The Austrian manufacturer of premium optical devices Swarovski Optik, a subdivision of the Swarovski company known for its jewelry, continues to supply optical sights for sniper rifles to Russia. Deliveries continue despite the war in Ukraine and Austria’s policy of “permanent neutrality.” The Austrian authorities refused to supply weapons to Kyiv, citing neutrality — yet at the same time they continued importing into Russia dozens of Steyr Mannlicher rifles and pistols, which are used in the war in Ukraine.
Open-source investigations based on Russian customs data and battlefield videos confirm that Russian fighters in Ukraine are using Western high-end ‘hunting’ scopes, including products from Swarovski Optik. Dozens of videos show Russian troops mounting Swarovski and other Western brands on rifles at the front, while import statistics reveal that Russia brought in around $173 million worth of such optics in 2022–2023 alone. Although Swarovski Optik officially exited the Russian market, its products continue to surface in the war zone via parallel import schemes.”
According to customs data, since the beginning of the war at least 90 optical sights produced by Swarovski Optik Vertriebs GmbH have been imported into Russia. Most of them (57) were delivered in 2023. The total value of the imported sights is almost 21 million rubles.
Key points:
• The Austrian company Swarovski Optik, known for its jewelry and premium optics, continues to supply sniper rifle scopes to Russia even after the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine. According to customs data, at least 90 optical sights produced by Swarovski Optik Vertriebs GmbH have been imported into Russia since the invasion, worth nearly 21 million rubles in total. Formally, these deliveries occur against the backdrop of Austria’s policy of “permanent neutrality,” under which Vienna refused to supply weapons to Ukraine, yet did not halt the import of high-tech optical products into Russia.
In Russian customs documents, importers declare Swarovski sights as products “for hunting, tourism, and sport shooting,” allegedly not classified as military goods. However, military analysts note that this is high-grade optics suitable for installation on combat weapons without any technical limitations. There are no obstacles to mounting such scopes on military rifles. This represents a classic export-control evasion scheme: a formally civilian designation makes it possible to bypass stricter controls, while the actual end-use is military.
• Swarovski Optik products belong to the expensive, elite segment: a typical scope costs approximately $3,000–$5,000, making them inaccessible to ordinary hunters. The company’s products are considered among the highest-quality in the world — on par with Germany’s Carl Zeiss — and equally suitable for sport shooting and sniper use. This means that the real users of such optics are most likely not civilian shooters, but elite units of Russian special services and the military.
• The high cost and quality of Swarovski sights indicate that the primary beneficiaries of these supplies are elite FSB special-purpose units (“Alpha”, “Vympel”) and GRU Spetsnaz involved in the war in Ukraine. Given the nature of their tasks, such units have priority access to the best optics, which increases accuracy and sniper effectiveness on the battlefield. Tracking the use of these scopes at the front is difficult: rifles and equipment are camouflaged, and Russian forces deliberately conceal the origin and models of their gear.
• After the start of the full-scale invasion, the logistics of Swarovski deliveries to Russia changed but did not stop. Previously, products were shipped directly from Austria; now the optics are imported via intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates.
In 2024, the intermediary was BMH Equipment LLC, and in 2023 — Bynuna Military & Hunting Equipment Trading LLC, both registered in Abu Dhabi. In Russia, the importer is LLC “Center for Electronic Commerce” (CEC Group), demonstrating a typical scheme of “re-packaging” European goods through Middle Eastern intermediaries to reduce political risks and dilute the responsibility of the original manufacturer.
• The CEC Group not only imports Western optics but also produces its own optical and thermal-imaging devices under the Fortuna and Arkon brands, officially declaring that their products are intended including for special-service personnel. Russian government procurement data show that the company has supplied its optics to military units associated with the FSB and SVR (foreign intelligence service). After 2022, CEC equipment began to be actively purchased for the front, and Z-bloggers repeatedly organized crowdfunding campaigns for Arkon and Fortuna thermal imagers and sights for Russian units in Ukraine.
• Advertisements for Swarovski sights are openly published in specialized Russian Telegram channels used by hunters and participants of the war against Ukraine alike. Russian sellers offer these scopes for 300,000–500,000 rubles, describing them as “extremely useful” for those hunting “trophies,” emphasizing accuracy, range, and stability under harsh conditions. The market thus openly demonstrates that the product is not merely ‘sporting’ or ‘touristic,’ but is being actively positioned and purchased as a tool for combatants.
• Swarovski Optik is not the only Western brand whose optics are present in Russia: the Russian market also offers scopes from the German companies Schmidt & Bender and Steiner, as well as Austria’s Kahles and America’s Nightforce. According to customs data, Kahles and Nightforce scopes are imported into Russia by LLC “Navigator,”which uses intermediaries in Turkey and Canada. Among Navigator’s partners is Lobaev Arms, a manufacturer of sniper rifles that supplies its weapons to the front.
Swarovski Optik is the Austrian high-end manufacturer of hunting and birding optics (rifle scopes, binoculars, spotting scopes). The broader Swarovski group announced in 2022–2023 that it had suspended, and then completely exited, its business in Russia “in accordance with current sanctions and trade restrictions.”
On paper, that means:
- No official Swarovski retail,
- No direct sales to Russian entities,
- No regular corporate presence.
Yet Russian customs data and open-source video evidence show that Swarovski Optik rifle scopes are still turning up in Russia and on Russian weapons in Ukraine.
How Swarovski Optik products still reach Russia
. Legacy channels and “frozen” official dealers
Before 2022, Swarovski Optik had official dealers in Russia. The company’s own dealer locator still lists Levsha Group Co. Ltd. in St Petersburg as a Swarovski Optik store (whether this page is fully up to date is unclear).
Those pre-war relationships matter because:
- Russian distributors and retailers know how to order, stock and market the brand.
- Some inventory was already inside Russia before the full-scale invasion and sanctions.
- Existing dealer networks are a ready-made infrastructure for parallel imports.
Even after official exit, these actors can:
- Import remaining stock from third countries,
- Re-label goods,
- Offer warranty/service locally, pretending nothing has changed.
2.2. Parallel imports via third countries
Investigations using Russian customs data show that in 2022–2023 Russia imported rifle scopes worth about 16 billion rubles (≈$173–180 million) from Western producers, including Leupold, Nightforce, Holosun and Swarovski Optik.
Key mechanisms:
- Routing through “friendly” intermediaries
Customs data and trade databases show exports of optical accessories from Austria to Kazakhstan and other Eurasian states where controls are looser – for example, textile scope cases from Swarovski Optik to Kazakhstan.- From there, goods can be re-exported to Russia as “Kazakh” or “regional” stock.
- This meshes with the broader pattern already track: Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE, Armenia as sanctions-bypass hubs.
- Use of non-EU intermediaries / shell companies
In a parallel case, a German optics firm was caught supplying Russia through a Turkish shell company, which then shipped scopes onward to Russian customers.- Even if this specific case is not Swarovski, it illustrates the standard playbook: EU manufacturer → friendly middleman (Turkey/UAE/China) → Russian importer → frontline units.
- Mislabeling as civilian “hunting optics”
In the customs system, these scopes are declared as hunting/sporting goods, not military items. Important Stories and derivative reports stress that the declared purpose is “installation of sights on hunting weapons,” even though dozens of videos show them on assault rifles and sniper rifles in Ukraine.- HS codes and product descriptions are chosen to sit just outside the most tightly controlled categories or to exploit delays in sanctions updates.
Bottom line: even if Swarovski Optik itself has cut off direct sales, its products can still move through a gray network of traders in “friendly” jurisdictions plus Russian wholesalers using loopholes.
Domestic distribution: who brings Swarovski optics into Russia?
Customs-based investigation highlights two main Russian importers/wholesalers for Western scopes overall:
- Pointer (St Petersburg) – imported around 50,000 scopes from Holosun alone for about 3 billion rubles.
- Navigator (Moscow) – imported scopes worth around 400 million rubles, including thousands of Holosun products, and a total of about 4.5 billion rubles of “hunting goods.”
Alongside these large wholesalers, you have a dense ecosystem of “hunting optics” web-shops that openly advertise Swarovski Optik rifle scopes with delivery across Russia:
- OpticsTrade / opticstrade.com – Russian-language site offering Swarovski scopes with Russia-wide shipping.
- Custom-Guns, which explicitly lists “Swarovski (Austria)” scopes with delivery in Russia.
- Teplovizory.com, marketing a “full line of optics from Swarovski – 29 models” available with assistance in selection and nationwide shipping.
- Vortex-Russia, Svarog Market, Premium-Optics and similar shops advertising large assortments of Western optics, including Swarovski.
These companies:
- Position themselves as civilian hunting and sport shooting suppliers,
- Legitimize import flows under the cover of “hunting equipment”,
- Act as last-mile distributors for both civilian and military end-users.
Who actually uses Swarovski Optik products inside Russia?
There are three main user groups.
Russian military and paramilitary units in Ukraine
Open-source footage and the Important Stories investigation show that Russian fighters on the Ukrainian front are using Western-made hunting scopes, including Swarovski Optik:
- Videos on YouTube and Telegram show Russian snipers and assault troops with Leupold, Nightforce, Holosun and Swarovski Optik scopes mounted on their rifles.
- A portion of the imported optics is clearly ending up on the battlefield, despite being imported as “civilian” goods.
IStories and follow-up reports also point out that:
- Some Western scopes, bought by wholesalers such as Pointer and Navigator, were then supplied to Russian arms manufacturers like Orsis (“Promtekhnologiya”) and to hunting shops like “Hunt,” owned by producers of Bespoke rifle brands.
- A company linked to former Wagner personnel reportedly obtained Western scopes via these channels.
So the path is roughly:
EU/third-country stock → Pointer/Navigator → gun manufacturers & specialist hunting shops → front-line units (army, Rosgvardia, PMCs, volunteer battalions).
4.2. Russian security services and special units
High-end glass like Swarovski Optik is expensive; that makes it attractive not just to hobby hunters but to:
- FSB, Rosgvardia and Interior Ministry special units with sniper and marksman roles,
- Elite police and anti-terror units that historically used imported optics even before 2022.
There is less open footage of these units than of regular army in Ukraine, but:
- Their budget and status make premium European optics a logical choice.
- Historically, Russian law-enforcement snipers have used Western brands (Schmidt & Bender, Zeiss, Kahles, etc.); Swarovski fits into that procurement culture.
Civilian hunters, sport shooters and “near-military” users
Finally, the classical hunting and sport shooting segment:
- Wealthy hunters in Russia’s regions (Siberia, Far East, North Caucasus)
- Long-range shooting clubs and practical shooting enthusiasts.
- Private security and “bodyguard training” schools.
These users provide the political cover:
- As long as there is a sizeable civilian market, Russian authorities can claim that imports are for “sports and hunting,”
- Retailers can show genuine civilian sales, which makes scrutiny harder,
- Some of these individuals later join or support volunteer units, bringing their personal weapons and optics to the front.
- Officially, Swarovski has left Russia and abides by EU sanctions.
- In practice, Swarovski Optik products still flow into Russia because:
- Parallel imports through Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE and other intermediaries exploit weak export controls and vague product classifications.
- Russian wholesalers (Pointer, Navigator) and a broad network of “hunting optics” stores act as internal smuggling and distribution hubs.
- End-users include both civilians and combatants, with clear evidence that some of these scopes are mounted on rifles used by Russian forces in Ukraine.
- Sanctions gaps: high-end optics labeled as “hunting” gear fall into gray zones of export control, and no systematic mechanism yet exists to:
- track parallel re-exports from Central Asia and the Middle East,
- or to hold original manufacturers to a due-diligence standard on indirect flows.
Sanctions-policy recommendations: stopping Western optics through Kazakhstan / Turkey / UAE
Close the “hunting optics” loophole in EU/US control lists
Problem: High-end rifle scopes are typically declared as civilian hunting/sport optics, even when they are functionally indistinguishable from military sniper optics. That lets exports to “friendly” intermediaries pass, and from there they are re-exported to Russia.
Recommendations:
- Expand dual-use / military lists to explicitly include:
- variable-magnification rifle scopes above a certain optical performance (e.g. ≥6× magnification, certain light transmission, integrated rangefinding / ballistic turrets);
- scopes with integrated electronics (rangefinders, ballistic computers, night/thermal capability).
- Create a new EU & US “Category: Precision Sporting Optics” with:
- licensing requirement for any export to high-risk jurisdictions (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Turkey, UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, etc.);
- presumption of denial if the end-user or distributor has re-export links to Russia or Belarus.
- Ban exports to Russian/Belarusian nationals abroad (including intermediaries registered in third countries) when it concerns high-end optics.
This turns “it’s just hunting gear” into a non-argument.
Tighten controls on re-exports from Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE
Problem: Austria or Germany may not export to Russia directly, but the same goods go to Almaty, Istanbul or Dubai and then quietly move to Russia.
Recommendations:
- EU/US “high-risk hub list”
Publish and regularly update a short list of jurisdictions that are major sanctions-bypass hubs (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Turkey, UAE, possibly Serbia, Hong Kong). - Mandatory “no re-export to Russia/Belarus” clauses
- Make these clauses standard in all export licenses for listed optics to high-risk hubs.
- Require the importer to acknowledge liability under EU/US secondary sanctions if they re-export.
- Mirror measures with local authorities:
- Negotiate memoranda of understanding with Kazakhstan, Turkey and UAE customs about:
- flagged HS codes (optical sights, night vision, thermal imaging);
- mandatory additional documentation for onward export;
- shared watchlists of Russian-linked trading houses.
- Offer technical assistance (risk-profiling software, training) in exchange for real enforcement.Red-flag patterns in customs data:
- Surging imports of Western optics into Kazakhstan/Turkey/UAE disconnected from their domestic hunting market size;
- Short dwell time in warehouses before re-export to Russia or to shell firms in Armenia/Georgia.
- Negotiate memoranda of understanding with Kazakhstan, Turkey and UAE customs about:
Secondary sanctions on key Russian wholesalers and foreign facilitators
Problem: Parallel imports work because Russian wholesaler networks (e.g. big “hunting optics” importers) know how to order, pay, and distribute, while foreign shell companies provide cover.
Recommendations:
- Designate major Russian optics importers and retailers that:
- sell Western scopes in bulk,
- are linked to arms manufacturers, PMCs, or known front-line supply chains.
- Identify and sanction foreign shell companies in Turkey/UAE/Central Asia that:
- have no meaningful local retail presence,
- import large quantities of EU/US optics,
- have payment/ownership ties to Russian entities.
- Apply “menu” secondary sanctions:
- Asset freezes and transaction bans for any EU/US person doing business with those companies;
- Banking sector pressure (SWIFT messaging alerts, compliance notices) to cut them off from dollar/euro clearing.
This makes being a middleman for Russian optics not just profitable, but dangerous.
4. Corporate due-diligence obligations for optics manufacturers
Problem: Companies like Swarovski Optik can truthfully say “we exited Russia,” but do minimal work to police where their products go after they leave the factory.
Recommendations:
- Legally require “sanctions-sensitive sectors” (precision optics, machine tools, electronics) to:
- maintain an up-to-date map of distributors and sub-distributors down to the second tier;
- conduct enhanced due diligence on dealers in high-risk hubs;
- keep transaction-level data for exports to these hubs for a fixed period (e.g. 5–7 years).
- Mandatory “end-use monitoring plans” as a condition of export licenses:
- periodic audits of stock and sales by distributors in Kazakhstan/Turkey/UAE;
- right for EU/US authorities to inspect audit documentation;
- requirement to immediately report suspicious bulk orders or unusual routing.
- Civil and administrative penalties on manufacturers that:
- ignore clear red flags (e.g. one “hunting shop” in Almaty ordering volumes exceeding the entire national hunting market);
- keep supplying dealers already flagged by EU/US authorities or NGOs as sanctions-evaders.
This shifts responsibility from “we shipped legally” to “we must ensure we’re not arming an aggressor via loopholes.”
5. Financial and shipping choke-points
Problem: Even with better lists, goods still move if financiers and logistics operators look the other way.
Recommendations:
- Targeted banking guidance (“red flag typologies”):
- Large payments from small traders in Almaty/Istanbul/Dubai to EU optics producers using vague descriptions (“sporting goods,” “accessories”);
- Back-to-back letters of credit where the ultimate consignee is in Russia or Belarus;
- Repeated use of the same small banks in high-risk jurisdictions.
Banks should be required to:
- file suspicious activity reports,
- possibly block transactions until additional documentation is provided.Maritime & freight forwarder controls:
- Work with major logistics companies to identify shipments containing high-end optics and flag re-routing from high-risk hubs to Russia/Belarus;Include relevant HS codes in EU/US “items of concern” lists for carriers;
- Penalize carriers that systematically ignore suspicious patterns.
. Transparency and naming-and-shaming
Problem: Most of this trade survives because it is invisible to the public and even to many regulators.
Recommendations:
- Create a joint EU/US “Optics Leakage Watchlist”:
- publish an annual list of:
- high-risk distributors,
- known re-export routes,
- jurisdictions with poor enforcement.
- publish an annual list of:
- Support investigative journalism and OSINT projects:
- fund NGOs and research institutes that:
- scrape customs data,
- document optics on Russian weapons in Ukraine,
- trace serial numbers and dealers.
- Use their findings to inform sanctions designations and export-control adjustments.
- fund NGOs and research institutes that:
- Publicly call out states that under-enforce:
- quiet diplomacy first;
- if ineffective, explicit references in EU/US sanctions reports to the role of specific hubs in supplying Russia with Western optics.
Shining a light on the trade raises reputational costs for everyone involved.
. Integrate optics into broader Russia sanctions strategy
Finally, this should not be treated as a niche technical issue but as part of a systemic effort to cripple Russia’s battlefield overmatch in sensors and precision.
Recommendations:
- Treat precision optics, rangefinders, thermal imagers as strategic enablers on par with machine tools and microelectronics.
- Include them in:
- national Russia sanctions strategies,
- NATO / G7 coordination formats,
- regular “sanctions gap” reviews.
- Link Western optics leakage directly to:
- documented civilian casualties in Ukraine,
sniper and artillery effectiveness of Russian forces.
