Russia Escalates Rhetoric Against Kyrgyzstan

The onset of hostile rhetoric from the Kremlin towards the Kyrgyz authorities is alarming and evokes parallels with Moscow’s statements regarding Ukraine before the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In late June this year, the Kyrgyz parliament passed final amendments to a bill on the rehabilitation of those persecuted for political and religious beliefs from 1918 to 1953. The law concerns the rehabilitation of those who fought against the Bolsheviks and communists in the 20th century. Russian propaganda, as it did with Ukraine, baselessly claims that the bill was developed in 2019 with the involvement of the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan and the Open Government Partnership (OGP), funded by USAID. The Kremlin attempts to perpetuate the myth that anti-Sovietization and de-Russification are linked not to the numerous crimes of the Soviet regime and Russia, but to Western policies. The criticism of the law adopted by Bishkek is not only a defense of Stalinist-era repressions but also an assertion of Moscow’s right to interfere in the affairs of former Soviet Union countries.

The Kremlin is convinced of its right to suppress dissent within its empire, excluding the pursuit of self-determination by peoples of their own volition. In its view, any aspiration for self-determination within its sphere of influence is a result of external influence on the country.

Although Russian critics themselves speak of Bishkek’s efforts towards decolonization, Russian propaganda denies the sovereign right to pursue decolonization of former Soviet republics while indirectly acknowledging its colonial policy in these countries. As with Ukraine, the Kremlin accuses Bishkek of supporting fascism, which, in Moscow’s understanding, lies in the population’s unwillingness to become part of the empire and a puppet of Russia.

The promotion of the law in parliament, according to the Kremlin, was carried out by parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Shakiev, a protégé of Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan and the second most influential person in the country. We believe that Tashiev is the target of Russian intelligence efforts to alter Kyrgyzstan’s political landscape.

In the Kyrgyz parliament, a significant portion of deputies come from the southern regions of the country. It was their ancestors who resisted the Sovietization of the country. Therefore, the rehabilitation of the anti-Soviet resistance is a matter of heritage for these parliamentarians and the struggle of their ancestors. This is also tied to their desire to reject the legacy of Soviet Kyrgyzstan. However, Russia perceives such a policy as hostile because it hinders its colonial policy in Central Asia.

The Kremlin integrates the ideology of the Soviet past of individual countries into contemporary politics despite Moscow’s complete loss of communist ideology. This can only be explained by the fact that, for the Kremlin, the significance of the USSR lies not in its communist-socialist ideology but in the imperial format of unification, where Moscow was the center of territorial control.

An example of the fascism of the Kyrgyz authorities, according to Moscow, is that at the 10th BRICS Parliamentary Forum, Shakiev spoke in Kyrgyz (the state language of the country he represents). Similar criticism was directed at Ukrainian politicians after the flight of the pro-Russian Yanukovych government from Ukraine.

Shakiev’s promotion of the de-Russification agenda has led to criticism in Russia, which resembles the anti-Ukrainian campaign that Moscow launched after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. We cannot assert that Russia’s future policy towards Kyrgyzstan will include an attempt at a military operation. However, we are convinced that the Kremlin will attempt to use hybrid methods to destabilize the authorities in Kyrgyzstan and bring pro-Russian forces to power.