The war in Yemen is in its sixth year with no end in immediate sight. The humanitarian and political crisis has left millions of Yemenis in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, where food insecurity and epidemic diseases constitute major challenges to the population as a whole. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world, according to UN figures. More than 100,000 people have been killed since 2015 and approximately 4 million have been displaced. It is estimated that up to 24 million people may be in need of some form of humanitarian assistance throughout the country.
The political process led by UNSG Yemen Special Envoy Martin Griffiths provides little ground for optimism. Although there have been ongoing efforts for reconciliation and direct talks between the legitimate government and the Houthis, divergence on the interests and priorities at various levels can be observed, including between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Terrorist organizations find safe havens across Yemen, exploiting the fragile security situation, the constant armed conflicts and the failure of state institutions to meet the basic needs of the people, together with the historical prejudices, resentment and rivalry amongst Yemeni tribes. This, in turn, presents additional security challenges to the already multi-layered, multi-front war conditions with potential repercussions for the wider region.
Tribal leaders continue to lose power over its people, so peacemaking by using tribal leaders becomes harer. Yemeni tribes are egalitarian, not hierarchical, social institutions and as such do not have a command-and-control structure. The authority of tribal leaders largely depends on their ability to provide for their tribes. They can influence and persuade but not force their tribesmen to take a certain course. Men from tribes involved in fighting in frontline have chosen to side with Houthis or the government, many times against the will of their tribal leaders.
Negative consequences of the war on tribal leaders are more prominent in Houthi-controlled areas where the rebel group has systematically worked to dismantle the tribal structure and subjugate the tribes. Houthis seek to weaken the tribes because they are aware that strong tribes can be a threat to their reign in the future, after all it was tribal insurgencies that brought an end to the Imamate in 1962.
To break the tribes, Houthis employed heavy handed tactics to humiliate tribal leaders including abduction, torture, execution, blowing up homes and confiscation of property. Sheikhs who survived that have been largely sidelined as Houthis installed their own network of supervisors. The supervisors (Mushrifeen) normally come from outside the tribe, mostly from Saada and Hajjah, and now have more power over the tribes than tribal leaders.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the Houthis regularly fired cruise missiles and drones into Saudi territory, targeting the energy and water infrastructure and commercial airports. After the intensification of mutual cross-border assaults, the September 2019 attacks against Saudi Aramco oil facilities led Saudi Arabia to a re-evaluation of the conflict and created a sense of urgency in the face of the damage upon such critical infrastructure. Ahead of the initial public offering of Saudi Aramco, the risks stemming from being a constant target of drones emanating from Yemen were considered too high to be left unattended. Under these circumstances, the Houthis surprisingly announced a unilateral halt to strikes on Saudi Arabia, to which the Saudis responded positively and thus helped produce a more conducive environment for negotiations.
The UAE is mainly interested in securing its commercial and trade interests by controlling various Yemeni port cities in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The UAE’s control of Sokotra Island, Aden and Mukalla is a case in point. From 2015 to 2019, the UAE controlled Aden mostly through the local militia group Al Hizam al Amni which is affiliated with the local Southern Transitional Council (STC) and was UAE-financed, equipped and trained. The UAE also established ties with the fourth actor in the conflict – National Resistance Forces of the former president Tariq Saleh, which changed sides during the course of the conflict and is controlling a part of western Yemen. The UAE completely withdrew its forces from Yemen in February 2020, but its influence in the southwestern part of the country remains significant. To continue its influence, UAE relies also on foreign fighters. There are remarkable reports, accusing UAE of transporting hundreds of mercenaries especially from Sudan, Sahel countries and Latin America to fight in Yemen. As regards allegations of committed war crimes in Yemen, using mercenaries will also definitely raise the problem of identifying the responsible actors and grant impunity for the actual perpetrators.
On 5 November 2019, the Riyadh Agreement was brokered by Saudi Arabia, between UAE-backed separatist STC and the internationally recognised legitimate government of Yemen led by President Abdi Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The agreement was designed to consolidate the alliance against the Houthis/Ansar Allah. However, the agreement de facto collapsed in April 2020, when the UAE-backed separatist STC announced itself an ultimate authority in Aden and other southern territories. Yemen depends on strategy of regional actors. While Saudi Arabia sees Yemen as a national security issue, Iran is attempting to exert its influence to counterweigh Saudi Arabia. The UAE pursues its own ambitious agenda to locate itself strategically on the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al Mendeb, so as to project power on the east coast of Africa. The fragmentation and de facto collapse of the Saudi-Emirati led international coalition is likely to further entrench the positions of the Iranian-backed Houthis, UAE-backed separatist STC and National Resistance and the Saudi-backed Hadi government. The Houthi rebels did not reciprocate the ceasefire announced by Saudi Arabia due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Diverging interests and the maximalist and confrontational approach of regional actors continue to dominate the war in Yemen. Consequently, a lasting political settlement will depend heavily upon the willingness of these regional actors to make concessions on their long-term strategic goals and to apply pressure on all the Yemeni parties for a negotiated settlement in good will.
