The New York Times from a few days ago reconstructs what happened in Syria on April 15th and reported in twitter images. An Israeli drone attacks a Jeep belonging to Hezbollah members on the Syrian border with Lebanon. Among other things, the Jeep had recently crossed the border. Three men rush out of the car to escape, but then return to get a forgotten bag, and a moment after they disappear from the drone’s vision, the car explodes. NYT reports that “Israel has adopted a policy of warning Hezbollah operatives in Syria before bombing their convoys to avoid killing them and risking a devastating war in Lebanon”. What has been said is extremely interesting if we connect it to data that NYT reports: “Israeli airstrikes in Syria in recent years have killed hundreds of Iranians, Syrians and Iranian-backed militiamen from Iraq and elsewhere. But these strikes have killed as few as 16 Hezbollah operatives since 2013 “.
The drone strategy reminds us of two important aspects of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. On the one hand, that of the EBO (effect based operation) as a small-scale deterrent strategy and on the other, that of the PSYOP (psychological operations). Israel can identify agents in Lebanon who may be subsequently hit in Syria, and where according to agreements made with Russia, Israel can strike at any time.
For the first time, Israel made psychological operations, PSYOP, an inseparable part of its military operations in the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. An IDF (Israeli defense forces) body dedicated to PSYOPs, MALAT, was established in 2005, 6 years after the closure of the previous one. PSYOP and EBO work perfectly together. Both try to influence the minds of the public. The PSYOP does this through the dissemination of information (social media are currently an excellent tool) and the EBO through a series of violent targeted attacks (the drones are perfect because they allow less human losses and zero military involvement on the ground). Hezbollah has long recognized the importance of PSYOP, and for its for the way it transforms everything into hit and answer.
A functional dialectic that some examples can make even more understandable. The operation Northern Shield in 2018 by the IDF in the destruction of the tunnels built by Hezbollah became one of the first escalations in recent years in the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah released footage of IDF troops operating in the Israeli enclave along the Lebanese border showing the location of the Israeli forces, their activities, the weapons and tools they carried, while the IDF released a recording of the sounds of the excavations in the tunnels. Hezbollah countered by distributing a detailed map of the exact places where IDF forces operate.
The most serious drone attack occurred in August last year: the first hit in the southern suburb of Dahiyeh in Beirut, and the second hit a Hezbollah’s media center. It was told in the media that the two drones hit crates believed to contain materials needed for the production of long range missiles.
Hezbollah’s response did not delay. A small Israeli army drone had crashed in southern Lebanon apparently hit by a civilian with a shotgun. Late August 2019 Hezbollah launched several anti-tank guided missiles into an Israeli military position along the Lebanese border, hitting an armored jeep. The Israeli army responded with artillery bombings and airstrikes against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. There was no victim on either side. Probably by both Israel and Hezbollah wanted. Tension? Yes, War? No. On October 31st Hezbollah again fired an anti-aircraft missile at an Israeli drone in Nabatiyeh in southern Lebanon, but IDF denied it.
The current escalation, however, began on March 26th of this year when the Israeli military shot down a Hezbollah drone that had entered Israeli airspace. Hezbollah continued (as if nothing had happened) all warlike activities both in Lebanon and Syria.
On April 10th IDF released footage of a meeting in the Golan Heights between a Syrian supreme commander and Hezbollah official Hajj Hashem, who is responsible for the troops in the Golan Heights. Warning sign that Hezbollah has not picked up again. Then came the April 15th attack. The footage released clearly demonstrated Israel’s message: IDF “sees everything going on in Syria and Lebanon and will last as long as it’s comfortable for us”. Two days after the attack, the IDF reported three breaches of the security barrier in the area of the northernmost city of Metullah, Israel. IDF confirmed the damage to the fence, but denied that there was a violation of Israeli territory. Hezbollah’s response was: “we can infiltrate the country at any time of our choice”.
The drone war follows, but the underlying message is clear. The Israeli army for its part mainly highlights the threat of Hezbollah’s long rage missiles. Starting in 2016, Hezbollah and Iran are looking to produce these missiles within Lebanon, both by converting the current supply of simple rockets into precisely guided ammunition, and by setting up factories to produce new missiles. Hezbollah is told to be holding thousands of missiles that can reach into the heart of Israel.
An open war between the two sides is unlikely only because it is inconvenient for both at the moment. The message is clear: Israel will never allow a military-strong Iran-Hezbollah front nor a Hezbollah with long range missile capabilities. The parties maintain the pressure, they send messages to each other trying not to cause victims. At least for now, the mutual deterrence works.
