In the next 30-45 days, new portions of leaks from U.S. government agencies should be expected. However, these “leaks” will in fact be about troves of falsified documents that allegedly got into the media space from sources in government agencies. It is likely that such information operations will include papers from government bodies of other NATO Allies.
The large-scale data leak from the Pentagon, as per our estimates, is part of a complex operation launched by Russian intelligence to discredit the United States and its military-technical cooperation with Ukraine. After a significant blow to the Russian intelligence potential in the U.S. and across Europe, the Kremlin stepped up its psyops. Moscow is trying to legalize its narratives through so-called “leaks” as if to back its formal statements. Thus, part of the Russian intelligence operations are aimed at imitating confirmation of Kremlin propaganda narratives and statements voiced by Russia’s political leadership.
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In the past three months, the Russians have been trying to introduce into the media space the claim that the United States was behind the Nord Stream gas pipe explosions. These were mainly false-flag psyops involving foreign journalists and acclaimed outlets. However, their problem was about the lack of documentary evidence, as in the case of Seymour Hersh. The latter’s claims were based on testimonies he refused to disclose.
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It is obvious that the lack of an intelligence asset and the current capabilities of individual intelligence agencies in Russia is forcing the Kremlin to conduct joint efforts of malign influence involving the capabilities of both SVR foreign intelligence and GRU/GUGSh defense intel.
Due to the failure of these operations, it is highly likely that one of the next spins posing as a leak of documents from Federal agencies, will include falsified evidence of U.S. involvement in gas pipeline sabotage.
However, the conduct of interagency operations obviously leads to issues with their proper coordination. As a result, agencies are snubbing multi-faceted plans, instead focusing on activities that require no elaborate plan to design consecutive events.
The efficiency of such operations is affected by the degrading environment in Russian intelligence circles as they keep promoting the theses coming from the country’s political leadership, which in turn disavows the sources and goals of such information. Task performers operate stereotypically, lacking creativity. They also employ their old assets, which affects the efficiency and credibility of events designed.
For example, statements by Sergei Naryshkin, chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service, indicate that the agency leadership is directly involved in the psyops typically supposed to be run by their subordinates. This is likely done to personally impress Vladimir Putin and emphasize their effectiveness against the backdrop of competition among the special agencies. Other Russian information operations target mainly Russia’s domestic audiences and are launched purely for the purpose of propaganda within Russia. They see the result of such actions abroad in identifying points of infiltration of such malign data rather than inspiring discussion of this content involving further political reactions. Thus, further Russian psyops will only contribute to the disclosure of Russia’s assets and confidants through whom this disinformation gets into the respectable media. As a result, we believe that Russian intelligence operations will intensify in the cyber domain, where Russia’s capabilities are much greater than in HUMINT and where they can join forces with the respective services from China, Iran, and North Korea.
