The exposure of the management system behind the Russian disinformation network Doppelgänger indicates that the Kremlin views the European Union’s information space as a full-fledged theater of hybrid operations. Their purpose is not merely to discredit Ukraine or disseminate anti-Western narratives, but also to gradually weaken European states’ ability to make coordinated strategic decisions concerning Russia.
The principal threat to the EU lies less in the scale of Russian disinformation than in its potential transformation into domestic political influence through parties, civil society organizations, media structures, and individual members of political elites. This is precisely what makes combating Russia’s influence infrastructure a matter of European security rather than solely information policy.
Published materials concerning Doppelgänger suggest a possible multilayered coordination system involving representatives of the Russian Presidential Administration, structures linked to the Russian Foreign Ministry, and private political consultants. In particular, the investigation identifies Sergei Kiriyenko, Sofia Zakharova, Alexander Kharichev, and Ilya Gambashidze among the key individuals associated with various aspects of these activities. The information presented requires a distinction between documented facts, journalistic attribution, and analytical conclusions.
At the same time, the effectiveness of Russia’s strategy depends on political and social milieus within European states that can legitimize narratives favorable to Moscow. In this context, particular attention should be paid to Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), certain segments of Italy’s radical right and left, and other European political forces opposing sanctions, military support for Ukraine, or the strengthening of NATO.
However, political alignment with Russian positions does not in itself prove an intelligence relationship with the Kremlin. Establishing that particular individuals or organizations belong to foreign influence networks requires evidence of financing, coordination, covert contacts, or the performance of tasks for a foreign state.
The European Union’s strategic objective should be to deprive Russia of the ability to turn information operations into political decisions within the EU. This means not banning political opposition but identifying, prosecuting, and dismantling illegal channels of Russian funding, covert lobbying, intelligence activity, and organized interference in democratic processes.
Doppelgänger as an Element of Russia’s State Strategy
Investigating Doppelgänger’s structure makes it possible to reassess the nature of Russian information operations. These are not a collection of independent propaganda campaigns but an organized influence system in which strategic objectives are set at the state level and implementation is delegated to specialized organizations.
According to published materials, the Russian Presidential Administration, the Social Design Agency, the autonomous nonprofit organization Dialog, and affiliated structures play important roles in this system. Some units develop narratives, while others handle the technical production of fabricated materials, their dissemination, and effectiveness assessments.
In particular, Sofia Zakharova is credited with coordinating the “European Counter-Campaign,” aimed at discrediting the United States, NATO, Ukraine, and sanctions policy. This division of responsibilities indicates the systematic nature of an operation geared toward specific political outcomes.
Strategically, Doppelgänger performs three interconnected tasks.
First, it fosters distrust of European institutions, national governments, and traditional media. Second, it seeks to intensify social conflicts over migration, economic hardship, energy policy, and assistance to Ukraine. Third, it creates the information conditions for strengthening political forces whose positions objectively advance Russian foreign-policy interests.
Direct control by Moscow over such political forces is not always necessary. It may be enough for the Kremlin that certain parties independently promote decisions favorable to it, while Russian information infrastructure merely amplifies their public visibility.
This presents an especially complex challenge for European democracies: Russian influence can spread simultaneously through covert operations and lawful mechanisms of political competition.
Germany: AfD as a Potential Channel for the Political Legitimation of Russian Narratives
Germany is one of the priority targets of Russian influence operations. Its economic weight, role in NATO and the EU, and importance in financing and arming Ukraine make Berlin’s political decisions strategically significant to Moscow.
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party warrants particular attention when analyzing the political consequences of Russian information campaigns.
Criticism of sanctions against Russia, calls to restore economic relations with Moscow, and opposition to certain forms of military assistance to Ukraine create considerable scope for overlap between AfD positions and Russian strategic interests.
However, three phenomena must be distinguished: ideological affinity, Russian propaganda’s use of party statements, and actual coordination with Russian structures. Only the last, supported by appropriate evidence, can indicate the deliberate execution of Kremlin assignments.
A particular danger is that Russian information operators may exploit domestic German political conflicts to achieve the following outcomes: reduced public support for military assistance to Ukraine; increased pressure on the government to ease sanctions; discrediting NATO as a security guarantor; deepening divisions between eastern and western federal states; and normalizing the idea of restoring a strategic partnership with Russia without any change in its aggressive policies.
At the same time, Russia’s strategy is not confined to supporting a single ideological current. Moscow may simultaneously exploit right-wing populist, far-left, anti-establishment, and conspiracy-oriented circles if their activities weaken European unity.
For Germany, the central task is not to remove AfD administratively from the political process but to establish whether individual party representatives maintain covert organizational, financial, or information ties with Russian influence structures.
Where evidence exists, such ties should be addressed through counterintelligence measures, financial investigations, and judicial proceedings.
Italy: Political Fragmentation as an Opportunity for Russian Influence
Italy is another important focus of Russia’s strategy. Unlike Germany, where attention is concentrated on major political parties, potential influence channels in Italy span a broader range of political, media, and civil society environments.
Historical ties between certain Italian politicians and Russia, the traditional presence of pro-Russian positions in parts of the right and left, and debates over sanctions create favorable conditions for promoting narratives beneficial to Moscow.
The radical-right milieu deserves particular attention, including political initiatives associated with Roberto Vannacci, as well as certain representatives of Lega and extraparliamentary movements.
For Moscow, Italy matters primarily as a country capable of influencing EU-wide decisions on sanctions, defense policy, and relations with Washington.
Even a limited strengthening of political forces advocating compromise with Russia could increase the domestic political cost of supporting Ukraine for the incumbent government.
In this context, Russian information campaigns may exploit energy prices, migration policy, budget spending, and social inequality to create the impression that assistance to Ukraine runs counter to Italian citizens’ interests.
According to materials on Doppelgänger, fabrications circulated in Italy included claims that confiscated Russian villas had allegedly been handed over to Ukrainians. Such stories serve an obvious political purpose: portraying Ukraine as a privileged recipient of resources at the expense of Europe’s population.
Thus, the risk for Italy lies not only in direct Russian interference but also in the gradual transformation of information constructs favorable to Moscow into ordinary arguments in domestic political debate.
The “Fifth Column” as the Main Multiplier of Russian Influence
The term “fifth column” should not be used to characterize all Eurosceptic or opposition political forces, but rather as an analytical designation for networks that knowingly and covertly act in the interests of a foreign state in violation of their own country’s laws and security.
In this sense, the greatest danger comes not from individual propaganda outlets but from mechanisms that convert external information influence into domestic political action.
Model of the Transformation of Russian Information Influence:
Kremlin strategic centers
Setting objectives and priorities
Doppelgänger and associated operators
Fabrications, fake media outlets, artificial amplification
European information and political environments
Adoption and legitimization of narratives, sometimes without coordination with Russia
Influence on public attitudes and political decisions
Sanctions, assistance to Ukraine, defense budgets, EU unity
An analytical model of a possible influence mechanism, not proof of unified centralized control over all participants.
It is at the stage of political legitimization that Russian operations may achieve their greatest strategic impact. Fabricated information initially spread through anonymous resources can make its way into politicians’ statements, parliamentary debates, and mainstream media.
The fabricated story about Ukrainian leaders purchasing yachts illustrates the risk of this transition. As noted in the investigation, this story was subsequently used in American political debates. Nevertheless, repetition of a falsehood does not prove that politicians knew of its Russian origin.
The EU must therefore counter two distinct threats: organized networks of covert foreign influence and the broader vulnerability of the political environment to information manipulation.
Why Existing EU Measures Are Insufficient
The European Union already imposes sanctions on organizers of Russian information operations, restricts the activities of certain propaganda structures, and strengthens oversight of digital platforms.
In particular, the Social Design Agency and Struktura, companies linked to Doppelgänger, were added to EU sanctions lists as early as 2023. Nevertheless, the network continued to adapt by using new domains, technical concealment tools, and methods of content dissemination.
The problem lies in the structural asymmetry between Russia and the European Union.
Moscow can coordinate information operations within a centralized state system, whereas the EU response depends on alignment among member states, national laws, and individual regulators.
Moreover, a substantial share of European measures focuses on technically blocking disinformation rather than identifying every channel through which it is used politically.
A further problem is the lack of transparency surrounding political financing, intermediaries’ activities, and cross-border information campaigns.
The scale of an operation should not automatically be equated with its effectiveness. EU DisinfoLab cautions that Doppelgänger’s actual impact is difficult to quantify and that some Russian reports may exaggerate the campaigns’ success.
The need to strengthen Europe’s response therefore stems primarily from the systemic nature of the threat, not from any proven total control by the Kremlin over European public opinion.
EU Strategy: From Fighting Fake News to Dismantling Influence Infrastructure
To substantially reduce Russian influence, the European Union must move from a predominantly reactive information policy to a comprehensive strategy encompassing counterintelligence, financial, legal, and technological responses.
First priority – identifying actual channels of Russian political influence. European states need to intensify scrutiny of opaque financing of parties, political foundations, civil society organizations, and media projects. Particular attention should be paid to intermediaries who may conceal the origin of funds or the sponsors of information campaigns.
Second priority – strengthening counterintelligence coordination. National security services should systematically exchange information on Russian influence operations, especially where the same infrastructure is used in several countries. The priority should be concrete indications of illegal coordination, not individuals’ political views.
Third priority – dismantling Doppelgänger’s technical and financial infrastructure. Sanctions should be supplemented by measures to block illicit financial flows, action against intermediary companies, efforts to stop the use of spoofed domains, and stronger accountability for organized fraudulent impersonation of legitimate media outlets.
Fourth priority – protecting European electoral processes. The EU should ensure transparency in political advertising, detect coordinated inauthentic activity, and rapidly exchange data on foreign interference. These mechanisms must operate regardless of which parties are targeted by interference.
Fifth priority – targeted accountability for individuals involved in covert operations. If investigations establish that politicians, officials, or media intermediaries participated in illegal activities benefiting Russia, the relevant materials should be referred to law enforcement. Possible measures include criminal prosecution, sanctions, confiscation of unlawfully acquired assets, and restrictions on access to classified information in accordance with the law.
Sixth priority — reducing structural dependence on Russia. Information security cannot be separated from energy, financial, and technological security. Continuing critical dependencies creates additional opportunities for political pressure and corrupt influence.
It is essential that these measures do not become a tool for targeting lawful opposition. Otherwise, the Kremlin would gain another opportunity to discredit European democracies by portraying protection against foreign interference as political repression.
Why Neutralizing Russian Influence Is a Prerequisite for Europe’s Strategic Autonomy
Russia’s information strategy is long-term and extends beyond its war against Ukraine.
Its broader aim is to shape a Europe incapable of acting as a unified geopolitical actor. Moscow benefits when individual EU states block collective decisions, societies lose trust in democratic institutions, and support for Ukraine becomes a source of constant domestic political conflict.
In this sense, information operations and covert influence networks are complementary instruments.
Russia does not necessarily need openly pro-Russian governments to formally come to power in most EU states. To weaken European policy, it is enough to create blocking minorities, raise the political cost of decisions opposed to Russia, and deepen disagreements among allies.
This strategy is especially dangerous where certain EU foreign-policy decisions require unanimity.
Accordingly, countering Russian influence must involve not only investigating covert networks but also institutional changes that reduce the risk of paralysis in common foreign policy.
Further support for a comprehensive approach comes from a study published in September 2026 by the European Centre for Strategies and Transformations. It describes Russian information activity as a multilayered ecosystem combining strategic direction, content production, concealment, dissemination, and artificial message amplification.
Thus, Europe’s response should target not only individual falsehoods but also the organizational mechanisms that enable their production, dissemination, and political exploitation.
The exposure of new details about Doppelgänger demonstrates that Russian influence operations pose a systemic threat to the European Union’s political resilience. Their danger lies not only in the ability to spread disinformation but also in their potential to enter legitimate political debates and influence European states’ strategic decisions.
Germany, Italy, and other EU countries remain important Kremlin targets because of their role in shaping common sanctions, defense, and foreign policies. Moscow’s most effective approach may be not to create fully controlled political organizations but to exploit existing domestic divisions and political forces whose positions align with Russian interests.
The central recommendation is that the EU should move beyond containing individual manifestations of Russian propaganda toward systematically dismantling the Kremlin’s illegal influence infrastructure within Europe. This primarily concerns covert financing, intelligence links, opaque lobbying, corruption mechanisms, and coordinated interference operations.
It is crucial for Europe to deprive Moscow of the ability to use domestic democratic processes as an instrument of external control. At the same time, efforts to combat Russia’s “fifth column” must be based on evidence of illegal activity, the rule of law, and the protection of political pluralism.
In the longer term, the effectiveness of European policy toward Russia will depend not only on the scale of military assistance to Ukraine or sanctions pressure but also on the European Union’s own ability to protect its institutions from covert foreign interference.Europe will not be able to fully neutralize the Russian threat beyond its borders until it limits the Kremlin’s ability to influence its political decisions from within.
