. Often referred to by his initials “IOG,” Guelleh has ruled Djibouti for over 26 years, and this amendment permits him to extend that reign into his 80s. Under the previous rules, his age (77) would have disqualified him from standing in 2026. By lifting the restriction, the door is open for him to seek a sixth consecutive term and continue his presidency beyond the 2020s. Guelleh has not yet formally declared his candidacy, but he hinted in May 2025 that he “loves [his] country too much to embark on an irresponsible adventure” that could cause divisions. Many interpreted this as a signal that he viewed stepping down – and potentially igniting a succession struggle – as the greater risk, thereby justifying his staying on. In practical terms, the amendment guarantees political continuity at the helm of the state, allowing Guelleh to maintain his grip on power, his legacy projects, and his place among Africa’s longest-ruling heads of state. It also spares him the uncertainty of retirement in a system where departing strongmen often fear retribution or loss of influence. Essentially, the age limit removal is tailor-made to extend Guelleh’s tenure, cementing what opponents call a “presidency for life” trajectory.

Beyond the president himself, the ruling elite and inner circle of the regime also benefit significantly. Guelleh’s continued rule means the preservation of the status quo for those in top government, military, and business positions who are allied with him. Over decades, a tight network of family members, clansmen, and loyalists has formed around the president, controlling key sectors of the economy (like the strategic port and logistics businesses) and enjoying the rents from foreign military base agreements. These elites have a vested interest in avoiding a power transition that could threaten their privileges. By keeping Guelleh in office, they ensure that their patron – who has overseen a system of patronage and clientelism – remains in place. As Alexis Mohamed noted in his resignation, Djibouti under Guelleh has been marked by “clientelist” governance that serves a narrow group’s interests. That clientelist network stands to lose from a change at the top; hence its members are arguably the strongest proponents of extending Guelleh’s rule. The amendment thus safeguards the political and economic interests of the ruling coalition’s barons: ministers, security chiefs, ruling party stalwarts, and business figures linked to the First Family.

Another beneficiary is the ruling party (UMP/RPP) as an institution. With Guelleh staying on, the party avoids a potentially fractious succession fight among ambitious figures beneath him. No obvious successor has been publicly anointed, and removing Guelleh could have risked internal splits within the dominant Issa-Somali clan or the UMP ranks. By retaining their long-time figurehead, the party maintains unity and continues to leverage Guelleh’s established authority and relationships (domestically and internationally). In a sense, Guelleh’s candidature in 2026 would be the UMP’s safest bet to remain in power; any new candidate, even from within the regime, would have been a step into unknown territory. Furthermore, elements of the civil service and security apparatus also benefit insofar as the political hierarchy remains unchanged – careers and loyalties built under the current president can continue without disruption. Finally, one could argue that foreign stakeholders (such as countries with bases in Djibouti or investors in Djibouti’s infrastructure) perceive continuity at the top as beneficial for stability. Although not direct “beneficiaries” in the way domestic actors are, these external partners likely appreciate the predictability of Guelleh staying in power (and indeed, none have publicly objected to the constitutional change). Overall, the age limit removal serves the self-preservation of Djibouti’s power structure: from the president at the apex down to the coterie of elites and loyalists whose fates are tied to his.

Motivations Behind the Amendment

Why did Djibouti’s leadership pursue this constitutional amendment now? Several motivations – overlapping political and personal calculations – help explain the timing and intent of abolishing the presidential age cap:

• Political Continuity and “Stability”: The official rationale given by the government is to ensure continuity in a turbulent region. Parliamentary Speaker Dileita Mohamed Dileita defended the change as necessary for “the stability of the small country, [situated] in a troubled Horn of Africa region with Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea”. Djibouti’s neighborhood is indeed volatile, and Guelleh’s regime portrays his long rule as a source of consistency and peace amid regional conflicts. By this logic, keeping the same leader is meant to prevent any internal power vacuum or uncertainty at a time when external threats (militant groups, regional wars) loom. Guelleh himself implied that a premature succession could “cause divisions” domestically. Thus, a key motivation is to maintain political continuity – avoiding a potentially destabilizing transition and instead extending the status quo which the ruling elite argues has kept Djibouti comparatively stable and secure. In reality, this “stability” argument also conveniently allows the president to remain in office and forestalls any debate on who might succeed him.
• Ethnic/Clan Consolidation of Power: Djibouti’s politics have long been influenced by its two main ethnic groups – the Issa-Somali majority and the Afar minority. Power since independence has been concentrated in the Issa (specifically, the Issa sub-clan of the Somali Dir clan to which both former President Hassan Gouled Aptidon and his nephew Guelleh belong). One underlying motivation for extending Guelleh’s rule is to ensure the presidency remains in Issa hands, avoiding any scenario in which an Afar politician might contend for the top job. By eliminating the age limit, the Issa-dominated establishment can keep its longtime patron in place rather than risk a succession that might reopen ethnic bargaining. Historically, the Afar have felt marginalized – a fact that sparked a civil war in the 1990s (led by the Afar-dominated FRUD rebel group) until a power-sharing deal brought some Afar into secondary positions of government. Currently, Afar figures hold roles like the Speaker of Parliament or other posts, but the Issa elite retains true executive power. If Guelleh were to retire, there could be pressure (at least from the Afar community) to consider an Afar presidential candidate or to renegotiate the balance of power – a prospect the Issa ruling circle is likely keen to avoid. Keeping Guelleh (an Issa) in office sidesteps any ethnic power-shift. In essence, the amendment contributes to ethnic consolidation: it prolongs the Issa-led political order. While this motivation is seldom stated openly by officials, it aligns with the regime’s historical reluctance to entrust top leadership to an Afar. The flip side is that it risks aggravating Afar grievances (see Ethnic Dynamics below), but from the perspective of the ruling clan, it preserves their long-held dominance.
• Preservation of Elite Interests and Patronage Networks: A more cynical but realistic motivation is the protection of the elite’s economic interests and the patronage system built around Guelleh. After 26 years in power, President Guelleh sits atop a well-entrenched network of political patrons, business monopolies, and even family enterprises that have thrived under his administration. These range from control over port operations and logistics (a lucrative sector given Djibouti’s strategic location and foreign base leases) to influence over government contracts and state finances. Were a new president to take over, even from within the regime, it could upset these networks – new loyalties might form, or anti-corruption pressures could mount. By extending Guelleh’s tenure, the current elite coalition secures its continued access to state resources and economic rents. High-level officials and business allies can be assured that their contracts, concessions, and positions remain safe under the same leadership. Furthermore, many in Guelleh’s inner circle likely fear loss of protection if power changes hands; some could face legal or financial scrutiny in a post-Guelleh era. Thus, self-preservation is a powerful motivator. The constitutional change guarantees personal and class interests are safeguarded, reinforcing what observers like Alexis Mohamed describe as an increasingly kleptocratic or “clientelist” style of governance that benefits a select few. In summary, the amendment is as much about guarding elite privilege as it is about national stability – the two are intertwined in Djibouti’s context.
• Lack of a Clear Successor / Power Vacuum Concerns: An underlying motivation related to continuity is the absence of a clear successor within the ruling establishment. At 77, Guelleh’s potential exit has loomed in recent years, but no single heir-apparent has been publicly groomed or accepted by all factions of the regime. Guelleh’s rule has been so personalized that the prospect of his departure raises fears of infighting among power brokers or even military intervention. Indeed, Djibouti experienced rumors of a coup plot in 2022, reflecting jitters about stability and loyalty at the top. By removing the age barrier, Guelleh can remain in office and buy time to manage succession on his own terms – or indefinitely delay it. This motivation is essentially about preventing a power vacuum. As long as Guelleh remains the unifying figure, the various elements of the regime (security forces, clan elders, business magnates) stay aligned. The amendment gives the regime breathing room to perhaps quietly plan a transition in the future, but without the immediate pressure of the 2026 deadline. In the interim, it avoids a scenario where multiple ambitious figures could destabilize the system by jockeying for position. In short, keeping the status quo leader is viewed as safer than confronting the unknowns of a transition.

In summary, the push to abolish the age limit was driven by a confluence of factors: the regime’s desire to project continuity and stability, the intent to maintain the ethno-political hierarchy, the imperative to protect entrenched elite interests, and the need to avert a succession crisis. All these motivations align around one outcome – enabling President Guelleh to continue ruling and thereby preserving the core interests of those in power.

Ethnic Dynamics: Issa Majority vs. Afar Minority

Ethnic considerations are crucial to understanding both support and opposition to the constitutional amendment within Djibouti. The country’s population (around one million) is primarily divided between the Issa-Somali majority (part of the broader Somali/Daarood clan family) and the Afar minority, along with smaller Arab and other groups. Since independence in 1977, the presidency has been held by an Issa Somali (first Hassan Gouled Aptidon, then his relative Ismaïl Omar Guelleh), while Afars have often been given secondary positions like Prime Minister or Assembly President as part of an unwritten power-sharing balance. This arrangement has left the Issa firmly in control of the state’s apex, breeding resentment among some Afars. The recent move to allow Guelleh an indefinite presidency thus plays into longstanding Issa–Afar dynamics.

Within the power structure, members of both ethnic groups formally supported the amendment – but this reflects the co-optation of Afar elites into the regime rather than true pluralism. For instance, Assembly Speaker Dileita Mohamed Dileita is ethnically Afar, yet he was a vocal proponent of lifting the age limit (even claiming 80% of the population supports it) Dileita is a veteran politician who served as Prime Minister (2001–2013) and has been a loyal ally of Guelleh. His role illustrates how the regime incorporates some Afar figures to showcase inclusivity, even as real power remains with the Issa core. The Afar-led faction of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) that joined the government in the 1990s likewise holds a few parliamentary seats within the UMP coalition. These pro-regime Afars toed the line and voted for the amendment, aligning with the Issa majority in parliament. In short, within official circles, there was no visible ethnic split on this measure – the Issa and allied Afar politicians unanimously backed Guelleh’s bid to stay in power. This unity is largely manufactured by the one-party dominance; dissenting Afar voices have been either repressed or marginalized from institutions.

Among the broader Afar community and opposition, however, the abolition of the age limit is likely viewed with dismay as it further cements Issa hegemony. The Afar have a history of opposition: the FRUD rebellion (1991–1994) was sparked by Afar grievances over exclusion from power, and while a peace accord brought some Afar into governance, a radical faction of FRUD continues a low-level insurgency to this day. As recently as October 2022, armed FRUD rebels attacked an army barracks in the Afar-majority north (Tadjourah region), killing several soldiers and taking hostages. They claim to fight the “Issa-dominated system” under President Guelleh. Moves that extend Issa rule – such as enabling Guelleh’s life presidency – can inflame these sentiments. While the average Afar civilian in Djibouti cannot freely protest (due to the authoritarian climate), diaspora Afar activists and opposition groups have decried Guelleh’s prolonged rule as detrimental to ethnic balance. They argue that political openings are continually shut, denying the Afar (and indeed any non-Issa) a chance at true executive power. The opposition boycotts of elections in 2013, 2018, and 2023 often had ethnic undercurrents, as many opposition leaders (though not exclusively Afar) saw the system as stacked against them.

It’s worth noting that not all opposition to Guelleh is ethnic – there are Issa dissidents as well, such as some within the Issa sub-clans or businessmen like Abdourahman Boreh in exile. However, ethnicity overlaps with politics in Djibouti: the ruling RPP/UMP is rooted in the Issa community, whereas the strongest challenges (electoral or armed) often have come from Afar quarters. The age-limit amendment essentially signals to Afar opponents that the status quo will continue indefinitely, dampening any hope that 2026 might have been an opportunity for change or a negotiated transition. This could potentially deepen Afar alienation. For example, the president of the opposition-affiliated Ligue Djiboutienne des Droits Humains (LDDH), Omar Ali Ewado (an Afar human rights activist), reacted by warning that the revision “prepares a presidency for life” for Guelleh and appealed for a “peaceful democratic transition” instead. Such calls highlight the desire among many Afars (and other disaffected citizens) for an end to Issa/Somali domination of the highest office.

In daily governance, ethnic relations in Djibouti are usually calm on the surface, but there have been periodic clashes and tensions that mirror political exclusion. For instance, ethnic clashes between Issa and Afar communities erupted in Djibouti city in 2021 and 2022, partly fueled by spillover from an Afar-Issa conflict in neighboring Ethiopia’s Sitti zone. These incidents resulted in property destruction and highlighted the fragility of ethnic coexistence when political grievances simmer. By entrenching the rule of one ethnic-backed regime further, the amendment could risk aggravating these tensions if not accompanied by outreach or power-sharing gestures. The regime likely calculates, however, that its mix of co-option and coercion will keep a lid on ethnic dissent: key Afar elites remain on its side, and security forces can suppress any unrest.

In conclusion, ethnic dynamics played an implicit role in the age-limit saga. The Issa-majority leadership unanimously supported the change to benefit their leader and maintain their dominance, while Afar voices of opposition (mostly outside the formal system) view the development as another sign of political marginalization. The amendment itself was not framed in ethnic terms by the government – it was justified with “stability” rhetoric for the whole nation – but its effect is to extend a political order that one group overwhelmingly controls. This underscores that in Djibouti’s internal politics, questions of who holds power are inseparable from ethnic context. The longevity of Guelleh’s rule, now set to continue, symbolizes the enduring ascendancy of the Issa clan, and it remains to be seen whether Afar discontent will stay muted or find new expression in response.

Political, Social, and Institutional Consequences

The abolition of the presidential age limit in Djibouti carries significant implications for the country’s political future, social fabric, and institutional integrity:

• Political Impact: The immediate political consequence is the indefinite extension of incumbent rule. By law, President Guelleh can now run again in 2026 and potentially continue winning highly controlled elections thereafter. This entrenches a de facto one-man regime, moving Djibouti even closer to overt autocracy. Any prospect for leadership renewal or political alternation has been postponed indefinitely. The opposition – already weak and largely excluded – faces the reality that the playing field remains fundamentally unfair. This could further demoralize electoral opposition parties, leading them to continue boycotting elections they deem hopeless, as they did in 2023. Some opposition activists have likened Djibouti’s situation to a monarchy or “presidency for life,” especially with Guelleh’s family/clan so entrenched. Politically, this move may also concentrate power even more in the presidency: knowing he effectively has no expiry date, Guelleh might feel even less incentive to compromise or consider reforms. Any internal dissent within the ruling party could be stifled by the knowledge that the patriarch isn’t leaving soon. On the other hand, the risk of an eventually sudden transition (due to health or other unforeseen issues) could become a taboo topic, which is dangerous – the longer a leader stays, the harder the eventual succession may be. There is also a regional political impact: Djibouti joins the ranks of African states that have removed constitutional constraints to prolong a leader’s rule (akin to Uganda’s removal of age limits in 2017 for Museveni, or Cameroon’s scrapping of term limits for Biya). This could set a discouraging example in the Horn of Africa, although Djibouti’s neighbors (like Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki or Ethiopia’s former leaders) are themselves no strangers to long tenures.
• Social Impact: Socially, the amendment could breed public cynicism and frustration, especially among Djibouti’s youth. Over 70% of the population is under 35 (the country has a very young demographic profile), meaning most Djiboutians have never known a leader other than Guelleh. Issues like unemployment, high cost of living, and limited freedoms already cause quiet discontent. Seeing the constitution changed once again to favor the incumbent may reinforce a sense of powerlessness among citizens. That said, open public outcry within Djibouti is muted by heavy-handed security measures. In the aftermath of the parliamentary vote, expressions of dissent have mostly surfaced on social media, where younger Djiboutians and diaspora voices vent frustration. However, as Horn of Africa expert Sonia Le Gouriellec observed, inside the country the opposition has “no space to express itself” due to repression. Small-scale protests are typically met with swift arrests. Thus, while many citizens likely oppose lifelong rule in private, it’s unlikely to translate into immediate street demonstrations under the current climate. Another social consequence is the potential for deepening ethnic mistrust (as discussed above). Afar communities might feel a renewed sense of exclusion, which can strain social cohesion. Additionally, by concentrating political power, the regime has arguably neglected socio-economic development for much of the population – a trend that could worsen if accountability further erodes. On the positive side (from a stability perspective), some Djiboutians, especially from the president’s clan or beneficiaries of the system, might genuinely support Guelleh staying, believing it averts chaos. The government claims “more than 80% of the population supports” the removal of the age limit – a figure that is dubious but indicates the regime’s narrative that society is content. In reality, the social outcome is a populace that remains largely voiceless, with a growing generational divide between an aging leadership and a young citizenry.
• Institutional Impact: Institutionally, this amendment is another blow to the credibility of Djibouti’s constitutional framework. It demonstrates that constitutional provisions can be altered at will to suit the incumbent, undermining the very purpose of having rules like age or term limits. The separation of powers in Djibouti is further blurred – the legislature’s unanimous vote underlines its subservience to the executive, rather than any genuine check or debate. The judiciary (e.g., the Constitutional Council) was silent on this change, unsurprisingly, as it is not independent. In effect, rule of law is weakened when the supreme law is seen as malleable clay in the hands of those in power. This sets a precedent that any constitutional safeguard can be reversed if it inconveniences the leadership. The notion of constitutionalism – that certain principles should be above the whims of one leader – suffers. Also, bypassing a referendum, while legal, dodges a test of popular legitimacy; it shows the regime’s preference for controlled outcomes over democratic legitimacy. Another institutional consequence is on the electoral system: the 2026 presidential election will proceed with the incumbent eligible, which likely means another heavily managed electoral exercise with a pre-determined result (Guelleh was officially re-elected with 97% in 2021). This could further erode citizens’ trust in the voting process and institutions like the electoral commission. Moreover, internal regime institutions like the ruling party’s mechanisms for leadership selection are rendered moot – the party will simply rally behind the same candidate again rather than conduct any genuine internal contest or renewal. Finally, there’s an impact on the military and security institutions: they have long pledged loyalty to Guelleh; extending his rule keeps their command structure and allegiances intact. But it also means these forces remain oriented around an individual rather than a constitutional order, which is a hallmark of personalized regimes. Should an eventual succession occur, those institutions may face turbulence adjusting loyalty, which is a longer-term concern. In sum, the institutional norm in Djibouti is now clearly that the constitution exists to serve the ruler, not to constrain him – a reality that weakens the integrity of governance.

Reactions: Inside Djibouti, direct public criticism is limited due to fear, but notable local actors have spoken out. The LDDH’s president, Omar Ali Ewado, condemned the amendment and warned that it cements a life presidency, urging instead a peaceful transition to democracy . His statement reflects the sentiment of many civil society observers that this path forecloses any hope for democratic change if left unchallenged. Former presidential advisor Alexis Mohamed’s denunciation of the parliament’s legitimacy (calling it a mere puppet) and his call for a referendum indicate splits even within the elite – his resignation in September 2025 was a rare crack in the public facade of regime unanimity. The broader opposition in exile and online has uniformly criticized the move; for example, Djiboutian dissidents on platforms like X (Twitter) and Facebook lambasted the idea of an increasingly gerontocratic leadership clinging to power while the country’s young population faces unemployment and poverty. However, the regime has thus far weathered these criticisms. State media and pro-government voices have tried to cast the constitutional change as popular and necessary, downplaying any discontent. Given Djibouti’s strategic importance (hosting U.S., French, Chinese, and other military bases), international reaction has been muted – major powers are more concerned with stability and their interests than with Djibouti’s internal democratic norms. This international tolerance, combined with domestic repression, means the short-term consequence is that the regime likely feels emboldened to proceed without concessions. The age limit saga thus encapsulates a pattern: constitutional checks are removed, power is further centralized, and critical voices are left sounding alarms largely from the sidelines.

Djibouti’s recent removal of the presidential age limit illustrates how internal dynamics – from political calculations and ethnic considerations to elite interests – converge to sustain an entrenched leadership. The legislative process behind the amendment was swift and orchestrated, a testament to the dominance of President Guelleh’s ruling party and the weakness of institutional opposition. The change principally benefits Guelleh, enabling him to extend his 22+ year rule into a new decade, and it secures the continued influence of the clique around him. Behind the official discourse of “stability” lie motivations of maintaining continuity, averting succession uncertainties, and keeping power firmly within the incumbent’s ethnic-majority circle and loyal elite. The Issa majority backing Guelleh and co-opted Afar allies have closed ranks to support the measure, even as disenfranchised Afar and opposition voices decry it as a step toward life-long autocracy. The consequences for Djibouti’s polity are profound: a further drift from democratic norms, potential exacerbation of ethnic grievances, and the hollowing out of constitutional credibility. As Djibouti heads toward the 2026 election, it does so with the rules yet again rewritten to favor the status quo.

In the words of a Djiboutian human rights leader, the regime is “preparing a presidency for life” – a development likely to shape Djibouti’s political landscape for years to come. Unless internal reformist pressures or external influences induce a change of course, the small Horn of Africa nation seems set to continue down the path of personalized rule. For now, President Guelleh and his supporters have achieved their immediate aim, but the long-term stability of this arrangement remains an open question. With socio-economic challenges mounting and an ever-younger populace, the promise of indefinite continuity may eventually run up against the demands for change. How the regime manages that tension – between political continuity and the need for renewal – will determine whether Djibouti can avoid the pitfalls that often accompany prolonged one-man rule. For the moment, however, the die is cast: the constitution has been amended, the age barrier has fallen, and Djibouti’s 77-year-old leader stands poised to extend his decades-long presidency into the foreseeable future.