Since 2015, Russia has emerged as the single most decisive external actor keeping the Assad regime in power. Its military intervention reversed rebel gains, secured key economic and military footholds, and allowed Moscow to dominate Syrian airspace. However, by 2024–2025, the Kremlin’s influence over Damascus has faced new constraints:
- Iranian deep penetration into Syrian security, paramilitary and religious structures,
- Chinese financial entry into reconstruction and logistics,
- and rising popular fatigue inside Syria with Assad’s economic paralysis, sanctions, and corruption.
In this environment, Russian planners have strong incentives to re-engineer political power inside Damascus without destabilizing the core Assad state. The most coherent strategy — from Moscow’s point of view — is not regime overthrow in the sense of removing the Assad family, but a controlled, pro-Assad “palace coup”: replacing certain figures inside the regime, ministries, intelligence portfolios or economic command networks to consolidate a decisively Russian-aligned governing bloc.
This kind of “internal coup” would not change Syria’s flag, ideology or ruling dynasty. It would change who commands real power and patronage networks, ensuring that Moscow — not Tehran — holds the critical levers inside the Syrian state.
Why Would Russia Consider a Pro-Assad Coup?
1.1 Countering Iran’s asymmetric takeover
Iran has expanded control over:
- militias (Liwa Fatemiyoun, Zainabiyoun, Hezbollah units),
- intelligence penetration (Mukhabarat cells loyal to Tehran),
- religious institutions and Shia conversion networks,
- and strategic territory around the Lebanese border and southern Damascus.
For Moscow, this is dangerous at multiple levels:
- Iran makes Syria less predictable,
- Tehran competes for command-and-control inside Syrian security services,
- and Iranian militias undermine Russia’s efforts to monopolize state coercion.
A pro-Assad internal “reconfiguration” would:
restore the primacy of formal state structures over Iranian proxy forces, replacing commanders and ministerial nodes currently controlled or influenced by Tehran.
Pre-empting post-Assad instability
As Assad ages and health rumors circulate periodically, Russia fears a succession crisis that could:
- empower Iranian militias,
- trigger a scramble for territorial control,
- or produce a power vacuum exploited by Turkey, Gulf actors, or jihadist remnants.
A controlled elite reshuffle before Assad exits the scene allows Moscow to create:
- a loyal transitional core,
- a military-intelligence leadership aligned with Russian doctrine,
- and a succession pathway acceptable to Moscow and the Syrian Alawite elite.
This is not regime change — it is regime stabilization under Russian supervision.
Economic leverage
Syria is entering a phase where reconstruction becomes the central prize:
- ports (Latakia, Tartus),
- electricity grids,
- grain infrastructure,
- phosphates,
- telecommunications,
- and LNG/energy nodes.
Russia wants Syrian structures to allocate concessions, licenses and revenue streams to Russian state and private networks without Iranian interference, Gulf sabotage, or unpredictable intra-elite rivalries.
A controlled coup helps Moscow:
discipline the elite and concentrate economic authority where Russia can capture rents and enforce contracts.
Mechanisms of a Pro-Assad Coup
Russia would never pursue a classic televised overthrow. The Kremlin prefers bureaucratic, intelligence and military realignment from within, minimizing visibility and risk.
Here are realistic operational mechanisms:
Strategic replacement inside the Mukhabarat
Moscow could quietly:
- remove pro-Iranian security chiefs,
- elevate GRU-friendly or Wagner-trained cadres,
- reorganize intelligence portfolios under a “national security reform.”
This is the most decisive arena because:
controlling intelligence = controlling Syria.
Cabinet restructuring under “reform” narrative
A coup from within may take the form of:
- a new prime minister or deputy prime minister,
- dismissal of finance, economy, interior or energy ministers,
- elevation of a “technocratic wing” loyal to Moscow.
None of this changes Assad’s position as head of state. It changes the command of money, coercion, and policy execution.
Military coordination “retraining”
Russia could:
- restructure command inside the Republican Guard, Air Defense and Special Forces,
- eliminate militia intermediaries loyal to Iran,
- re-embed Russian advisors in operational commands.
The public justification would be:
“modernization and anti-corruption.”
The real purpose: recentralizing force under Russian guidance.
Asset seizure and economic reallocation
Once elite reshuffling begins, Russia could pressure Damascus to:
- cancel or reassign Iranian-linked concessions,
- open Tartus/Latakia to expanded Russian basing,
- offer preferential contracts to Russian oil, construction, and telecom actors.
Behind the scenes, coercion happens via:
- blackmail files,
- sanctions relief promises,
- and personal security guarantees to selected Assad insiders.
Beneficiaries Inside Syria
A pro-Assad coup does not empower opposition. Instead, it benefits:
The Alawite military-technocratic wing
Especially:
- younger commanders tired of Iranian militia interference,
- officers trained by Russia,
- and networks aligned with formal state hierarchy.
Assad loyalists seeking internal stability
They prefer Russian patronage over Iran’s unpredictable militia structure, which threatens:
- elite monopoly,
- territorial cohesion,
- and succession planning.
Syria’s coastal business networks
Tartus/Latakia oligarchs prefer Russian involvement because:
- Russia protects state sovereignty,
- Iran competes in parallel markets,
- Chinese capital requires state discipline that Iran undermines.
Why Would Assad Accept It?
Counterintuitive, but rational:
- Assad keeps the presidency, symbols, and dynasty narrative.
- Russia protects him from Western escalation and from internal meltdown.
- Iran’s militias increasingly act independently, weakening state authority.
- A Russian “interior stabilization plan” allows Assad to remain ruler without losing sovereignty to Tehran.
This is why it is not regime change — it is regime consolidation in Assad’s favor.
Foreign Actors: Who Loses?
5Iran
The main loser.
A pro-Assad coup:
- reduces Iranian militia influence,
- limits economic extraction,
- threatens clerical and ideological penetration,
- and may dramatically shrink Hezbollah’s freedom of maneuver inside Syria.
Iran has strategic red lines:
- maintaining logistics to Lebanon,
- ideological recruitment,
- and protection of Shia religious institutions.
A Russian-backed leadership reshuffle risks Iranian retaliation, including assassination, militia uprisings or destabilization campaigns.
Turkey
Turkey is not directly harmed by a pro-Assad coup, but:
- a stronger Russian-controlled Syrian state could negotiate territorial integrity claims earlier than Ankara prefers,
- Turkish influence zones in Idlib and the north could face pressure,
- and Russia may later leverage Syria against Turkey’s NATO policy.
Gulf States
Saudi Arabia and UAE may quietly favor a reduction of Iranian dominance in Damascus, but are wary that a stabilized Russia-controlled Syria could:
- prolong Assad’s rule,
- block Gulf influence in reconstruction,
- and complicate Arab League diplomacy.
The United States
Washington faces a paradox:
- weak Assad = humanitarian crisis + jihadist risk,
- strong Assad under Russian control = permanent Russian foothold,
- Iranian control = increased Hezbollah threat.
A Russian-controlled “internal coup” that stabilizes the regime may entrench Moscow as the principal security guarantor, reducing U.S. leverage in:
- Syrian airspace,
- Israeli security calculations,
- and eastern Mediterranean posture.
Operational Risks for Russia
Even a controlled palace coup carries risks:
- Iranian intelligence infiltration could expose Russian plans.
- Iran-backed militias could launch revenge operations.
- Assassination of Moscow-aligned security commanders is plausible.
- Syrian elite could fracture if the redistribution of economic rents is too aggressive.
- If Assad feels threatened personally, cooperation could collapse.
Russia must ensure elite consensus, not just coercion.
Consequences for Regional Security
Consolidation of a Russian strategic bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean
A coup that strengthens Assad’s chain of command under Russian oversight means:
- long-term naval basing in Tartus,
- air defense expansion,
- and potential integration into Russian Middle East operational planning.
Reduced Iranian regional leverage
Limiting Iran inside Syria weakens:
- Hezbollah supply corridors,
- Iranian expeditionary strategy,
- and Tehran’s deterrence posture against Israel.
New geopolitical bargaining space for Moscow
Once internal Syrian stability is secured, Russia can:
- negotiate with Turkey over buffer zones,
- negotiate with Israel over airstrike rules,
- and negotiate with Gulf monarchies over reconstruction access.
Russia becomes the gatekeeper, not just Assad’s protector.
Is It Realistic?
A pro-Assad coup is far more realistic than Western-backed regime change because:
- it protects Assad,
- preserves the Alawite state,
- aligns with Russian long-term basing,
- and counterbalances Iran.
It is surgical internal engineering, not revolution.
Russia’s most coherent long-term strategy in Syria is not replacing Assad, but reorganizing the regime from within, realigning intelligence, military, and economic power with Moscow while constraining Iran. This constitutes a pro-Assad internal coup, designed to:
- stabilize succession,
- centralize coercion,
- and secure Russian geopolitical dominance in the Levant.
Such a controlled elite reshuffle could fundamentally transform Syria’s post-war architecture, redefine Iran’s regional reach, and entrench Russia as the primary arbiter of power, conflict management, reconstruction flows, and military access in the Eastern Mediterranean.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: tHE SYRIAN “PRO-ASSAD COUP” VS. tHE YANUKOVYCH REINSTATEMENT PLAN
Nature of Political Engineering
Syria
- A pro-Assad coup is designed as internal regime restructuring.
- The head of state (Assad) remains.
- Moscow intends to replace inner-ring elites, military command and economic controllers without overthrowing the ruling dynasty.
- The goal is regime optimization under Russia’s guidance, not regime change.
In essence:
Russia wants to improve the regime from within, not replace it.
Ukraine (Yanukovych plan, 2022)
- Intended full external regime replacement.
- Moscow assumed the Ukrainian government would collapse if Kyiv was quickly seized.
- Yanukovych would be flown into Ukraine as a restored “constitutional president”, providing nominal legality to a Russia-installed occupation government.
- It was a classic forced regime change, not internal stabilization.
In essence:
Russia wanted to reverse history and reinstall a deposed, illegitimate actor as a proxy ruler.
Comparative Legitimacy Strategy
Syria
- Moscow does not need international recognition changes: Assad already has formal sovereignty and a U.N. seat.
- By working “inside the palace,” Russia benefits from continuity of legal identity, avoiding sanctions escalation and diplomatic disputes over legitimacy.
Legitimacy formula:
Keep Assad → Adjust internal power → Preserve international recognition.
Ukraine
- Yanukovych had:
- zero domestic legitimacy,
- zero constitutional authority in practice,
- was seen by Ukrainians as a fugitive responsible for killings during Euromaidan.
Russia’s plan was to manufacture legality by claiming:
“The rightful president has returned to request Russian peacekeeping assistance.”
This would mimic:
- Soviet doctrine in Czechoslovakia (1968),
- U.S. doctrine in Grenada or Panama (1980s),
- but with no real domestic acceptance.
It depended entirely on:
- shock, paralysis, rapid occupation,
- and moral disorientation of Ukrainian elites.
Once Kyiv did not collapse, the narrative died instantly.
Military Dependency
Syria
- The pro-Assad coup does not depend on conquest.
- Moscow already controls:
- airspace,
- key bases,
- strategic intelligence channels,
- and the regime’s survival mechanisms.
- Russia can re-engineer Syrian elites without major battlefield risk, because the state apparatus is stable and loyal.
Operational model:
Political consolidation is a post-war management tool, not tied to battlefield outcomes.
Ukraine
- The Yanukovych scenario was 100% conditional on lightning military success:
- seizure of Kyiv,
- decapitation of Zelensky’s government,
- collapse of national cohesion,
- destruction of Ukrainian communications.
No victory → no political engineering.
Therefore:
The entire plan was a political appendix to blitzkrieg.
Once Russia failed to take Kyiv, the coup narrative became politically useless and strategically absurd.
Internal Power Ecosystems
Syria
- Assad regime is hierarchical, authoritarian, centrally controlled.
- Elite politics revolve around:
- Alawite security structures,
- military patronage,
- intelligence clans.
- Moscow can surgically replace nodes inside a coherent authoritarian machine.
Ukraine
- The Ukrainian political ecosystem is pluralistic, decentralized, resilient, and nationally mobilized.
- Post-2014:
- oligarchs, civil society, military elites, media, regional power centers — all moved decisively away from Russian influence.
- There was no single point of internal control that Moscow could co-opt.
Therefore:
What works in Damascus cannot work in Kyiv.
Popular Legitimacy & National Narratives
Syria
- Assad has significant support inside his core constituencies, even if unpopular nationally.
- State identity is tied to continuity of the Assad dynasty, especially in the military and bureaucracy.
- A pro-Assad coup does not challenge state mythology — it reinforces it.
Ukraine
- Yanukovych is a symbol of national betrayal.
- Attempting to restore him would radicalize resistance, not pacify the country.
- Instead of consolidating power, it would trigger asymmetric underground warfare and mass mobilization, even more intense than 2022.
The idea that Ukrainians would accept Yanukovych after eight years of war and de-Russification was a catastrophic misreading of political psychology.
Role of Foreign Patrons
Syria
- Russia and Iran compete inside a regime already dependent on foreign patrons.
- Assad’s own survival is externally guaranteed.
- Internal restructuring is consistent with Syrian experience of foreign-managed statecraft.
Ukraine
- Post-2014 Ukraine became strongly Western-aligned:
- U.S., UK, EU, Poland, Baltics support,
- full societal rejection of Russia,
- and a national military that refuses political surrender.
No domestic actor could legitimize a pro-Russian reinstatement.
7) Strategic Payoff
Syria
If a pro-Assad coup succeeds, Moscow gains:
- full control over intelligence apparatus,
- primacy in reconstruction economy,
- disciplined military hierarchy,
- leverage over Iran,
- stable long-term basing in the Mediterranean.
This is feasible, rational, incremental, and geopolitically valuable.
Ukraine
If Yanukovych had been restored (in Moscow’s imagination), Russia expected:
- legal justification for occupation,
- rapid surrender of Ukrainian forces,
- international confusion,
- fragmentation of NATO response,
- and recognition negotiations.
None of this was realistic, because it required complete occupation and political demoralization — conditions that never materialized.
Outcome Certainty
Syria
A controlled palace coup is high probability, low visibility, and strategically sustainable.
Ukraine
The Yanukovych scenario was high fantasy, dependent on:
- false military assumptions,
- Kremlin propaganda bias,
- and total misreading of Ukrainian agency.
Once war plans failed at Hostomel and Kyiv, the political operation collapsed before existing.
Big Geopolitical Lesson
Russia excels at internal engineering inside dependent authoritarian states (Syria). It fails catastrophically when trying to impose externally-manufactured legitimacy inside democratic or mobilized national states (Ukraine).
This is a structural intelligence conclusion:
- authoritarian dependency enables surgical internal coups,
- pluralistic nationalism destroys puppet reinstatement strategies.
| Metric | Pro-Assad Coup (Syria) | Yanukovych Reinstatement (Ukraine) |
| Mechanism | Internal reshuffle | External regime replacement |
| Legitimacy | Existing presidential authority | No domestic legitimacy |
| Dependency | Russia dominates regime | Russia has zero societal leverage |
| Military requirement | Minimal, incremental | Total occupation |
| Feasibility | High | Near-zero |
| Strategic payoff | Long-term Levant foothold | Unrealistic geopolitical fantasy |
| Risk | Iranian pushback | Full-scale insurgency and Western escalation |
Key Judgments
- Russia’s internal, pro-Assad “palace coup” engineering in Syria is relatively feasible but carries high risk of Iranian backlash and intra-regime fragmentation if mishandled.
- Russia’s Yanukovych reinstatement concept in Ukraine (2022) was structurally unworkable from the outset and collapsed as soon as the blitzkrieg failed; its main risks lie in strategic miscalculation, reputational damage, and long-term hardening of Ukrainian and Western opposition to Russia.
- Core contrast:
- In Syria, failure would mean loss of leverage and increased Iranian dominance in a key theater.
- In Ukraine, failure has already meant strategic defeat, long war, and deepened NATO cohesion.
- Overall: Russia’s authoritarian-insider engineering (Syria) is dangerous but rational; its democracy-override engineering (Ukraine) was an extreme intelligence and political failure.
2. Comparative Risk Matrix
(Risk rated: Low / Medium / High for Moscow; impact = effect on Russian strategic position if the regime-engineering attempt fails or underperforms.)
| Risk Category | Syria – Pro-Assad Internal Coup | Ukraine – Yanukovych Reinstatement (2022) |
| A. Domestic Backlash in Target Country | Medium–High: Failure or miscalculation could trigger violent intra-regime clashes, defections, or localized uprisings (incl. Alawite/loyalist friction, militia clashes). However, state coercive apparatus remains largely under Assad, giving Moscow some control. | Very High (realized): Any open attempt to reinstall Yanukovych would have intensified mass resistance, underground networks, and partisan warfare. This risk materialized: the concept became politically unusable once Ukrainian society mobilized. |
| B. Foreign Patron Counteraction (Iran, West, etc.) | High: Iran likely to resist a Russian-backed purge of its Syrian networks (Hezbollah logistics, IRGC structures). Possible responses: targeted assassinations, militia mutinies, sabotage of Russian assets. Risk of turning Syria into a Russo–Iranian proxy battleground. | High (realized): The Yanukovych scenario deepened Western resolve. Failure of regime change led to massive Western military, economic, and intelligence support to Kyiv, plus unprecedented sanctions on Russia. No realistic path to “re-legitimizing” Yanukovych. |
| C. Elite Fragmentation & State Collapse | Medium: If Russia overplays its hand, competing clans within the Syrian security elite (pro-Iran vs pro-Russia vs opportunists) could fracture regime cohesion. However, the authoritarian structure and Assad’s personal role mitigate complete collapse. | Very High (for Russia’s goals): Ukraine’s state did not collapse; instead, the attempt at decapitation strengthened national unity. From Moscow’s perspective, the risk of “no collapse” materialized fully, nullifying the political engineering plan. |
| D. Military Overstretch & Operational Blowback | Medium: Managing an internal coup while sustaining deployments in Ukraine and Syria strains Russian command and logistics, but Syrian theater is limited and Russia already entrenched. Blowback = localized clashes, not full front. | Very High (realized): The entire Yanukovych plan depended on rapid conquest. Failure produced long front lines, high casualties, equipment attrition, and opened multi-year war. The political plan’s collapse amplified military overstretch. |
| E. Reputational Damage & Credibility of Russian Security Guarantees | Medium: If Moscow fails to shape Assad’s inner circle, Russia appears weaker versus Iran and less reliable as “regime manager” – but still remains Syria’s main air and base patron. | High (realized): Failure in Ukraine + absurdity of the Yanukovych idea badly damaged Russia’s image as a competent strategist. It exposed deep flaws in Russian political intelligence, making other elites more cautious about trusting Moscow’s promises. |
| F. Alliance/Bloc Reaction (NATO, regional coalitions) | Medium–Low: Western and regional actors already view Russia as entrenched in Syria; an internal reshuffle won’t dramatically change NATO posture, though Israel, Iran, Turkey will adjust their calculus. | Very High (realized): The invasion and implied puppetry (incl. Yanukovych) produced the opposite of Moscow’s intent: NATO expansion (Finland, Sweden), stronger cohesion, forward deployments, and long-term defense spending increases. |
| G. Risk of Escalation to Direct Great-Power Confrontation | Medium: Highest risk is localized confrontation with Israel (air defense incidents) or Iran-backed forces; less likely to trigger direct U.S.–Russia clash unless Russian moves threaten U.S./coalition assets. | Medium–High: Ukraine has already become a central Russia–NATO confrontation arena (albeit via proxy). A Yanukovych-type puppet path would not have reduced this; if anything, it would have strengthened Western resolve to contain Russia. |
| H. Long-Term Strategic Setback if Engineering Fails | High: Failure to re-engineer the regime risks Syria drifting further into Iranian orbit, limiting Russian access to reconstruction rents and weakening its role as primary arbiter in the Levant. | Already High (realized): The collapse of the lightning-regime-change plan locked Russia into a prolonged war, heavy sanctions, economic damage, and long-term loss of influence in Europe. Strategic setback is structural and enduring. |
Structural Differences in Failure Modes
Syria – If the Pro-Assad Coup Fails
- Most likely failure mode:
- Partial reshuffle with incomplete outcomes; Iran retains or even expands influence in security and militia structures.
- Consequences for Moscow:
- Reduced leverage over Assad’s inner circle.
- More dependence on transactional deals with Iran.
- Diminished ability to monetize reconstruction and ports.
- Syria remains a Russian foothold, but as a co-managed space with Tehran, not a Russian-dominated protectorate.
- Risk character:
- Contained, regional, high-stakes but not existential for Russia.
Ukraine – How the Yanukovych Plan Failed
- Actual failure mode:
- Military blitzkrieg collapses; Kyiv holds; Zelensky government survives; Ukrainian population mobilizes; Yanukovych option is politically unusable.
- Consequences for Moscow:
- Protracted, high-intensity war.
- Deep sanctions and economic degradation.
- NATO expansion and long-term hostile perimeter in Europe.
- Near-total destruction of Russia’s influence in Ukraine for a generation or more.
- Risk character:
- Systemic, strategic, and already realized – a failure that reshapes Russia’s overall global position, not just one theater.
4. Intelligence Confidence & Assessment
- On Syria:
- Assessment: Russian internal regime engineering is feasible but fragile, with main uncertainties around how far Moscow dares to push against Iranian entrenched interests and intra-elite resistance.
- Confidence: Medium – based on observable patterns of Russian behavior in Syria, known dependency of Assad on both Russia and Iran, and typical Russian preference for controlled, deniable political operations.
- On Ukraine (Yanukovych):
- Assessment: The reinstatement plan was strategically irrational except under the assumption of a near-total Ukrainian collapse, which Russian intelligence misjudged. Its failure is a completed fact, not a scenario.
- Confidence: High – grounded in open-source evidence of Russian intentions, Ukrainian domestic dynamics, and the course of the 2022 campaign.
5. Bottom-Line Comparative Insight
Syria illustrates Russia’s strength: covert engineering inside dependent authoritarian regimes. Ukraine illustrates Russia’s weakness: catastrophic misreading of national resilience and democratic legitimacy.
- In Syria, failure would reduce Russian leverage and increase Iranian influence in the Levant.
- In Ukraine, failure has already transformed Russia’s global position, leading to long-term confrontation with the West and the collapse of Moscow’s influence over a major neighbor.
